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ABSTRACT 
 
With an annual growth of almost 20% since the year 2000, Indian merchandise 
exports exceeded 300 billion U.S. dollars in 2012. The country is becoming a major 
supplier to the world. However, companies sourcing products and operating in India are 
experiencing a variety of supply chain disruptions that impede their operations and 
finances. The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the frequency, impact and 
severity of supply chain risks experienced by companies in India, as well as assess the 
usefulness of mitigation methods and enquire about future expected disruptions. It is 
hoped that the results will prepare managers to better prioritize their supply chain risk 
management efforts and investments. The scope of this study is upstream (sourcing and 
operations) disruptions that affected Indian supply chains over the past three years, 
including the areas of logistics and transportation. The methodology is a quantitative, 
empirical study, using a survey instrument in the form of a questionnaire distributed 
electronically to thousands of members of four prominent trade associations in India. 
The platform for the questionnaire is a modification of a traditional risk analysis 
progression: mapping, identifying, assessing, mitigating and improving, also dubbed 
“MIAMI”.  
The main findings are that there are major and significant differences in severity 
(frequency and impact) between the thirteen risk categories presented. There are also 
significant group differences among the respondents. Traditional mitigation methods 
differ with respect to usefulness, and expected risks are somewhat different than past 
ii 
 
risks. Conclusions reached are that chronic risks such as inadequate transportation, 
logistics and utilities infrastructure, supplier and labor problems, and bureaucracy/red 
tape are more severe than highly publicized and visible risks such as natural disasters, 
terrorism and crime. Traditional mitigation methods are useful for many of the 
disruptions, but ineffective for non-physical risks. There is a certain optimism with 
respect to future infrastructure related disruptions.  
Limitations of the study include a relatively low response rate, the classic 
difficulty in risk analysis of comparing and scaling the impact of disruptions, and that it is 
not fine grained enough to fully describe any specific industry sectors. This study 
contributes to the field of supply chain risk management by adding crucial empirical 
information from a heretofore unexplored market.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Companies sourcing products and services in far-away places are best served by 
having in place plans and programs for handling the many risks involved. Bad things will 
inevitably happen to long and complex supply chains that are under pressure to deliver 
goods expediently and cheaply.  Supply chain risk management is a growing and 
increasingly formalized practice for treating the various supply chain risks. Its focus is on 
preventing costly disturbances from happening or minimizing the impact of the 
disturbances1 that inevitably happen in global supply chains. This dissertation builds on 
a solid foundation of academic and practitioner research and literature and uses a 
certain methodology for assessing supply chain risks in the emerging economy of India. 
This empirical study applies the framework of mapping, identification, assessing, 
mitigating and improving (“MIAMI”) when enquiring supply chain executives about risks 
they have experienced.    
Sodhi et al. concluded a 2012 paper in Production and Operations Management 
with their finding that there are three gaps pertinent to future research in supply chain 
risk management: 1) No clear consensus on the definition of SCRM (Supply Chain Risk 
Management); 2) Lack of commensurate research on response to supply chain risk 
incidents; and 3) a shortage of empirical research in the area of SCRM (Manmohan S. 
                                                          
1 According to Webster’s Dictionary, both disturb and disrupt mean to “throw into disorder”. This 
dissertation uses the term disruption most of the time, but occasionally the synonym disturbance is 
applied (Merriam-Webster, 1976). Disruption can be further defined as “an event that results in a 
displacement or discontinuity; the act of causing disorder” (J. C. Coyle, Novack, Gibson, & Bardi, 2011) 
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Sodhi, Son, & Tang, 2012). This dissertation attempts to add to the body of knowledge 
by modifying a methodological framework and contributing up-to-date empirical 
information to aid the profession in controlling and reducing supply chain risks. 
Supply chain risk management has become a high priority issues for companies 
operating in global markets. The ability to meet customer demand and preserve the 
financial bottom line hinge on effective preparation and mitigation efforts. Sourcing and 
operating in less developed economies present supply chain managers with a new set of 
potential risks and uncertainties.  
India’s economy is growing rapidly. Its exports sector has been experiencing an 
annual growth of almost 20% for the past few years, as more companies perform 
sourcing and production there. It is expected that India will become a more realistic and 
attractive alternative for many categories of goods and services. India is still 
inexpensive, with an abundance of labor and a very promising demographic profile. 
However, the country represents a cocktail of serious supply chain risks for firms 
attempting to source or produce there. This dissertation will survey Indian supply chain 
managers on what specific risks they encounter, what impact these risks had on their 
companies, what mitigation steps may have worked, and what specific risks they expect 
to experience in the future. We also check for group differences. For example, do 
foreign owned firms have different risk experiences than Indian firms?   
The usefulness of this research cannot be overestimated. So far, articles, news 
reports and commentaries about doing business in India have been full of mostly 
anecdotal stories of the risks and disturbances experienced there. Literature on Indian 
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supply chains describe poor infrastructure, bureaucratic delays, red tape and the 
prevalence of corruption. A comprehensive review of the literature reveals no academic 
studies that enquire on-the-ground practitioners about the identification, assessment 
and mitigation of supply chain risks in India. The results of this research will be valuable 
for companies contemplating or currently sourcing and producing there. It is hoped that 
the results will reveal the issues of real concern to supply chain managers in India, and 
can help practitioners focus in on risk factors that deserve immediate attention.  
It appears that India is not necessarily riskier than other countries in Asia when it 
comes to supply chain exposures. Overall risk consists of a mosaic of miscellaneous 
operational and environmental disruptions. India has a different set of risks than China, 
for example, or even Pakistan and Bangladesh next door. Each specific supply chain is 
also different, meaning that the interplay between this and the country’s environmental 
factors determine the relevant risk topography and circumstances for a company. The 
risk exposure, experience and impact will depend on a given company’s industry and 
product categories.  
Although supply chains span from raw materials to the ultimate consumers, this 
dissertation limits its focus to the upstream portion, specifically the sourcing and 
production in India. However, any such delineation has fuzzy borders. Many of the 
downstream risks are the same as the upstream risks. This dissertation is concerned 
with the supply chain risks encountered within India. Whether these are within the 
upstream or downstream portion of the supply chain is of less concern.  
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The dissertation is organized as follows: A comprehensive literature review 
outlines the attractiveness of sourcing in India, defines global supply chains and supply 
chain risk, and discusses what modern supply chain risk management encompasses. 
Thereafter, the attention will be on a thorough review and discussion of the five MIAMI 
steps: mapping the supply chain, identifying relevant risks, assessing the probability and 
impact of these risks, mitigating the relevant risks through prevention and minimization 
strategies, and improving the risk management process through a system of control, 
monitoring and learning. The dissertation culminates with the empirical study. The 
research methodology and survey process are explained in Chapter 4, and the results 
are revealed and discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 7 is a concluding chapter that 
recaps the overall findings, makes some comments on possible causalities, suggests that 
some Indian risks are not remedied with traditional mitigation methods, and 
recommends general paths for further and more pin-pointed research into Indian supply 
chain risks.  
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CHAPTER 2: SOME BACKGROUND ON INDIA 
 
a. The Rise of India 
India is no longer an exotic destination for sourcing and procurement.  
Globalization has moved India closer in many ways, and it is much easier now for foreign 
companies to do business there.  Foreign and Indian owned firms are producing more 
goods and services within India than at any time in history. The country’s exports and 
domestic consumption are at record highs.  India’s gross domestic product (GDP) per 
capita doubled over the ten years from 2002 to 2012. According to the World Bank2, the 
annual GDP growth averaged 7.1% over the 12-year period from 2000 to 2011, with a 
high of 9.8% in 2007 and lows of 3.9% in 2002 and 2008. After a slowdown in 2012-13, 
The Economist Magazine projects the 2014 growth will be 7.3% (Economist, 2013b).  In 
terms of GDP, India is now the world’s tenth largest economy, although some sources 
already put it third in PPP3-adjusted terms, after the U.S. and China (McKinsey, 2013). 
The country’s exports have experienced an even more impressive growth. From 
2000 to 2011 the merchandise exports grew from US$ 42 billion to US$ 301 billion4, 
equal to an average compound growth rate of 19.6%.  In fact, since 2007 this growth 
rate has accelerated to an average of 19.8%. In comparison, China’s average exports 
growth rate from 2000 to 2011 was a bit higher at 20.3%, but this slowed to an average 
of 11.7% between 2007 and 2011.  In addition to merchandise exports – which include 
                                                          
2 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG  
3 “Purchasing Power Parity” adjusts currency exchange rates to reflect real purchasing power 
4 Hereafter, all dollar amounts will be in U.S. dollars.  
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tangible goods and commodities – India has a thriving services exports sector, adding 
another 50% to total exports. The total annual exports of $450 billion are a huge 
contributor to the country’s $ 2 trillion economy. In 2011, India was the world’s 19th 
largest merchandise exporter and the 6th largest services exporter5. Table 1 compares 
the growth in India’s merchandise vs. services exports since the year 2000. Despite a 
leveling out in 2012, with these types of longer term growth rates, exports will soon 
exceed one quarter of India’s official economic output, and the country will move up 
into the upper echelons of global export powerhouses.  
Table 1: INDIA’S MERCHANDISE VS. SERVICES EXPORTS, 2000 – 2011: 
Category:6 Year 2000: Year 2011: Compound average 
growth:: 
Merchandise exports $ 42 billion $ 301 billion 19.6% 
 
Services exports $ 17 billion $ 148 billion 21.7% 
 
Total 
 
$ 59 billion $ 449 billion  
 
 
Sourcing from India is likely to keep growing at a rapid rate over the next 
decades. Consumers all over the world are likely to see more “Made in India” tags, and 
the country can expect a boom in exports of raw materials, components, finished 
products and services.  Long and complex supply chains, combined with corporate 
performance and efficiency pressures, make for some interesting risk scenarios in a 
country as diverse and arguably chaotic as India. Sahay et al. suggest that managing the 
                                                          
5 http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres12_e/pr658_e.htm  
6 Merchandise exports: Tangible goods exported. Services exports: Business, technical or 
professional services Incl. software); travel; passenger fares; transportation; royalties and license fees 
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supply chain in such a vast country as India is most challenging for companies because 
of business practices, government regulations, technological capability and 
transportation infrastructure, among other factors (Sahay, Gupta, & Mohan, 2006).  
Global companies have many choices from where to source their products. 
Figure 2 illustrates a particular chosen path, where companies decide to outsource7 
production to an offshore location, in this case India. In India, companies either deal 
with arms-length suppliers or set up their own subsidiaries, which again tend to source 
locally from 2nd tier suppliers and so on.  
 
Figure 1: THE UPSTREAM FOCUS OF THIS DISSERTATION 
 
 
  
                                                          
7 A useful definition of sourcing: “The act through which work is contracted or delegated to an 
external or internal entity that could be physically located anywhere”. Outsourcing is defined as a subset 
of this, i.e. “contracting with a third party provider” (Oshri, Kotlarsky, & Willcocks, 2011), p.7.  
We prefer the term “global sourcing” over similar terms such as “outsourcing” and “offshoring”. 
Outsourcing is a practice that does not necessarily involve foreign trade; a company that hires a janitorial 
service to clean its offices is outsourcing an activity that previously may have been done in-house. 
Offshoring typically refers to companies moving its production facilities abroad and setting up factories 
there.  Another acceptable synonym for global sourcing is the more maritime sounding “offshore 
sourcing”, although it raises the question of whether Canada and Mexico are really offshore in relation to 
the United States. See table 3 for examples of definitions and nuances.  
Where to 
produce?
In-house Outsource
Domestically
Near-
shoring
Offshoring
China
Southeast 
Asia
India
Supplier
2nd tier 
suppliers
Company 
subsidiary
Suppliers
Eastern 
Europe
Other
8 
 
b. Why Source Overseas? 
 
Companies source abroad because it makes sense economically. Globalization in 
its many manifestations has broken down crucial barriers that previously prevented a 
smooth worldwide trade in goods and services: regulatory barriers, tariff barriers, 
communications barriers, transportation barriers, immigration barriers, cultural barriers, 
and so on.  With the gradual breakdown of factors that prevented global commerce, we 
have seen global exports as a percentage of global output (nominal GDP) rise from 12% 
in 1980 to more than 25% in 2011 (various sources, incl. World Bank and World Trade 
Organization)8. Global trade has doubled in relative importance the past thirty years. 
One can argue that this is due to a self-reinforcing process: the more that rich nations 
import from the developing nations, the more these developing nations are able to 
build their own economies and import back from the rich nations.  
Typical drivers for global sourcing can include: 
 Price and competitive pressures (Olson, 2012) 
 Globalization and trade liberalization (breakdown of trade barriers) 
 Easier and cheaper communications (digitalization, data transfers, travel, 
transportation networks, incl. containerized shipping technology)  
 Qualified and cheap labor abroad   
 Rise of the global consumer and purchasing power in Asia 
 
While stating that the ultimate objective of a company’s global sourcing strategy 
is to exploit both its own and its suppliers’ competitive advantages and the comparative 
locational advantages of various countries in the global competition, Kotabe and Murray 
                                                          
8 The nominal world GDP is reported to have been $70.1 trillion in 2011 and $18.8 trillion in 
1980.  World exports (obviously identical to world imports) were $17.8 trillion in 2011 and $2.3 trillion in 
1980.  
9 
 
also make an interesting observation that in the U.S., managements’ strategic emphasis 
has drifted away from manufacturing to marketing and finance over the years (Kotabe & 
Murray, 2004).  In other words, American firms did not see a value or core competency 
in manufacturing, and were more likely to move this activity overseas.  
The Economist Magazine, in a January 2013 Special Report on outsourcing and 
offshoring, outlined the broad range of variables, including the complex web of 
strategies, priorities and risks now faced by managers of multinational companies. 
(The_Economist, 2013). Globalization is serving as the “great equalizer”, making the cost 
differences between the West and the developing world less stark and less of an 
economic argument for offshoring. Other arguments – often conflicting – are often 
heard. For example, more automated production makes it less beneficial to rely on low 
cost labor, while growing consumer markets in emerging economies renders it more 
economical to locate production plants there. A chart in The Economist’s special report 
forecasted the “manufacturing outsourcing cost index”9 of China to be practically equal 
to the U.S. in 2015, while for India the forecast for 2015 was 83% of the U.S. cost. The 
surprising prediction for China is confirmed by the official Chinese newspaper China 
Daily, which reported that Chinese wages saw double digit growth of 14.3% between 
2010 and 201110. China’s rapid wage increases, combined with a U.S. stagnation in 
                                                          
9 Although the magazine did not specify how it arrived at this index, it mentioned that high 
transportation costs and delays partially offset the lower labor costs. The index can be considered a 
measure for total landed cost. 
10 www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-05/29/content_15416969.htm  
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manufacturing wages since the 1990’s, means the wage gap has narrowed between 
China and the U.S. 
Eight arguments for global sourcing 
 
Deresky suggests five main reasons why companies find it beneficial to do global 
sourcing (Deresky, 2008). How these relate to India is discussed in more detail below: 
 
 
1. Save money: 
 
Indian factory workers are often paid less than $1,000 per year, and even 
engineers with doctoral degrees may receive annual salaries of no more than $10,000.  
Nevertheless, supply chain professionals are concerned with the Total Landed Costs, or 
the Total Cost of Outsourcing – TCO - (Mangan, Lalwani, & Butcher, 2008), which 
includes:  
 The basic cost of the product of service (of which the labor cost is a component) 
 The cost incurred to manage the outsourcing arrangement (incl. setting up, 
monitoring from beginning to end of the relationship, coordination, risk 
management and contingency planning) 
 Added transportation and inventory costs 
1. Save money (experience cost efficiencies; lower cost of production) 
2. Access to foreign markets and customers 
3. Avoid trade barriers 
4. Diversify production 
5. Leverage global talent (access to human resources) 
 
Three other reasons found in the international business literature include: 
 
6. Reduce fixed costs at home and be more flexible (Cullen & Parboteeah, 2008) 
7. Improved agility by shedding unnecessary overhead (S. T. Cavusgil, G. Knight, 
& J. S. Riesenberger, 2008b)  
8. Gain access to suppliers’ capabilities (Kotabe & Murray, 2004) 
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There are now reports that companies sourcing in China are finding that the 
overall cost savings are less than they hoped for and what they experienced just a few 
years ago (Rein, 2012; Shister, 2011). Several authors have observed a possible loss of 
Chinese competitiveness. Some of it is due to rising costs and a strengthening Renminbi. 
Steeply rising wages and higher rents take a toll on factories that rely on cheap inputs 
(Bradsher, 2012; Rein, 2012)11. Because of rough labor conditions and workers 
becoming more assertive about their rights, there also appears to be more frequent 
factory riots, strikes and worker unrest in China (Barboza & Bradsher, 2012; Wan, 2012). 
These result in plant closings; for example Foxconn Technology’s production of iPhones 
was interrupted in the fall of 2012 (Foxconn supplies Apple, Dell, HP and Microsoft). 
2. Gain access to foreign markets and customers 
 
Setting up production arrangements or facilities in foreign countries can serve at 
least three purposes: 1) production for sale and consumption in the host country; 2) 
sourcing and production for exports back to the home country; and 3) production for 
sale and consumption to countries with which the host country has free trade 
agreements.  An example of the third case would be to manufacture items in India that 
are marketed to other Asian countries. Such sales would often benefit from regional 
free trade agreements.    
                                                          
11 In his 2012 book, Rein lists several reasons why China is in the process of losing its 
competitiveness, for example, 1) more expensive production through rising labor costs, high labor 
turnover, expensive land and buildings, rising currency, inflation, and higher commodities prices; and 2) 
business risks such as inconsistent product safety and quality, corruption, weak judicial system, corner 
cutting, shoddy real estate construction, and poor educational system. He also claims that China is not 
putting more emphasis on domestic consumption and production for its home markets (Rein, 2012) 
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3. Avoid Trade Barriers 
 
India’s high import tariffs, trade restrictions and discrimination against foreign 
products12 (India is not a signatory to the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on 
Government Procurement (Makar, 2008)) often make it more attractive to manufacture 
within India the products to be sold there.   
4. Diversify Production 
From a supply continuity standpoint it makes perfect sense to diversify the 
production of high value products over two or more facilities. Diversification (having 
redundancies) is one of the classic mitigation methods for reducing overall supply chain 
vulnerability.   
5. Leverage Global Talent 
Multinationals such as IBM and Microsoft are benefiting from a good supply of 
Indian professionals with engineering, science and programming backgrounds. 
Internally, large corporations can also free up expensive home country labor by shifting 
certain tasks to cheaper labor at other locations of their sprawling, global networks.   
6. Reduce fixed costs at home and be more flexible 
 
As Kotabe and Murray have pointed out, global outsourcing usually reduces the 
capital investment in in-house manufacturing facilities, thus lowering the company’s 
                                                          
12 The U.S. Dept. of Commerce writes: “Current procurement practices can result in 
discrimination against foreign suppliers when goods or services of comparable quality and price are 
available locally” (Commercial_Service, 2012).  
13 
 
fixed assets, its breakeven point, and boosting its ROA (return on assets) and ROE 
(return on equity) given the same operating margins (Kotabe & Murray, 2004). Company 
executives have a strong incentive to seek better returns, and will tend to increase 
outsourcing to accomplish this. Switching from high fixed capital costs to a variable cost 
environment will be beneficial in a market that is unpredictable, volatile and in need of 
production and marketing flexibilities.  
7. Improve agility by shedding unnecessary overhead 
The flexibility created by moving to a variable cost scenario improves agility and 
the capability to respond quickly to changes in markets, technologies and the 
environment (Bowser & Balasubramaniam, 2009; Christensen, 2003). Agility implies 
greater organizational flexibility and faster responsiveness to evolving customer needs 
(Cavusgil et al., 2008b).   
8. Gain access to suppliers’ capabilities 
In complex supply chains, each link will have specific core competencies that add 
value to the “value chain”13. For many firms it is cheaper and makes more sense to find 
suppliers that can contribute value to the production process, rather than building up or 
continuing in-house activities. Indian suppliers have competitive strengths that add 
value to the total product, including but not limited to inexpensive and highly qualified 
                                                          
13 Value chain: The sequence of value-adding activities performed by the participants in the 
supply chain in the process of developing, producing, marketing and servicing a product (Cavusgil et al., 
2008b) 
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labor, engineering and software coding talent, highly experienced textile workers and 
tailors, and valuable raw materials, especially mined and agricultural products. 
Further arguments for sourcing in India 
 
If “demographics is destiny”, India will have an ample supply of labor for decades 
to come, creating an obvious and partially untapped potential. While cost reduction is 
the primary driver to India (Deresky, 2008), much has been written lately about other 
benefits of doing business or investing there. Examples include ongoing economic 
reforms, trade liberalization, deregulation, infrastructure investments, and the 
membership in the World Trade Organization. Many multinationals appreciate the 
advanced English skills, a “westernized” managerial class, and the convenience of 
opposite time zones (S. T. Cavusgil, G. Knight, & J. R. Riesenberger, 2008a; CIA, 2012; 
Cullen & Parboteeah, 2008; Economist, 2013a; Engardio, 2007; Makar, 2008).  
Western firms are increasing their investments in India. The web version of the 
newspaper The Hindu recently reported that General Electric is investing $ 200 million in 
Pune, which will be its first manufacturing facility in the country14. Through its joint 
venture with the Tata Global Beverages, Starbucks in 2013 opened its first stores in 
Mumbai and New Delhi.  The Wall Street Journal reported that the initial plans were to 
invest $80 million and open 80 stores in the country. The same article also wrote that 
Dunkin’ Brands were planning to open 30 Dunkin’ Donuts outlets together with its 
                                                          
14 September 24, 2012: http://www.thehindu.com/business/global-firms-will-increase-
investments-in-india-ge/article3932064.ece  
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Indian partner by 2014.15 The Swedish giant retailer IKEA recently obtained approval by 
the Finance Ministry and plans to invest $1.75 billion in as many as 25 new stores in the 
country.16  Following the recent relaxation of regulations on foreign (single brand) 
retailers in India, this would be the largest FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) by a foreign 
retailer ever recorded.17  These examples illustrate that foreign multinationals have an 
ongoing interest in getting established in India, either with manufacturing plants or with 
distribution and retail facilities to sell directly to the growing class of Indian consumers.   
India’s continued economic growth, regulatory streamlining and improving 
infrastructure will increasingly make the country a more viable and less risky destination 
for sourcing and manufacturing.  Foreign investors have to navigate both the federal 
and statewide mazes of rules, regulations, incentives and rivalries. Despite the potential 
long term benefits of doing business in India, sourcing from there can be a risky 
proposition. Mark Crone writes that the traditional three drivers of sourcing strategy – 
cost, quality and service – now has a new important sibling: risk (Crone, 2006). Various 
risks are infiltrating supply chains, and sourcing and operating in India can present 
management with a multitude of challenges. It seems appropriate for us to research the 
particularities of the supply chain challenges experienced in India.  
  
                                                          
15 October 26, 2012: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203922804578080072469407526.html  
16 http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323585604579008593008552768   
17 November 19, 2012: http://ibnlive.in.com/news/finance-ministry-to-decide-on-ikeas-fdi-
proposal-on-tuesday/306324-7.html  
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW AND CURRENT KNOWLEDGE 
 
Because this dissertation focuses on supply chain management risks in India, it is 
useful to provide appropriate definitions before we move on.   
a. Supply Chain Management 
A supply chain is a conceptual term for a string or network of companies from 
suppliers to end-users, with the intention of integrating supply and demand via 
coordinated company efforts (Frankel, Bolumole, Eltantawy, Paulraj, & Gundlach, 2008).  
There are numerous, similar definitions of supply chain offered by many authors18 (for 
some examples, see Table 2). For the purposes of this research, the definition offered by 
the Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals will be used:  
“Supply chain management encompasses the planning and management of all 
activities involved in sourcing and procurement, conversion, and all logistics 
management activities. Importantly, it also includes coordination and collaboration with 
channel partners, which can be suppliers, intermediaries, third party service providers, 
and customers. In essence, supply chain management integrates supply and demand 
management within and across companies”19.  
 
 
                                                          
18 (Canbolat, Gupta, Matera, & Chelst, 2008; Cavinato, 2004; Chapman, Christopher, Jüttner, 
Peck, & Wilding, 2002; Enyinda, Ogbuehi, & Briggs, 2008; Frankel et al., 2008; Hallikas, Puumalainen, 
Vesterinen, & Virolainen, 2005; Mangan et al., 2008; Ramsey & Moffett, 2011; Ritchie & Brindley, 2007; 
Sheffi, 2005; P. J. Singh, Smith, & Sohal, 2005; Takahashi, 2012; Thun & Hoenig, 2011).  
 
19 CSCMP’s website: http://cscmp.org/aboutcscmp/definitions.asp  
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Table 2: DEFINITIONS OF SUPPLY CHAIN, IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER 
Definition Author 
A network of interrelated entities that combine to 
enable the satisfaction of customer demand. 
(Chapman et al., 2002) p. 60 
The network of organizations that are involved, through 
upstream and downstream linkages, in the different 
processes and activities that produce value in the form 
of products and services in the hands of the ultimate 
consumer.  
(Christopher & Peck, 2004) p. 2 
The fundamental purpose of a supply chain is to match 
supply with demand.  
(Cohen & Kunreuther, 2007) 
Global supply chain refers to the firm’s integrated 
network of sourcing, production, and distribution, 
organized on a worldwide scale and located in countries 
where competitive advantage can be maximized. It 
involves both upstream (supplier) and downstream 
(customer) flows.   
(Cavusgil et al., 2008b) p. 497 
A linked set of resources and processes that begins with 
the sourcing of raw materials and extends through the 
delivery of products and services to the end user across 
the modes of transport.  
(ISO, 2011)  
(International Organization for 
Standardization) 
Complex networks of different players, established with 
core objectives to minimize the costs, maximize the 
value and explore new markets through effectively 
managed relationships between members.  
(Singhal, Agarwal, & Mittal, 2011) 
p. 21 
A network of organizations possibly including suppliers, 
manufacturers, logistics providers, 
wholesalers/distributors, and retailers that aims to 
produce and deliver products or services for the end 
customer.  
(Manmohan S. Sodhi et al., 2012) 
p. 6 
 
Two of the definitions in Table 2 mention sourcing as an element of the supply 
chain. Sourcing is recognized as part of a set of activities named Supply Management. 
This term is broader than what was earlier referred to as Purchasing.  The Institute of 
Supply Management (ISM) offers this definition: “The identification, acquisition, access, 
positioning, management of resources and related capabilities the organization needs or 
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potentially needs in the attainment of its strategic objectives”20.  Interestingly, 
“sourcing” is absent from this definition, as are the popular terms “procurement” and 
“purchasing”. Burt et al. describe supply management as a five-step process consisting 
of identification of the need, identification of suppliers, establishing a price, establishing 
a purchase agreement, and finally managing the relationship with the chosen supplier 
(Burt, Petcavage, & Pinkerton, 2010). Frankel et al. offer some historical perspective and 
a good compilation of definitions while describing the recent evolution from purchasing 
to supply management (Frankel et al., 2008). ISM lists this definition of “sourcing” in 
their online glossary: “(1) The process of identifying sources that could provide needed 
products or services for the acquiring organization; (2) The term used to reflect the entire 
purchasing process or cycle”21. The process of identifying sources is not particularly risky 
or perilous.  It is when the sourcing efforts result in ongoing supplier relationships that 
the buying organization is exposed to incremental hazards and risks. Table 3 lists four 
valid definitions of outsourcing.   
You will notice that the third of the four definitions in Table 3 specifically 
includes production activities.  This is an appropriate segue into the second and closely 
related functional focus of this dissertation, namely manufacturing and production 
activities in India.  As mentioned, we are not particularly interested in the demand side 
of the supply chain, but both the sourcing and production sides are of concern.  The 
                                                          
20 https://www.ism.ws/Glossary/GlossaryTermDetail.cfm?TermID=2575  
21 http://www.ism.ws/Glossary/GlossaryTermDetail.cfm?TermID=2462  
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main reason the demand side is not being targeted here is that those risks are deemed 
independent from the sourcing and manufacturing in India. Problems with constructing 
Table 3: DEFINITIONS OF OUTSOURCING 
Definition Author 
A deliberate decision to have outsiders or strategic allies 
perform certain activities in the value chain. 
(Cullen & Parboteeah, 2008) p. 
225 
The use of professional, skilled, service-sector workers 
located in countries other than that in which the firm is 
domiciled. 
(Deresky, 2008) p. 468 
The procurement of selected value-adding activities, 
including production of intermediate goods or finished 
products, from independent suppliers.  Global sourcing [is] 
the procurement of products or services from 
independent suppliers or company-owned subsidiaries 
located abroad for consumption in the home country or a 
third country. Offshoring refers to the relocation of a 
business process or entire manufacturing facility to a 
foreign country.  
(Cavusgil et al., 2008b), 2008, 
pages 266, 484 and 489 
Broadly, an activity may be organized in one of four 
alternative ways: domestic outsourcing, offshore 
outsourcing, domestic in-house, or offshore in-house.  
(Gray, Roth, & Leiblein, 2011) 
 
reliable sales forecasts or predicting consumer demand patterns have little to do with 
where the product is made. So we will exclude the demand side challenges and risks 
from further analysis in this research. When we empirically survey supply chain 
practitioners about their risk experiences, it is likely that they will provide answers that 
reflect what they experience both on the supply side and the demand (downstream) 
side, notwithstanding our preference to have them focus on the supply and production 
side.   
Returning to the realm of supply chain management, we now get a sense of the 
human activities that go into the many steps of getting product from “dust to rust”, 
“farm to fork”, “cradle to grave”.  The eight definitions in Table 4 give us a feel for the 
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domain, including the lengthier CSCMP definition. “Management” is appropriately 
defined as “the process of guiding the development, maintenance, and allocation of 
resources to attain organizational goals” (Gitman & McDaniel, 2009). Its four core 
activities consist of planning, organizing, leading and controlling. If they are done right, 
the company will benefit from organizational efficiency and effectiveness, and be able 
to achieve its mission and objectives (Gitman & McDaniel, 2009).  
Some of the seven definitions from Table 4 allude to the desirability of 
collaboration and coordination among the participants in the supply chain.  Clusters of 
connected networks represent an extended enterprise perspective of supply chain 
management, providing us with an opportunity to impact the total system of 
interrelated companies for increased efficiency and effectiveness (J. J. Coyle, Langley, 
Novack, & Gibson, 2013). Effectiveness is concerned with the extent to which company 
goals are accomplished. They usually include customer service measures such as lead-
time, stock-out probability, and fill rates.  Efficiency measures how well company 
resources are utilized, for which measures may include procurement, inventory and 
operating costs (Lai, Ngai, & Cheng, 2002). The supply chain management challenge is to 
be effective in providing excellent customer service while keeping the overall costs 
down.   
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Table 4: DEFINITIONS OF SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT (SCM) 
Definition Author 
The integration of key business processes from end user 
through original suppliers that provides products, services, 
and information that add value for customers and other 
stakeholders.  
The Global Supply Chain Forum 
(GSCF), as reported by (Lambert 
& Cooper, 2000) 
The management of upstream and downstream 
relationships with suppliers and customers in order to 
create enhanced value in the final market place at less cost 
to the supply chain as a whole.  
(Christopher, 2002) p. 2 
SCM recognizes dependencies between firms. It has 
achieved the status of a generic term for various 
systematic processes that implicitly consider time- and 
functional dependencies between firms’ activities.  
(Svensson, 2002) p. 116 
A multi-disciplinary and multi-functional set of activities 
which deals not only with the more physical and tangible 
attributes and activities (e.g. logistics), but equally the 
more behavioural and intangible dimensions (e.g. 
relationship building and management) 
(Ritchie & Brindley, 2007) p. 
1401 
SCM is the integration and management of supply chain 
organizations and activities through cooperative 
relationships, effective business processes, and high levels 
of information sharing to create high-performing value 
systems that provide member organizations a sustainable 
competitive advantage.  
(Handfield, 2007) 
SCM is interested in the coordination and collaboration of 
processes and activities across functions within a network 
of organizations.  
(Olson, 2012) p. 12 
SCM encompasses the planning and management of all 
activities involved in sourcing and procurement, 
conversion, and all logistics management activities. 
Importantly, it also includes coordination and 
collaboration with channel partners, which can be 
suppliers, intermediaries, third party service providers, 
and customers. In essence, supply chain management 
integrates supply and demand management within and 
across companies. 
CSCMP, 2012 
(http://www.cscmp.org/about-
us/supply-chain-management-
definitions) 
 
The management of material, information and financial 
flows through the supply chain. It includes the 
coordination and collaboration of processes and activities 
across different functions such as marketing, sales, 
production, product design, procurement, logistics, 
finance, and information technology within the supply 
chain.   
(Manmohan S. Sodhi et al., 
2012) p. 6 
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While it is quite clear that sourcing, procurement and materials management 
(the management of incoming supplies) are part of supply chain management, it may be 
a stretch to include production and manufacturing as activities under the purview of 
logistics and supply chain managers. As Coyle et al. point out, logistics, by its nature, 
focuses on processes that cut across traditional functional boundaries (J. J. Coyle et al., 
2013). The supply chain interfaces and integrates with other functional areas such as 
marketing, manufacturing, operations, engineering, finance, accounting and human 
resources. Because the manufacturing or “conversion” processes are intensely 
dependent on input from the supply chain function, it makes sense for this research to 
study risks not just isolated to the logistics activities of a firm, but in a more integrative 
perspective that includes the manufacturing functions. The coupling between supply 
chain activities and manufacturing is so close that disturbances will tend to affect both.  
Nevertheless, we will not attempt to uncover or analyze disruptions that may occur 
solely as a result of manufacturing operations. For example, we will not be concerned 
with machine breakdowns (a manufacturing problem) unless they are caused by 
insufficient power supply or poor raw materials (supply chain problems).   
Most risks that affect the supply chain, i.e. supply chain management risks, 
should squarely belong within the domain of the supply chain managers.  Supply chain 
leaders cannot walk away from trouble as soon as disruptions inevitably happen, and 
they cannot customarily rely on other mechanisms and structures within the firm22 to 
                                                          
22 For example, enterprise risk systems, security systems, procedures and personnel, insurance 
coordinators, etc.  
23 
 
rectify perilous situations or provide safety nets. Generally, if the risks originated with 
the supply chain, they belong in the supply chain and should be handled primarily by 
supply chain people.23 We remarked earlier that the act of management consists of the 
four main activities of planning, organizing, leading and controlling.  It would make 
sense that an awareness of risks should permeate and shape how managers think and 
act throughout the execution of these four activities. When supply chain managers 
formulate strategies, policies and operating procedures, risks and how to control them 
must be constantly in the back of their minds.  
b. Supply Chain Risks 
This part of the presentation will discuss the three concepts of risk, supply chain 
risk, and supply chain risk management. The dissertation will eventually arrive at a 
discussion of risks encountered when sourcing overseas, and particularly in India. An 
extensive literature review and the ensuing survey of supply chain professionals working 
in India will help us uncover and identify the specific risks experienced in India, their 
impacts and which methods practitioners find are useful in mitigating them.  
Stage 1: Risk 
 
The 2003 version of Guinness World Records features the highest fall survived 
without a parachute: In 1972, a Yugoslavian air stewardess survived a 33,000 foot fall 
after a midair airplane explosion (Folkard, 2003)24. Despite this miraculous story, the 
                                                          
23 As we will see, there are of course exceptions to this. Many risk scenarios are serious enough 
to engage the entire organization, and they can potentially damage a lot more than just the supply chain.  
24 The author remembers this story. Supposedly the survivor was using the lavatory when it 
happened, and this encapsulated unit landed on a long and snowy slope that softened the impact.  
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example of jumping from an airplane without a parachute has been used as an 
illustration of something totally risk “free”: You are 100% certain to die, so there is no 
risk involved (Holton, 2004).  Risk ≠ Certainty.  Certainty also implies 100% probability 
and absolutely no variability of outcomes.  Table 5 lists several definitions of risk by 
authors and thinkers both outside and inside the world of supply chain management. 
The three terms (bold print) that repeat themselves are 1) Probability25; 2) Variability26; 
and 3) Uncertainty27.  Probability is a measure of relative frequency of an event and is 
limited within a range from zero (no chance) to one (certainty) (Waner & Costenoble, 
2007).  Some probabilities are objectively determined; for example a fair coin toss has a 
probability of 0.5 (or 50%) of landing on heads. Most other probabilities are subjectively 
determined: 60% chance of rain tomorrow; 90% certain that the company will meet its 
profitability target; between 90% and 100% probability that a magnitude 5 or higher 
earthquake will hit the Puget Sound region over the next 100 years28. Although such 
estimates are often made by scientists and government agencies, they are still 
subjective probabilities that may be based on what the estimator knows and a 
combination of educated guessing, statistics, various forecasting and simulation 
techniques, and rounding. As Holton points out, probability quantifies perceived 
uncertainty, meaning that most probability assessments are based on incomplete 
information and possible ignorance of the “unknown unknowns”29 (Holton, 2004).  
                                                          
25 Acceptable acronyms for probability are chance and likelihood. 
26 Acceptable acronyms for variability are fluctuations, variation and variance.  
27 An acceptable acronym for uncertainty is unpredictability.  
28 http://eqint.cr.usgs.gov/eqprob/2002/out/image.24079.jpg  
29 A statement most recently attributed to former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.  
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Table 5:  DEFINITIONS OF RISK 
Definition Author 
Usually if the term “yield” were replaced by “expected 
yield” or “expected return”, and “risk” by “variance of 
return”, little change of apparent meaning would result.  
(Markowitz, 1952) p. 89 
The threat of injury, damage or loss, a dangerous 
element or factor, or the chance of loss. 
(Merriam-Webster, 1976) 
Explicit recognition of the [known] probabilities of 
events outside the decision maker’s control. 
(Cleland & Kocaoglu, 1981) p. 308 
Risk is always relative to the observer.  It is subjective 
just as is probability itself. It depends on what the 
observer knows.  
(Kaplan & Garrick, 1981) p. 22 
 
Risk is an set of triplets; R = [(si, pi, xi)], i = 1,2,…,N,  
where si is a scenario identification or description, pi is 
the probability of that scenario; and xi is the 
consequence or evaluation measure of that scenario, 
i.e. the measure of damage.  
(Kaplan & Garrick, 1981) p. 13 
Reflecting variation in the distribution of possible 
outcomes, their likelihoods, and their subjective values. 
(March & Shapira, 1987) p. 1404 
Risk has become increasingly a term referring not to the 
unpredictability of outcomes but to their costs, 
particularly their costs in terms of mortality and 
morbidity.  
(March & Shapira, 1987) p. 1411 
Risk refers to variation in corporate outcomes or 
performance that cannot be forecast ex ante.  
Unpredictability in corporate outcome variables.  
(Miller, 1992) p. 311 and p. 312 
The extent to which there is uncertainty about whether 
potentially significant and/or disappointing outcomes of 
decisions will be realized.   
(Sitkin & Pablo, 1992) p. 9 
The probability that a particular adverse event occurs 
during a stated period of time, or results from a 
particular challenge. As a probability in the sense of 
statistical theory, risk obeys all the formal laws of 
combining probabilities.  
(Royal_Society, 1992) 
The elements of the risk construct are a) potential 
losses, b) significance of those losses, and c) the 
uncertainty of those losses. 
(V.-W. Mitchell, 1995; Yates & 
Stone, 1992) 
The risk of any particular type of loss is a combination 
of the probability of that loss and the significance of 
that loss to the individual or organization.  
(V.-W. Mitchell, 1995) p. 116 
The uncertainty component of risk stems from 
imperfect knowledge.  
(V.-W. Mitchell, 1995) p. 116 
The risk of any particular type of loss is a combination 
of the probability of that loss P (Lossn) and the 
significance of that loss to the individual or 
(V.-W. Mitchell, 1995) p. 116 
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organization, I (Lossn). Therefore, Riskn = P (Lossn) x I 
(Lossn) 
A chance of danger, damage, loss, injury, or any other 
undesired consequences. 
(Harland, Brenchley, & Walker, 
2003) 
The probability of variance in an expected outcome.  (Spekman & Davis, 2004) p. 416 
Vulnerable; likely to be lost or damaged.  (Christopher & Peck, 2004) p. 3 
Risk is perceived to exist when there is a relatively high 
likelihood that a detrimental event can occur and that 
event has a significant associated impact or cost. 
(Zsidisin, Ellram, Carter, & 
Cavinato, 2004) p. 397 
…Knight’s famous definition of risk. Risk relates to 
objective probabilities. Uncertainty relates to 
subjective probabilities. 
(Holton, 2004) p. 20 (referring to 
Frank Knight’s 1921 book) 
Risk, then, is exposure to a proposition of which one is 
uncertain.   …we can never operationally define risk. At 
best, we can operationally define only our perception of 
risk.  
(Holton, 2004) p. 22 and p. 24 
Risk is calculable; it can be expressed in terms of odds.  
Uncertainty is incalculable.  
(Nohria, 2006) 
The expected outcome of an uncertain event (Manuj & Mentzer, 2008b) p. 196 
A common sense definition of risk – acknowledged by 
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO, 
2002) – mainly deals with two of its essential 
components: losses (along with related amounts) and 
uncertainty of their occurrence.  
(McCormack et al., 2008) p. 6 
The fluctuations (variability) around the expected value 
(mean) of a measure. 
(Wagner & Bode, 2009) p. 6 
A situation is risky when it entails exposure to two 
essential components: exposure to an event and the 
uncertainty of possible outcomes – both of which are 
necessary in completing a risky situation.  
(Rao & Goldsby, 2009) p. 100 
Risk = f (Threat, Vulnerability, Consequence) (TSA, 2010) 
Fluctuations which cannot be predicted precisely and 
change their nature, impact and occurrence over time. 
(Singhal et al., 2011) p. 21 
 
The first entry in Table 5 exemplifies the financial interpretation of variability, 
and combined with Wagner & Bode’s (2009) more statistically derived statement 
towards the end of the same table, we get a sense that risk occurs when there is 
possible variability of future outcomes. Risk, in short, is that the reality might be 
different than what we prepared for. In the Capital Asset Pricing Model (“CAPM”), the 
variability of an asset’s historical returns are divided into a systematic portion (returns 
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that co-varies with the market return) and a nonsystematic (residual) portion that can 
be called the specific risk (March & Shapira, 1987). Financial theory will penalize assets 
with highly variable returns by demanding a higher rate of return, or risk premium. The 
main rationale for this is found in utility theory, where decision makers (managers) 
display preferences for certain outcomes (Baird, 1989). Most decision makers are risk 
averse, implying that they want a premium (higher expected return) if they are to take 
on a wider range of possible outcomes30. Variability (or volatility) compared to a 
benchmark standard31 makes managers uncomfortable, and this has a price. Financial 
portfolio managers strive to create optimal mixtures of assets – yielding high returns 
with low risk – by combining investments with different attributes and performances. 
Supply chain managers aim for similar risk reduction by diversifying sources and taking 
steps to spread the exposure (Eule, 2012). Trkman and McCormack are touching upon 
this issue when they discuss supplier portfolio management in a 2009 paper (Trkman & 
McCormack, 2009).  They sorted suppliers into four categories32 depending on how they 
perform under endogenous and exogenous uncertainty, and concluded that the most 
desirable supplier mix depends on the operating environment of the supply chain 
leader, its strategy and the type of supply chain involved. They clearly endorsed using 
dual or multiple sourcing strategies, choosing suppliers with different performance 
                                                          
30 Their risk preferences create a concave preference curve, where preference is plotted vis-à-vis 
monetary value or outcome.  
31 In the U.S. stock market, the benchmark is typically the S&P 500 index, and stocks with a low 
variability compared to this (i.e. a “beta” below one) are considered low risk.  
32 ‘Rocks’, ‘Stars’, ‘Millstones’ and ‘Bouncers’ (e.g. the Stars perform well in turbulent 
environments) 
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characteristics (recall financial “betas”). Aydin et al. write about decentralized supply 
risk management, where to reduce overall supply risks33 they recommend finding and 
developing non-correlated suppliers to make use of diversification. They see benefit in 
dividing the suppliers into clusters to enjoy the fruits of both supplier competition and 
diversification (Aydin, Babich, Beil, & Yang, 2012). Adding to this type of positive 
thinking regarding risk, Richard de Neufville, in a paper about real options, encourages 
us to understand that uncertainty is not always a risk to be avoided, as it also presents 
valuable opportunities that can be exploited (Neufville, 2003). He encourages managing 
the risks instead of avoiding them. In that respect, real options theory34 underpins the 
claim that to build decisive advantage, a company must be faster at generating options 
and realigning resources than its competitors (Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009). In supply 
chain management, there seems to be similarities with financial management.  
Several authors have suggested that companies should view supplier risk in 
much the same way as financial institutions look at investor or investment risks, 
meaning that a higher level of risk requires a higher level of reward to assume those 
risks (Favre & McCreery, 2008). While it may be useful to use applications from financial 
risk management, supply chains present other types of risks, including the possibility of 
personal injury and property damage. Such safety issues can make it unethical and often 
unthinkable to tinker with the risk and reward relationship.  
                                                          
33 The three supply risks they highlight are 1) Shortage of critical parts or loss of supplier capacity; 
2) Loss of finished goods inventory due to use of defective parts; and 3) Inflated supply costs 
34 Real options theory stipulates that systems are built flexible enough so that they can adapt to 
changing conditions, new strategies and changing environments. The structure gives the manager the 
option to choose alternative paths under ways. Having real options builds resilience into a system.   
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Some academic articles attempt to optimize supplier networks by applying 
mathematical or statistical tools for trade-off analyses among metrics such as expected 
costs, quality acceptance levels and on-time delivery distributions. Wu and Olson 
authored a 2008 paper where they compared three different quantitative models: 
chance constrained programming (CCP), data envelopment analysis (DEA) and multi-
objective programming (MOP), combined with (Monte Carlo) simulations for all three 
methods. Such methods can serve as useful tools to evaluate and improve supplier 
selection decisions in uncertain supply chain environments (Wu & Olson, 2008).  
Uncertainty is the third term that kept appearing in Table 5: Definitions of Risk. 
Some writers – notably Frank Knight - have attempted to separate risk from uncertainty 
by characterizing risk as measurable and uncertainty as unmeasurable, so that risk 
relates to objective probabilities and uncertainty relates to subjective probabilities 
(Holton, 2004). In this view, risk is calculable; it can be expressed in terms of odds, while 
uncertainty is incalculable (Nohria, 2006). This view of risk is quite ambitious, as it 
requires known probability distributions of possible outcomes. However, as Vilko et al. 
point out, the cases when probability distributions cannot be defined are much more 
common than those where probability distributions are known (Vilko, Edelmann, & 
Hallikas, 2010).  
It seems the literature is moving away from a strict interpretive separation 
between risk and uncertainty, and the two terms are often used interchangeably, or 
conjunctively, as in “risk occurs because there is uncertainty about the future” (Waters, 
2011).  Another take on this is that “the uncertainty component of risk stems from 
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imperfect knowledge” (V.-W. Mitchell, 1995). Regardless of whether risk is part of 
uncertainty or vice versa, we are more interested in how risks and uncertainties can hurt 
supply chain operations.  
The notion of risk involves both uncertainty and some kind of loss or damage 
that might be incurred. Kaplan and Garrick express this as risk = uncertainty + damage 
(Kaplan & Garrick, 1981). This effectively cuts out the possible positive effects of risk, 
and limits our concern to risks that cause loss or damage.  For our purposes, Culp’s 
definition that risk can be defined as any source of randomness that may have an 
adverse impact on a person or corporation is useful (McCormack et al., 2008), as well as 
other descriptions that only cover the negative sides of risk: losses, disruptions, 
untoward situations, glitches, damage, hazards, disturbances, costs, etc.   
Lastly, for any uncertain outcome to have a possibility of hurting us, we need to 
have exposure to or an interest in what might transpire.  Risk, then, entails not only 
uncertainty, but also exposure, leading to Holton’s definition: Risk is exposure to a 
proposition of which one is uncertain (Holton, 2004). Kent Miller offers a slightly 
different interpretation by stating that exposure refers to the sensitivity of a firm or 
project’s cash flows to changes in any of a number of interrelated uncertain variables 
(Miller, 1992). According to Kaplan and Garrick, a risk analysis consists of answers to the 
following three questions, also dubbed their “set of triplets” (Kaplan & Garrick, 1981): 
1) What can happen, i.e. what can go wrong? 
2) How likely is it that it might happen? 
3) What are the consequences (impact) if it happens?  
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This division into Scenario, Likelihood and Consequence can be used to calculate 
a risk distribution curve, where the risk that the organization faces is the whole curve. 
So to answer the question “what is the risk”, a single number is not enough to 
communicate the idea of risk. As Kaplan and Garrick write, “It takes a whole curve”.  
Similarly, risk can be defined as a collection of pairs of likelihood (L) and outcomes35 (O), 
so that Risk = [(L1, O1), (L2, O2),…..(Ln, On)] where each 2-tuple is a possible scenario 
(McCormack et al., 2008). The alternative to the distribution curve concept is the point 
concept of risk, which combines the probability of a particular type of loss with the 
significance (impact) of that loss to the organization: Riskn = P (Lossn) x I (Lossn)  (V.-W. 
Mitchell, 1995).  To get an accurate depiction of the risk theatre, the whole distribution 
curve needs to be known.  Many unacceptable and unpalatable risks can hide behind 
midpoints such as expected values and averages.   
It is crucial for a company to determine whether it is truly exposed to any of the 
possible risks or hazards that exist. It becomes important to know whether its 
perception of exposure is commensurate with the risk level (sets of likelihoods 
multiplied by impacts) that can be anticipated. As Holton points out, there is no true risk 
because everything is a matter of perception. He claims we can at best only 
operationalize our perception of risk, and that is what we use to develop metrics and 
risk assessments, subjective as they may be (Holton, 2004).  Experienced managers will 
learn to discern exaggerated anxieties and worries from more objectively derived and 
                                                          
35 Outcomes are the same as impacts.  
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cool-headed assessments of exposure and risk.  Organizations are not vulnerable to 
every possible risk that may exist. Contrary to what the public may think, the instances 
of piracy in the Gulf of Aden are not a major threat to the integrity of the global 
transportation system. However, it is a real concern to the shipping lines trafficking that 
particular stretch of water. Risk identification and assessment is ultimately a very 
particular and individual endeavor.  
Stage 2: Supply Chain Risk 
 
Because risk is a product of exposure and uncertainty (Holton, 2004), one can 
conceptualize exposure as being inherent in the firm’s nature36, while the uncertainty 
comes from the broader environment in which the firm is operating. In a systems sense, 
there is also a dynamic interplay between a firm’s exposure and how it responds to its 
environment, and how the environment responds to the firm’s exposure37. A firm’s 
exposure to a disruptive event will influence how vulnerable it is to such an event (or 
scenario), as the firm’s vulnerability to a disruptive event can be viewed as a 
combination of the likelihood of a disruption and its potential severity (Sheffi, 2005). 
Exposure makes a firm vulnerable to disruptions.  There is agreement among supply 
chain academics and practitioners that over the past few decades, vulnerability of 
supply chains to disturbances or disruptions has increased (Christopher, 2002; 
Christopher & Lee, 2004; Kotabe & Murray, 2004; S. Wagner & C. Bode, 2006). The main 
                                                          
36 Including its attributes such as business model, strategies, asset base, location, industries 
served, ownership structure, product range, management style, corporate culture, history, etc.  
37 Case in point: a well-guarded and protected warehouse is less likely to be a target for burglars 
or intruders.  
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reasons for this increased vulnerability can be traced to three main and somewhat 
intertwined factors:  
1. Increased competitive pressures: This lead to efforts to make processes and 
supply chains both more efficient and more effective (responsive). Efficiencies 
were achieved by making supply chains leaner, which implied lower inventories 
and quicker turnaround times. Many firms switched to single sourcing of crucial 
supplies. Customer responsiveness was improved by better quality control, 
faster to market, better selection, higher fill rates and shrinking product life 
cycles. (Melnyk, Ragatz, & Zsidisin, 2005). To stay relevant, firms were forced to 
embrace operational efficiencies.   
2. Accelerated globalization of markets: Globalization made it easier to find 
cheaper sources overseas, and with both suppliers and customers in foreign 
markets, the supply chains experienced longer freight routes and longer lead 
times, in addition to various cultural and communications snags. Global supply 
chains have more delay points and greater uncertainties (Manuj & Mentzer, 
2008a; Vanderspek, 2012). 
3. Increased inter-firm dependencies: The trend is towards increased collaboration 
within the supply chain networks to achieve better visibility and distribution 
accuracy. These couplings up and down the supply chain have created greater 
mutual dependencies and sensitivities.  
 
The three factors have contributed to increasing the complexity of modern, 
global supply chains (ScienceWatch, 2011). In a network sense, the many new nodes, 
links, relationships and interactions have created supply chains that are vulnerable to a 
variety of internal and external disruptions and hiccups. Complexity of a supply chain 
can also more simply be defined as the sum of two components: the total number of 
nodes and the total number of forward, backward and within-tier materials flows within 
a given supply chain (Craighead, Blackhurst, Rungtusanatham, & Handfield, 2007). As 
has been argued, accidents arise from systems, and they are inevitable if these systems 
are complex and tightly coupled (de_Koster, Stam, & Balk, 2011; Perrow, 1999a, 1999b). 
Perrow’s “Normal Accident Theory” holds that accidents become inevitable or normal in 
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complex, tightly coupled technological systems (Perrow, 1999a; S. M. Wagner & C. 
Bode, 2006)38. Low visibility, tight couplings and a lack of slack could be detrimental to 
resilience, where resilience is defined as the ability to recover quickly from disturbances 
(Sheffi, 2005)39. Supply chain visibility is defined roughly as availability of and access to 
relevant data (O. Khan & Zsidisin, 2012). Visibility reveals a bigger piece of the big 
picture, and allows for better planning and decision making. It entails having access to 
sales and production forecasts and inventory levels of both suppliers and customers, as 
well as updated information on availability of logistics resources (transportation and 
warehouse capacity, etc.)40  While lack of visibility is not strictly a risk, it is a deficiency in 
a defensive mechanism that healthy supply chains should possess.   
There are many benefits to reshaping the supply chain structures and practices 
to make them more efficient and effective, but many authors point out that these 
efforts have made them more susceptible to risks in the business environment (S. 
Wagner & C. Bode, 2006). Modern supply chain management and the adoption of lean 
principles have resulted in “system fragility”, according to Melnyk et al.  Waste 
reduction strategies such as buffer reductions41 have led to a state where companies 
                                                          
38 Complex systems imply complex interactions within the supply chain and between the supply 
chain and its environment (Speier, Whipple, Closs, & Voss, 2011) 
39 A more elaborate definition is “the supply chain’s ability to cope with the consequences of 
unavoidable risk events in order to return to its original operations or move to a new, more desirable 
state after being disturbed” (Christopher & Peck, 2004; Jüttner & Maklan, 2011). 
40 In classic information theory, the availability of information cuts down on uncertainty. For 
management purposes (planning, organizing, control), access to good information (through, for example, 
greater visibility) certainly helps in assessing the situation and making better decisions (Denning & Bell, 
2012) 
41 There are typically three types of buffers: safety stock, extended lead times and excess 
capacity (Melnyk et al., 2005) 
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have less control over their operations and are less able to respond to disruptions. In 
stable and predictable markets these powerful tools for making operations leaner and 
more efficient are quite effective, but they have created more fragile supply chains that 
appear less resilient when faced with risks and disruptive events (Melnyk et al., 2005). 
Waters confirms this by stating that removing slack in the supply chain is creating 
inflexible chains where even small and unexpected events can bring everything to a 
standstill (Waters, 2011). Through surveying 760 German companies, Wagner and Bode 
were able to empirically show that several structural variables of supply design42 were 
relevant for a firm’s exposure to supply chain risk.  These supply chain design variables 
amplified a firm’s exposure to risk (S. Wagner & C. Bode, 2006).  In their survey of 
German auto industry executives, Thun and Hoenig asked them to rank seven drivers of 
supply chain risk (Thun & Hoenig, 2011). Globalization came out first, followed by 
product variety, outsourcing, reduction of suppliers, focus on efficiency, central 
distribution and centralized production.   
Disruption risks are caused by events that create a supply shortage for certain 
durations (Haksöz & Arslan, 2012).  Disruptions can vary from everyday annoyances 
such as incoming deliveries that are late by a few hours to major catastrophic events 
that in the worst case might not only hurt people and the environment, but also force 
the company out of business.  Just by reading the daily newspapers, one can easily find 
headlines announcing yet another supply chain disaster somewhere in the world. As this 
                                                          
42 Such as the firm’s degree of dependence on certain suppliers or customers, the degree of 
single sourcing or reliance on global supply sources. 
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was written, the U.S. East Coast experienced Sandy - one of the worst hurricanes and 
floods in history; a generic Lipitor cholesterol drug produced in India was recalled 
because of findings of glass particles in the capsules, and a factory fire in Bangladesh 
killed more than 140 textile workers.43  The New York Times reported on January 23, 
2013 that since 2005, factory fires in Bangladesh have killed 600 workers. A few months 
later, a Dhaka garment factory building collapsed, killing more than 1,100 workers.  
Disruptions can be either internal or external to the focal supply chain, and they 
can be either caused by nature or by human actions.  Table 6 lists definitions of supply 
chain risk by recognized authors in the field.  In the spirit of the “triple bottom line”44, 
we appreciate definitions that mention negative consequences to people and the 
environment, in addition to the obvious profit degradation. With the possible exception 
of Harland et al.’s definition, the dozen variations in Table 6 do not contain direct 
references to these big picture risks, and only Zsidisin specifically mentions “threats to 
customer life and safety”. From a financial standpoint, it is likely that any disaster that 
causes loss of life or environmental damage will ultimately be costly for a business and 
affect the bottom line, but when we define supply chain risks, a more deliberate and 
balanced mention of the non-financial outcomes seems reasonable.45  This view is  
 
                                                          
43 After the November 2012 Bangladesh factory fire (following a similar fire just a few months 
earlier in Karachi, Pakistan), commentators pointed out that “low prices can have high costs”. Favre and 
McCreery noted that “low dollar spend suppliers can be a source of significant risk exposure” (Favre & 
McCreery, 2008) 
44 Or the popularly labeled 3 P’s: People, Planet and Profit 
45 Sadly, people were still perishing from the after-effects of the November 2012 hurricane Sandy 
when several press commentators chirped in that this disaster would be “good for business”. They were 
referring to greater sales of building materials and more work for contractors.   
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Table 6: DEFINITIONS OF SUPPLY CHAIN RISK 
Definition Author 
A variation in the distribution of possible supply chain 
outcomes, their likelihood, and their subjective value. 
(Jüttner, Peck, & Christopher, 2003) 
building on (March & Shapira, 
1987) p. 1404 
Any risks for the information, material and product 
flows from original supplier to the delivery of the final 
product for the end user.  In simple terms, supply chain 
risks refer to the possibility and effect of a mismatch 
between supply and demand.  
(Jüttner et al., 2003) p. 7 
Chance of danger, damage, loss, injury or any other 
undesired consequences. 
(Harland et al., 2003) p. 52 
The essence of most disruptions is a reduction in 
capacity and therefore inability to meet demand. 
(Sheffi, 2005) p. 14 
Unplanned and unanticipated events that disrupt the 
normal flow of goods and materials within a supply 
chain, and, as a consequence, expose firms within the 
supply chain to operational and financial risks. 
(Craighead et al., 2007) p. 132 
The distribution of performance outcomes of interest 
expressed in terms of losses, probability, speed of 
event, speed of losses, the time for detection of the 
events, and frequency. 
(Manuj & Mentzer, 2008b) p.197 
The combination of (1) an unintended, anomalous 
triggering event that materializes somewhere in the 
supply chain or its environment, and (2) a 
consequential situation which significantly threatens 
normal business operations.  
(Wagner & Bode, 2008) p. 309 
Supply chain disruption: An unintended, untoward 
situation. For the affected firms, it is an exceptional and 
anomalous situation in comparison to every-day 
business.  
(McCormack et al., 2008) p. 6 
Risks can be classified into Source Risks, Make Risks, 
Deliver Risks, and Return Risks.  
(McCormack et al., 2008) p. 22 
Deviation from the expected value of a supply chain 
performance objective resulting in negative 
consequences for the affected firm.   
(Wagner & Bode, 2009) p. 5 
The negative outcome resulting from adverse events 
that occur in supply chains, logistics networks, and 
transportation operations.  
(Wagner & Bode, 2009) p. 5  
Risk is the potential to lose time and money or other-
wise not be able to accomplish an organization’s goals. 
(Gitman & McDaniel, 2009) p. 4 
Operational risks and disruptions: Operational risks 
involve inherent uncertainties for SC elements such as 
customer demand, supply and cost. Disruption risks 
come from disasters (natural and man-made) and from 
economic crises.  
(Olson, 2012) p. 13 
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supported by Carter and Rogers, who in 2008 defined supply chain risk management as 
“the ability of a firm to understand and manage its economic, environmental, and social 
risks in the supply chain” (Carter & Rogers, 2008).    
Supply management refers to the upstream activities of sourcing and 
procurement, so it makes sense to include some alternative definitions of “supply risk” 
(as opposed to “supply chain risk”): 
Table 7: DEFINITIONS OF SUPPLY RISK 
 
Definition Author 
The probability of an incident associated with inbound 
supply from individual supplier failures or the supply 
market occurring, in which its outcomes result in the 
inability of the purchasing firm to meet customer 
demand or cause threats to customer life and safety.  
(Zsidisin, 2003a) p. 222 
Involving the potential occurrence of events 
associated with inbound supply that can have 
significant detrimental effects on the purchasing firm. 
(Zsidisin, 2003b) 
Threats to supply continuity. (Melnyk et al., 2005) 
Supply risk is the uncertainty associated with supplier 
activities and in general supplier relationships, i.e. the 
transpiration of significant and/or disappointing 
failures with inbound goods and services. 
(Jüttner, 2005), and (Zsidisin, Panelli, 
& Upton, 2000) 
Risk related to a given supplier’s characteristics 
evolves from the deviation between the level of 
manufacturer expectation and the actual supplier 
performance.  
(Levary, 2007) p. 392 
The distribution of outcomes related to adverse 
events in inbound supply that affect the ability of the 
focal firm to meet customer demand (in terms of both 
quantity and quality) within anticipated costs and 
time, or causes threats to customer life and safety 
(Manuj & Mentzer, 2008b) p. 197, 
building on (Zsidisin, 2003a) 
Those risks associated with the sourcing of products 
by a focal firm. 
(Christopher, Mena, Khan, & Yurt, 
2011) p. 67 
 
Although the definition by Manuj & Mentzer in Table 7 takes into account the 
customers and their well-being, we can think of costly risks and disruptions that do not 
necessarily trickle all the way down to the customer.  Many everyday annoyances and 
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delays can be costly and expensive to remedy, but they do not necessarily incapacitate 
the firm’s ability to make deliveries and meet demand.  Left unchecked, the many 
imperfections and inefficiencies in supply management will cause the overall cost level 
to rise over time, but firms are often able to satisfy demand regardless46.  Risk 
management, then, becomes an effective method to help reduce the chaos.   
 Levary’s definition from Table 7 is interesting from a risk theory standpoint. Risk 
occurs when there is a deviation between what is expected and what is experienced. 
What is expected should already be taken care of (discounted) through the company’s 
regular management practices, and risk is encountered when something unexpected 
happens. Perhaps many of the everyday annoyances are to be expected, in which case 
they should be remedied through sound and regular management practices.  Most low 
level disruptions can be dealt with as part of business as usual (Glendon, 2012). In 
supply chain risk management, if we can disregard many pedestrian disruptions that are 
bound to happen, the focus becomes on identifying, assessing, mitigating and 
controlling disruptions with probability and frequency, but with significant impact on 
the company’s operations, the environment and human safety. Adam Prakash puts it 
this way: “…unpredictable changes – or “shocks” – are of primary concern.  When 
shocks surpass a certain critical size or threshold and persist at those levels, traditional 
policy prescriptions and coping mechanisms are likely to fail” (Prakash, 2011). 
                                                          
46 Undoubtedly, sloppy management practices can over time contribute to “death by a thousand 
cuts”, so attention has to be paid to supply chain annoyances. Blake Johnson calls these “garden-variety 
business uncertainty” that needs to be dealt with (B. Johnson, 2012).  
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It is a plausible assumption that money can be made on a sustained basis for 
companies that tackle and overcome risk better than others.  The fact that risks exist 
and that things can go wrong serve as a natural barrier for over-establishment in any 
industry.  There is seemingly something Darwinian (“survival of the fittest”) about the 
ability to thrive and make money in any business.  The ability to deal with (and over time 
adapt to) various risk factors is an important element for continued existence.  
Unprepared firms essentially gamble that they will avoid the effects of a disruptive or 
damaging event (Autry & Bobbitt, 2008). Deliberate supply chain risk preparedness and 
management will be imperative to long term sustainability and should give the firm or 
supply chain competitive advantage in a perilous world. 
A useful paper by Spekman and Davis groups supply chain risks into four general 
categories (Spekman & Davis, 2004): 
1. Risks inherent in supply chain flows (goods, information and money) 
2. Risks associated with security (crimes). (Security management is an 
important subset of the realm of risk management) 47   
3. Risks associated with opportunistic behavior (trust issues) 
4. Risks associated with corporate social responsibility (the “triple bottom 
line”)  
 
The prevailing view is now an all-risk strategy that emphasizes the firm and its 
employees’ collective attention to both supply chain security management and supply 
chain risk management principles and methods (Autry & Bobbitt, 2008; Closs & 
                                                          
47 Includes man-made threats such as terrorism, theft, vandalism, smuggling, piracy, riots and arson.  
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McGarrell, 2004; J. J. Coyle et al., 2013; Iakovou, Vlachos, & Xanthopoulos, 2009; 
Marucheck, Greis, Mena, & Cai, 2011; Sweet, 2006; Williams, Lueg, & LeMay, 2008) 48,49.  
The perception of risk is often what guides management and practitioners in 
their decision making and prioritization. Perceived risk can be quite different than 
statistical (objective) risk based on actual occurrences and trends. (C. S. Tang, 2006b; 
Vanany, Zailani, & Pujawan, 2009).  Every decade has its highly publicized catastrophes, 
whether natural or man-made. Surveys of practitioners performed in the year 2012 
typically list the more general supplier risk as the number one perceived risk.50  A 
recurring “risk-of-the-month” phenomenon illustrates our reactive nature and how our 
perception of reality is shaped by recent or close events. Gail Dutton remarks that 
“supply chain managers who focus on the most recent threat will be blind-sided by 
something else” (Dutton, 2013). Tversky and Kahneman wrote an important article on 
cognitive biases that stem from people’s reliance on judgmental heuristics, especially 
when making judgments under uncertainty (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Despite our 
instinctive inclination to be reactive and focus on recent events, it seems the literature 
on risk management has now arrived at a more balanced, “all-risk” perspective 
emphasizing the importance of being prepared for any eventualities.  Several books on 
                                                          
48 Williams et al. uses a definition from Closs & McGarrell (2004): “The application of policies, procedures, 
and technology to protect supply chain assets (product, facilities, equipment, information and personnel) 
from theft, damage, or terrorism, and to prevent the introduction of unauthorized contraband, people or 
weapons of mass destruction into the supply chain” (Closs & McGarrell, 2004; Williams et al., 2008) 
49 Autry & Bobbitt describe a security breach as something that contaminates, damages or destroys 
products and/or supply chain assets.  
50 Avoiding suppliers that will ship bad or unsafe products or use hazardous production methods, for 
example. 
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SCRM written over the past couple of years seem to reflect this more comprehensive 
perspective of risks (O. Khan & Zsidisin, 2012; Kouvelis, Dong, Boyabatli, & Li, 2012; 
Olson, 2012; Manmohan S. Sodhi & Tang, 2012; Trent & Roberts, 2010). Tang and Musa 
did an extensive literature review and found that the field of SCRM since 2000 has 
“evolved from passively reacting to vague general issues of disruptions towards more 
proactively managing supply chain risk from system perspectives” (O. Tang & Musa, 
2011).  
Stage 3: Supply Chain Risk Management 
 
As pointed out by Sodhi and Tang, supply chain risk management (SCRM) is a 
nascent field, going back only to the early 2000’s (Manmohan S. Sodhi & Tang, 2012).  
Several authors have carried out extensive and useful literature reviews on SCRM, and it 
is evident that this is an area of research and practice that is still in a relatively early 
stage (Ghadge, Dani, & Kalawsky, 2011; Jüttner et al., 2003; Rao & Goldsby, 2009; 
Vanany et al., 2009). Overlapping fields such as Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) and 
Emergency & Disaster Preparedness have been around a bit longer, and for these there 
exists an older body of literature (Hale & Moberg, 2005; Olson & Wu, 2010). ERM 
embraces a broader and more general area of the risks that a company could run into, 
and can be defined as “… the discipline by which an organization in any industry 
assesses, controls, exploits, finances, and monitors risks from all sources for the purpose 
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of increasing the organization’s short- and long-term value to its stakeholders.” (CAS, 
2007)51 
Organizations often discuss ERM in the context of financial and strategic risk 
(Handfield, 2007). Supply chain risks overlap with other risks experienced by 
organizations, and what is damaging to a company’s supply chain will usually slop over 
and cause negative financial and marketing consequences. Based on a 2006 survey of 
financial executives that revealed that their greatest worry was supply chain risks, Harris 
Interactive advised that it is all too easy to look at risk in silos (Smyrlis, 2006). A 2009 
survey by Sodhi et al. revealed that nearly three quarters of the respondents believed 
SCRM to be a subset of ERM or an extension of it (Manmohan S. Sodhi et al., 2012).  
The definitions given in Table 8 reveal that we now have moved into the solution 
stage of organizational processes.  What can managers do to the supply chain to 
anticipate and handle the inevitable risks?  The literature seems to center around the 
following predicaments: 
 We have this supply chain structure and we need to get this product to the 
customer! 
 What can possibly go wrong or has gone wrong? 
 How do we fix it and prevent it from happening again? 
 
The SCRM literature is, therefore, quite prescriptive in its way of analyzing and 
recommending processes and solutions to the management. As Harland et al. 
 
                                                          
51 A slightly different definition of ERM is offered by Wikipedia: “The methods and processes used by 
organizations to manage risks and seize opportunities related to the achievement of their objectives.” 
Chapman is credited with this definition: “ERM as a set of coordinated actions about protecting and 
enhancing share value to satisfy the primary business objective of shareholder wealth maximization” (Yee, 
2009) 
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Table 8: DEFINITIONS OF SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MANAGEMENT (SCRM) 
Definition Author 
The identification and management of risks within the 
supply chain, and risks external to it, through a 
coordinated approach amongst supply chain 
members, to reduce supply chain vulnerability52 as a 
whole.  
(Chapman et al., 2002) p. 61 
The identification and management of risks within the 
supply chain and risks external to it through a co-
ordinated approach amongst supply chain members 
to reduce supply chain vulnerability as a whole. 
(Christopher, 2002) p.2 
Aims to identify the potential sources of risk and 
implement appropriate actions to avoid or contain 
supply chain vulnerability.   
(Jüttner et al., 2003) p. 9 
Effective supply risk [management] requires the 
identification and monetization of risk events, 
probability of occurrence, and the firm contingencies 
for alternative sources of supply. 
(Barry, 2004) p. 695 
A company manages risk in order to protect its assets 
and profits, and stay in business.  
(Finch, 2004) p. 194 
Risk management is primarily concerned with 
removing the degree of ambiguity or uncertainty 
concerning the task environment and the decision 
specific variables. 
(Brindley, 2004) p. 70 
 
To collaboratively with partners in a supply chain 
apply risk management process tools to deal with 
risks and uncertainties caused by, or impacting on, 
logistics related activities or resources. 
(Norrman & Lindroth, 2004) p. 14 
Focusing on their supply chains in order to reduce 
uncertainty and increase customer satisfaction, with 
the ultimate aim of generating greater levels of 
productivity, profitability and competitiveness. 
(P. J. Singh et al., 2005) p. 3375 
The management of supply chain risks through 
coordination or collaboration among the supply chain 
partners so as to ensure profitability and continuity.  
(C. S. Tang, 2006a) p. 453 
The organizational routines or regular and predictable 
patterns of activity and sequence of coordinated ac-
tions that, when bundled with rent-yielding resour-
ces, enhance the abilities of the supply chain to reco-
ver expediently from a manifested disruption and to 
create awareness of a pending or realized disruption. 
(Craighead et al., 2007; Grant, 2002) 
                                                          
52 Vulnerability is defined as “the degree to which people, property, resources, systems and 
cultural, economic, environmental and social activity is susceptible to harm, degradation, or destruction 
on being exposed to a hostile agent or factor” (Prakash, 2011). Also, vulnerability is a latent condition 
which becomes manifest if a disruptive event occurs (Jüttner & Maklan, 2011). Not wearing a bicycle 
helmet is not a problem until you fall off your bike.  
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The goal of risk management is to empower senior 
decision makers with a rational basis for determining 
which risk mitigation measures to enact versus how 
much and where to accept other risks. 
(Ritter, Barrett, & Wilson, 2007), p. 
86 
Risk management involves developing strategies for 
reducing the probabilities of negative events and/or 
their consequences should they occur.  
(Cohen & Kunreuther, 2007) 
Having the objective to control, monitor and evaluate 
supply chain risk.  The core activity of SCRM is the 
systematic identification, assessment and 
quantification of potential supply chain disruptions.  
(McCormack et al., 2008) p. 8 and p. 
10 
The identification and evaluation of risks and 
consequent losses in the global supply chain, and 
implementation of appropriate strategies through a 
coordinated approach among supply chain members 
with the objective of reducing one or more of the 
following – losses, probability, speed of event, speed 
of losses, the time for detection of the events, 
frequency, or exposure – for supply chain outcomes 
that in turn lead to close matching of actual cost 
savings and profitability with those desired.  
(Manuj & Mentzer, 2008b) p. 205 
Management controls create supply chain 
capabilities, or attributes that enable an enterprise to 
anticipate and overcome disruptions. 
(Pettit, Fiksel, & Croxton, 2010) 
To evaluate, control and monitor risk in order to 
safeguard supply continuity and maximize 
profitability, and … the process of planning, 
organizing, leading and controlling the activities of an 
organization in order to minimize the effects of risk 
on an organization’s capital and earnings (includes 
financial, strategic, operational, accidental losses and 
other risks).  
(Trent & Roberts, 2010) 
SCRM can be seen as the capacity to be agile.  (Lavastre, Gunasekaran, & 
Spalanzani, 2012) p. 830 
Supply chain solutions that ensure supply continues 
to meet demand in case of a disruption or soon after 
the occurrence of such a disruption.  
(Manmohan S. Sodhi & Tang, 2012) 
p. 303 
Process to identify the likelihood of potential losses, 
the impact on the business revenue, and mitigation 
plans to reduce potential losses.  
(Dow_Chemicals, 2012) 
The practice of managing the risk of any factor or 
event that can materially disrupt a supply chain, 
whether within a single company or spread across 
multiple companies. The ultimate purpose of SCRM is 
to enable cost avoidance, customer service, and 
market position.  
(SCRLC, 2012) 
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observed, the combined, messy, intertwined effects of increasing product and service 
complexity, globalized outsourcing and e-business have resulted in more complex and 
dynamic supply networks (Harland et al., 2003). They recommend a variety of risk 
management tools to deal with this, including scenario planning53, expert panels, Delphi 
studies and statistically based forecasting methods. In addition, they stress the 
importance of contracting with and developing trustworthy suppliers. More 
importantly, they were the first to outline a step-by-step “supply network risk tool” that 
has become a conceptual framework for a lot of the prescriptive work in the SCRM field 
(we have tweaked this model, relabeled it “MIAMI”, and used it as a framework later in 
this thesis): 
1. Map supply network (structure, key measures, ownership) 
2. Identify risk and its current location (type, potential loss) 
3. Assess risk (likelihood of occurrence, stage in life cycle, exposure, likely triggers, 
likely loss) 
4. Manage risk (develop risk position, develop scenarios) 
5. Form collaborative supply network risk strategy 
6. Implement supply network risk strategy 
 
Arben Mullai outlines a risk analysis process that consists of nine steps: 1) 
System definition, 2) Analytical process, 3) Hazard identification, 4) Exposure analysis, 5) 
Consequence analysis, 6) Exposure evaluation, 7) Consequence evaluation, 8) Risk 
characterization and presentation, and 9) Sensitivity analysis (Mullai, 2004). Kessinger 
and McMorrow are industry practitioners who stress the importance of having a 
                                                          
53 Also called “what if” analysis by some authors (Simchi-Levi, Snyder, & Watson, 2002). “What-
if” scenarios are often used in stress-testing exercises (Jayashankar M. Swaminathan & Tomlin, 2007) 
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comprehensive and systematic process of prevention, preparedness, mitigation, 
response and recovery. They outline three crucial abilities: 
1. Collect, communicate and respond 
2. Assess the impact of uncertainty 
3. Quantify supply chain performance and design supply strategies across uncertain 
business outcomes (Kessinger & McMorrow, 2012) 
 
 As for studies pertaining to SCRM strategies and practices, one stream of 
research over the past decade has focused on developing mathematical models for 
supply chain issues, while another stream of research has tried to empirically establish 
relationships between supply chain practices and performance (Hendricks & Singhal, 
2012). Almost without fail, all of these papers have based their logical construct on the 
simplified Identify – Assess – Mitigate framework (What can go wrong, how can it 
impact us, and what can we do about it?)  Trying to uncover definitional, process and 
methodology gaps in the SCRM literature, Sodhi et al. separated recent academic 
journal articles into four main elements of identification, assessment, mitigation, and 
responsiveness to operational and catastrophic risk incidents  (Manmohan S. Sodhi et 
al., 2012). Most of the articles were of conceptual nature (framework building rather 
than empirical), and 45% of them covered identification, 58% assessment, 61% 
mitigation, and 19% responsiveness (several articles covered more than one element). 
While Jüttner et al. distinguish four basic constructs (supply chain risk sources, risk 
consequences, risk drivers and risk mitigating strategies) (Jüttner et al., 2003), we find 
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the following five-step progression to be particularly meaningful, both conceptually and 
practically:54 
1. Define (map) the company’s supply chain 
2. Identify relevant risks to which the company might be exposed 
3. Assess these risks in terms of probability of occurrence and potential severity of 
impact 
4. Mitigate the risks through prevention and damage control (contingency plans)  
5. Monitor the risks and learn from past incidents, implying continuous 
improvement55 
 
 
c. The “MIAMI” Template 
 
An easy way to remember this five-step methodology could be to label it with 
the acronym MIAMI: Map, Identify, Assess, Mitigate and Improve!  
1. Mapping 
Mapping the supply chain is surprisingly challenging for many companies doing 
global sourcing and dealing with third party logistics providers (3PL’s). This is a process 
that takes quite a bit of diligent detective work, and it can be hard to get reliable 
information from the first tier suppliers about their next level (second tier) of suppliers 
and their supply chain practices. However, going through a thorough process of defining 
and mapping the upstream supply network has several benefits and may reveal 
inefficiencies, redundancies and, of course, risks.   
                                                          
54 Manuj and Mentzer present a similar five-step process that consists of risk identification, risk 
assessment & evaluation, selection of appropriate risk management, implementation of supply chain risk 
management strategies, and mitigation of supply chain risks (Manuj & Mentzer, 2008a) 
55 There are some similarities here to the DMAIC (define-measure-analyze-improve-control) cycle found in 
the Six Sigma quality management theory. Lee and Whang wrote a paper on how to use Six Sigma to 
obtain higher supply chain security with lower cost (Lee & Whang, 2005) 
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In this early stage it also makes sense to recognize the risk drivers that the 
company operates under (Jüttner et al., 2003). These drivers tend to increase the risk 
exposure of the company. Examples are single sourcing, lean practices with low 
inventories and tight deadlines56, short product cycles, long transportation routes and 
complex products with suppliers scattered all over the world. Before worrying about 
what can go wrong we need to know who we are, how we operate and what our supply 
network looks like. As Jüttner points out, the supply chain structure and practices can be 
a risk factor and amplifier by themselves (Jüttner, 2005).  
Mapping the flow of materials, information and money also involves describing 
who is doing what and how and where it is done. Producing in India involves incoming 
raw materials and supplies, and the analyst needs to know the layers of suppliers, the 
source of the raw materials, and the logistics steps that are necessary to get the 
merchandise in and out of the production facilities. A thorough analysis also looks at the 
internal production processes, and the logistical flow of the factory must be mapped 
out. The analyst needs to know where the product is coming from, how it is transported, 
how it is stored, how it is processed, and how it leaves the production facilities. Is the 
business power or water intensive? Does the business rely on unionized labor?  Only 
through an intimate knowledge of the internal supply chain processes can the analyst 
start focusing on the identification and assessment of the risks and possible disruptions 
that can affect the specific supply chain. Although the risk identification and assessment 
                                                          
56 Typical of Just-in-Time (JIT) type procurement and manufacturing practices.  
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processes themselves serve as filters, elimination of irrelevant scenarios and 
simplification at the mapping stage make it easier to focus in on proper situational and 
circumstantial risks instead of spending time on hypothetical risks that the company will 
never fall victim to57. The process of mapping that we are describing here can be done in 
a structured fashion similar to the key steps recommended in a logistics/supply chain 
network design process. Such systematic processes - that often include audits to provide 
a comprehensive perspective on the company’s logistics processes - are well described 
in many modern supply chain textbooks (J. J. Coyle et al., 2013). We are concerned with 
creating an initial system awareness (Zsidisin, Ragatz, & Melnyk, 2004).  
The Supply Chain Risk Leadership Council (SCRLC) recommends the risk 
management process begins with identifying internal and external environments 
(SCRLC, 2011). At this mapping stage, it is appropriate to give some thought to the 
organization’s own forms, structures and processes, as these may relate to the 
operating environment. Because risks or risky situations often occur at the intercept of 
the firm’s characteristics and the external environment in which it chooses to operate, 
the firm’s own attributes or impediments may indeed contribute and add to the overall 
risk exposure. For example, an inability to adapt could be a sustainability problem and a 
risk factor on its own (Carter & Rogers, 2008). It makes the firm more vulnerable. 
Deciding to source from or operate in India may consequently not be the ideal choice 
                                                          
57 “Never say never” is of course a valid objection to this simplification approach, as there is 
always a chance that the “unknown unknowns” will rear their ugly heads and surprise us. So we don’t 
want to simplify too radically.  
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for a company that suffers from various forms of inertia, unless it is able and willing to 
modify many of its operating practices, and thereby reduce its vulnerability.  
2. Identification 
Identifying relevant risks is perhaps the most important step. Kern et al. note 
that superior risk identification supports the subsequent risk assessment and this in turn 
leads to better risk mitigation (Kern, Moser, Hartmann, & Moder, 2012). Several 
researchers have classified supply risks into operational (internal) risks58 and disruption 
(external) risks (Kouvelis, Chambers, & Wang, 2006; C. S. Tang, 2006a). The operational 
risks can be internal to the company or internal to the extended supply chain (or 
network), while the disruption risks primarily consist of environmental and man-made59 
hazards. Environmental risks can be remediated through “business continuity planning”, 
while man-made attacks can be prevented with “supply chain security management”. 
(Markmann, Gnatzy, von der Gracht, & Darkow, 2011).60  Some authors use a finer filter 
to categorize risks.  For example, Manuj & Mentzer divide risks into eight categories: 
Supply, Operational, Demand, Security, Macro, Policy, Competitive, and Resource risks 
(Manuj & Mentzer, 2008a). Regardless of the method used to categorize the relevant 
risks, the target of risk identification is to identify all potential threats and all relevant 
vulnerabilities within the upstream part of the supply chain (Kern et al., 2012). A 
                                                          
58 Kleindorfer and van Wassenhove call them coordination (supply/demand matching) risks (Kleindorfer & 
Van Wassenhove, 2004) 
59 By “man-made” we include risky behavior by women, too!  
60 That many of these terms are used interchangeably is exemplified by this definition of business 
continuity planning (BCP) by Rice and Caniato: “BCP means developing plans to be resilient – that is, to be 
prepared to respond to and restore operations after an unexpected, major disruption occurs” (Rice & 
Caniato, 2003) 
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necessary systems perspective forces the individual company and its management to 
adopt both a company perspective and a supply chain perspective, simultaneously 
(Paulsson, 2005).  Christian Verstraete defines ‘operational’ risks as internal to the 
supply chain and which can be addressed through appropriate operational adjustments, 
while ‘structural’ risks are more environmental (exogenous) in nature and requires 
companies to change the way they operate. The latter type of risk requires a supply 
chain or network to be flexible enough to transform itself (Verstraete, 2008). What is 
particularly interesting about Verstraete’s article is the impact various risks might have 
on the company’s competitors or competing supply chains. Not only do managers need 
to worry about operational and structural risks in their own supply chains, but also in 
competing supply chains, as an integral part of the greater business environment and 
industry “system”.  
 SupplyChainDigest’s tri-annual listing of “The Top Supply Chain Disasters of All 
Time” (Gilmore, 2009) provides a glimpse of the severity of operational risks. Of the 
sixteen costly episodes listed, at least eleven of them pertain to disastrous transitions 
and implementations of new and ambitious operating processes, such as production or 
warehouse management systems. In fact, of the sixteen top-ranked disasters, none of 
them are external disruptions like natural or man-made disasters. Two take-aways from 
this exposé may be that 1) “change is risky”, and 2) “the enemy is within (the supply 
chain)”.  
Monroe et al. wrote a whole article on cataloguing the various sources of risks 
recognized in the supply chain literature between 2003 and 2010 (Monroe, Teets, & 
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Martin, 2012). They looked for general categories of risk sources, finding that the five 
most mentioned were supply risk, demand risk, process risk, environmental risk and 
control/business controls. All-in-all they spotted 39 different sources covered in 20 
journal articles, and proceeded to condense these into three general categories: 
demand-side risk, internal processes risk, and supply-side risks.  Each of these was given 
sub-categories of physical, informational, financial and relational. Taking a less abstract 
tack, a dissertation written by Oehmen identified four specific risk scenarios when 
sourcing in China: ‘total cost too high’, ‘insufficient delivery reliability’, ‘insufficient 
quality’, and ‘damage to reputation’ (Oehmen, 2009).   
Based on the structured interview technique61, Oke & Gopalakrishnan performed 
a study of supply chain disruptions in the retail sector (Oke & Gopalakrishnan, 2009). 
They asked many of the same questions we did in our electronic survey: the company’s 
background, the type of risks the company and entire supply chain have been exposed 
to or perceived as potential risks, the impacts of those risks, and the mitigation 
strategies that are in place to cope with them. They were also concerned with placing 
the identified risks into a likelihood versus impact matrix, thus being able to separate 
the risks into four distinct corners or classes: low likelihood/low impact, low 
likelihood/high impact, high likelihood/low impact and high likelihood/high impact. As it 
turned out, many of the identified risks clustered in the middle as medium 
                                                          
61 Basically asking the same questions, the same way and at the same time in the interviewing 
process (Shank, 2006) 
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likelihood/medium impact62, while the ones found to be low likelihood and high impact 
were man-made disasters and natural disasters. The high likelihood but low impact risks 
(“irritants”) were climate and delays due to the Chinese New-Year’s celebration. These 
risks are predictable, annual occurrences that can easily be prepared for.  
Correctly identifying plausible risks is a challenging process. Each supply chain 
has different attributes and exposures. The increased complexity of global supply chains 
relying on outsourcing and offshoring has added new levels of risk and interdependence 
that are sometimes not evident until disaster strikes, exposing hidden vulnerabilities 
and leading to large economic losses (Cohen & Kunreuther, 2007; Kleindorfer & Van 
Wassenhove, 2004).  Producing lists of plausible risks involve internal and external 
sources of information, both tapping into the institutional memory bank (what 
colleagues and supply chain partners remember) and using a variety of published 
sources such as annual reports by insurance underwriters, government agencies, 
industry associations and consulting firms specializing in risk tracking and analysis.  
With respect to sourcing and operating risks in India, there exists quite a bit of 
statistical and anecdotal material. Table 9 contains recent rankings by eight global 
organizations comparing the BRIC-M countries.63 These are all large, developing 
production economies that can be reasonably compared to India. Table 9 shows that 
India has an average composite score on par with Russia. Brazil, China and Mexico have  
 
                                                          
62 Examples of these mid-range supply risks were loss of key supplier, gas prices, regulations and socio-
economic factors.  
63 Brazil, Russia, India, China and Mexico.  
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Table 9: VARIOUS BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT INDICES 
 
Organization Index Year Co
u
n
tries 
ran
ked
 
IN
D
IA
 
B
razil 
R
u
ssia 
C
h
in
a 
M
exico
 
B
R
IC
-M
 
average 
So
u
rce: 
Transparency 
International 
Corruption 
Perceptions 
2011 183 95 73 143 75 100 97 64  
International 
Finance 
Corporation 
(World Bank) 
Doing 
Business  
2012 183 132 126 120 91 53 104 65  
Heritage 
Foundation 
Economic 
Freedom 
2012 179 123 99 144 138 54 112 66  
World 
Economic 
Forum 
Global 
Competitiven
ess Report 
2012 144 59 48 67 29 53 51 67  
Legatum 
Institute 
Legatum 
Prosperity 
Index 
2011 110 91 42 59 52 53 59 68  
United 
Nations 
Human 
Development 
Index 
2011 187 134 84 66 101 57 88 69  
Global 
Integrity 
Integrity 
Indicators 
2011 100 70 76 71 64 68 70 70  
Property 
Rights 
Alliance 
International 
Property 
Rights Index 
2012 130 62 62 97 57 76 71 71  
Average 
score 
The lower the 
better 
    95.8 76.3 95.9 75.9 64.3 81.6  
 
better composite scores. India is the worst scoring country of the five in the categories 
“Doing Business”, “Prosperity”, and “Human Development”.  It scores only better than 
                                                          
64 http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/ 
65 http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/india 
66 http://www.heritage.org/index/country/india 
67 http://www3.weforum.org/docs/CSI/2012-13/GCR_Rankings_2012-13.pdf 
68 http://www.prosperity.com/country.aspx?id=IN 
69 http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ 
70 http://www.globalintegrity.org/report/India/2011 
71 http://www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/ranking  
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average in the “Corruption Perceptions” and “International Property Rights” indexes. 
Apparently India still has a macro and socio-economic environment that breeds many of 
the risks faced by companies operating there. It is still a poor country (see Table 10), 
with problems such as corruption, crime and insufficient infrastructure.  Sourcing from 
this country will be made attractive only if the many potential risks are more than 
compensated for by cheaper production, access to resources (labor and raw materials), 
proximity to the markets, and an expectation that conditions will keep improving.   
 
Table 10: THE ECONOMIST’S EXPECTED GDP PER CAPITA IN 2013, SELECT ASIAN 
COUNTRIES 
Country Population GDP per capita 
Bangladesh 171 million $695 
China 1.34 billion $6,890 
India 1.24 billion $1,770 
Indonesia 251 million $3,890 
Malaysia 29 million $11,580 
Pakistan 184 million $1,410 
Philippines 106 million $2,650 
Sri Lanka 21 million $3,150 
Thailand 69 million $5,800 
Vietnam 90 million $1,800 
Source: (Economist, 2012b) 
 
The South Asian cluster of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka has many 
shared socio-economic and climatic impediments. The region is prone to natural 
calamities such as typhoons, heavy monsoon flooding and earthquakes, and a poor and 
dense population causes social ills and deprives the governments the revenues they 
need to build infrastructure. Other problems include ethnic and religious animosities 
that frequently bubble up in the form of terrorist actions, riots and armed attacks.   
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The Heritage Foundation in its “2012 Index of Economic Freedom” points out 
that despite India’s economic growth, the foundations for long-term economic 
development remain fragile because of: 
 An absence of an effectively functioning legal framework, where property rights 
are not protected effectively 
 Serious corruption, especially in government procurement and defense contracts 
 Government meddling in economic activity 
 Restrictive and burdensome regulatory environment, where licensing takes too 
long and trade barriers are erected 
 Inflationary pressure (Heritage_Foundation, 2012) 
 
The World Bank and the International Finance Corporation, in their “Doing 
Business 2012” report, give India very low scores in three categories, relative to 183 
nations ranked (World_Bank, 2012): 
 Starting a business (166 out of 183) 
 Dealing with construction permits (181 out of 183) 
 Enforcing contracts (182 out of 183) 
 
India also scores worse than the average in: 
 Getting electricity (98 out of 183) 
 Resolving insolvency (128) 
 Registering property (97) 
 Paying taxes (147) 
 Trading across borders (109) 
 
Doing Business measured the time and steps needed to legally build a 
warehouse in Mumbai, and found that it requires 34 procedures, takes 227 days and 
costs 16 times more than the average income per capita. The “Enforcing contracts” item 
was based on the set of procedural steps and time required to resolve a standardized 
commercial dispute through the courts. The main reason India placed second worst in 
the world on this measure was that filing such a case requires 46 procedures, an 
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average of almost four years and an expense of 40% of the claim.72 Under “Trading 
across borders”, obstacles such as excessive document requirements, burdensome 
customs procedures, inefficient port operations and inadequate infrastructure were 
listed as factors leading to extra costs and delays for exporters and importers. However, 
the time it takes to import or export has come down considerably over the past six 
years.  
Natural Disasters 
 
Appendix B contains tables, figures and maps showing frequencies and examples 
of the most typical natural disasters occurring in South Asia. Considering earthquakes 
and flooding, it turns out that India is not severely affected by the former. Almost every 
country in the vicinity tends to have more frequent and severe quakes than India. 
Flooding is a greater concern for India. Flash floods, as well as widespread and 
destructive flooding from monsoonal rains (June – September) are a clear threat to 
people and property (Central_Intelligence_Agency, 2012). There are two types of 
flooding: flooding induced by excessive rainfall, and flooding as a result of rising sea-
levels.  A 2008 analysis sponsored by the OECD predicted that India’s port cities will be 
some of the worst affected by rising sea-levels by the year 2070. A “perfect storm” 
combination of population and economic growth, global sea-level rise, more intense 
storms and higher storm surges, and human-induced subsidence will cause severe salt 
                                                          
72 Another example of a slow court system was reported by Global Integrity in its “India Notebook 2011”: 
In June of 2010, a court in Bhopal sentenced each of eight Indians to two years in jail for death by 
negligence in the Union Carbide gas plant leak, where thousands of people died. This verdict came down 
26 years after the disaster (Global_Integrity, 2012).  
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water flooding in coastal areas and port cities in India, including Chennai, Kolkata and 
Mumbai (Nicholls, 2008). Swiss Re identified India as one of the top ten countries in the 
world for flooding risk (Swiss-Re, 2012). Major flooding is most prevalent in the northern 
states of Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Assam, the 
eastern states of West Bengal, Orissa and Andhra Pradesh, and the southern state of 
Kerala (MapsOfIndia.com, 2012). 
Lonely Planet writes that, generally speaking, India’s climate is defined by three 
seasons – the hot, the wet (monsoon) and the cool (S. Singh & Bindloss, 2007). The hot 
season (April – June) can bring with it periods of damaging draught, with sustained 
temperatures above 100 degrees F.  In the middle of the winter, temperatures can get 
very cold in the areas north of Delhi, and people freeze to death every year.  Destructive 
and deadly cyclones tend to form between April and December, with peaks in May and 
November. An average of four to six major cyclones takes place in the North Indian 
Ocean every year.  
India’s worst natural disaster since the year 1900 in terms of casualties was an 
epidemic in 1920 that claimed 2 million lives. Droughts in 1942 and 1965 claimed 
approximately 1.5 million lives each. The natural disasters that affected the most people 
were droughts in May of 1987 and July of 2002, affecting more than 300 million people 
each event.  The costliest event was a flood in July of 1993 that caused damages 
estimated at $7 billion.73  
                                                          
73 It is amazing how “inexpensive” disastrous events are in India in comparison with disasters of 
similar severity in the developed world. The starkest example is perhaps the 2004 tsunami, which claimed 
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Compared to China and the United States, India cannot be characterized as 
particularly disaster-prone, although its preponderance of man-made disasters seems 
high (CIA, 2012; Swiss-Re, 2012): 
Table 11: INDIAN DISASTERS VIS-A-VIS CHINA AND THE U.S.  (% share of world totals) 
Description India % of global China % of global USA % of global 
Natural disasters 5.1% 10.3% 20.0% 
Man-made disasters  8.7% 6.0% 2.0% 
Population 17.0% 19.2% 4.5% 
Land area 2.0% 6.4% 6.5% 
GDP, nominal 2.6% 10.4% 21.4% 
Exports 1.7% 10.6% 8.3% 
 
In 2012, the British consultancy Maplecroft published an Asian Natural Hazards 
Risk map that depicted the economic exposure of natural disasters. The map, which was 
compiled in cooperation with the UN, identifies Japan, China and Taiwan as having the 
highest economic exposure to natural hazards in absolute terms. India did not show 
areas of high or extreme risk on this map, except in the far north, where there is high 
risk of earthquakes (Maplecroft, 2012b). 
Man-made Disasters 
 
Another major source of disruptions is man-made (human induced) disasters, or 
“technological disasters” as EM-DAT labels them (EM-DAT, 2012). As Appendix C shows 
in more detail, these consist of industrial accidents such as chemical spills, structure 
collapses, explosions, fires, gas leaks and poisonings, in addition to a variety of 
                                                          
16,000 lives on the Indian east coast, but had damages assessed at only a little more than a billion dollars.  
The 2011 tsunami that hit Japan claimed about 20,000 lives and cost more than $210 billion, the highest 
global damage estimate ever (Asian_Disaster_Reduction_Center, 2012).  The reasons Indian disasters 
might seem financially cheap are a combination of cheap construction and low casualty insurance 
coverage.   
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transportation accidents. Between the years 1900 and 2012, 658 such technological 
disasters caused the deaths of more than 32,000 people. The worst man-made disaster 
was the gas leak from Union Carbide’s plant in Bhopal on December 3, 1984. An 
estimated 2,500 people perished, and 300,000 were affected.  On August 11, 1979, the 
town of Morvi in Gujarat was flooded by a broken dam, killing 1,335 people and 
affecting 150,000 others. Poor quality infrastructure and high population density can be 
a deadly mixture. Major disasters are now being tracked closely by a variety of 
organizations, whether insurance underwriters or international aid agencies.  
There is little evidence to support the contention that catastrophic events are 
becoming more frequent. The annual number of reported disasters has shown a 
downward trend since the year 2000 (Guha-Sapir, Vos, Below, & Ponserre, 2012)74.  
With increasing development, there is, however, a trend that the economic damage is 
getting higher75. L. Coleman writes, “the probability of any event impacting on people 
and assets has risen significantly because of the doubling of the world’s population since 
about 1970, and a trend to locate assets – often of high value – in more hazardous areas 
such as coastlines” (Coleman, 2006). Wagner and Bode point out that “the vulnerability 
of supply chains to disturbance or disruption has increased” (S. Wagner & C. Bode, 
2006), because of a combination of factors such as more single and global sourcing.  
                                                          
74 Official statistics show, however, that there was a steady increase in reported disasters during 
the 25-year period from 1975 to 2000.  
75 The three most expensive disasters (Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, and the 2011 Japanese 
tsunami) have all happened within the past seven years. Note that they happened in the developed 
countries of the U.S. and Japan. 
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Asia is the most disaster prone continent.  From 2001-2010, 40% of the natural 
disasters happened there, 90% of the victims (fatalities or affected) lived there, and 38% 
of the monetary damages happened there.  Hydrological disasters (floods) usually have 
many victims, and this is a major reason for the high proportion in Asia.  Flooding 
combined with population density76 is a dangerous combination. About half of the 
reported natural disasters that happened in Asia between 2001 and 2010 were 
hydrological (floods and mudslides).  
Terrorism 
 
Supply chains are often susceptible to property damage and interruptions 
caused by terrorist attacks, either directly because assets have been destroyed, or 
indirectly through transportation delays and security measures in the aftermaths of 
events. Although the timing and severity of global terrorist attacks are quite random, 
the locations of such attacks are mostly concentrated to a few areas. Unfortunately, 
India is one of those areas. Out of 158 nations, the publisher of the Global Terrorism 
Index - the Institute for Economics and Peace (IFEC) - ranked India as the country that 
was the fourth most impacted by terrorism in 2011. This was behind Iraq, Pakistan and 
Afghanistan (Humanity, 2013; IFEP, 2012). 
So while many Middle Eastern countries are torn apart from sectarian violence 
and civil war, India has a somewhat different situation.  IFEC writes that attacks on 
                                                          
76 Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka are three of the most densely populated countries in the 
world. According to Wikipedia, Bangladesh has a density of 1,034 people per square kilometer, India’s is 
368, and Sri Lanka’s is 345.  
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Indian soil can be divided into foreign and home grown terrorism. The foreign breed has 
religious (Islamic vs. Hindu) overtones and is related to the conflict with Pakistan over 
Kashmir. The home grown one has to do with the Naxalite-Marxist insurgency in eastern 
India. It is notable that the Communist Party of India (Maoist) is responsible for 45% of 
all attacks in the country. IFEC points out that the vast majority of terrorism which 
occurs in India is by politically motivated nationalists and separatists. Overpopulation 
may be one underlying cause of these tensions. As noted by Mother Jones Magazine, 
”India, where the dynamics of overpopulation and overconsumption are most acute, 
where the lifelines between water, food, fuel, and 1.17 billion people — 17% of 
humanity subsisting on less than 2.5% of the globe's land — are already stretched 
dangerously thin” (Whitty, 2010). The size of India is less than a third of the United 
States, but the population is almost four times higher. From a business and supply chain 
standpoint, this dense population creates an abundant labor pool and promising sales 
opportunities, but downsides are the risk of congestion, delays and interruptions from 
terrorist attacks, riots or civil unrest.  
Supply chain risk managers must be mindful of the potential interruptions from 
terrorism in India. Foreign owned or export oriented companies do not seem to be 
specifically targeted.  Most of the attacks have been against soft targets, such as crowds 
of people, often in connection with public transportation. There does not seem to be a 
pervasive anti-western or anti-foreign sentiment in India, as the terrorism has mostly 
been of religious or domestic nature.   
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Risk managers must stay informed about what trends may affect the countries 
they are operating in, such as India. For example, a recent report by the British 
consultancy Maplecroft warned that India’s massive population and increasing demand 
for scarce resources make it (and Bangladesh) particularly sensitive to climate change. 
They recommend that “understanding climate vulnerability will help companies make 
their investments more resilient to unexpected change” (Guardian_The, 2010). The 
combination of high economic exposure and weak resilience make several Asian 
economies, including India, vulnerable to the fallout of large natural disasters. “These 
would not only include disruptions to their domestic economies, but also to the 
operations and supply chains of many of the world’s largest corporations who invest in 
these locations because of their significant growth opportunities” (Maplecroft, 2012a).  
Risk Taxonomies and India 
 
Based on an in-depth review of the business related risk literature, Rao and 
Goldsby developed a detailed typology of supply chain risk (Rao & Goldsby, 2009). They 
broke supply chain risk into five main factors, each with several sub factors as follows: 
1. Environmental risk (Political, Policy, Macroeconomic and Social) 
2. Industry risk (Input market, Product market and Competitive) 
3. Organizational risk (Agency, Credit, Liability and Operating) 
4. Problem specific risk (Risk interrelationship, Objectives and constraints, Task 
complexity) 
5. Decision maker risk (Knowledge/Skill/Biases, Information seeking, Rules and 
procedures, Bounded rationality) 
 
The typology is useful for managers in their identification and assessment of 
various operational risks. Companies should develop suitable typologies and 
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breakdowns that fit their products and operating environments. For example, another 
useful listing of supply-related risks are provided by Sodhi and Lee (they also broke 
these risks into whether they needed strategic or operational decisions to be mitigated) 
(M.S. Sodhi & Lee, 2007): 
 Mergers-and-acquisitions threat (i.e. a competitor buying a major supplier) 
 Acts of God and Acts of man (natural disasters, war, terrorism, sanctions) 
 Political risk 
 Capacity risk (too much or too little)  
 Single sourcing (relying on too few suppliers) 
 Intellectual property risk 
 Supplier delays 
 Inventory risk (obsolescence, space, cost) 
 
In addition, they include these as “contextual” risks: 
 
 Environmental risk and compliance 
 Regulation  compliance  
 Exchange rates 
 Financial risk 
 Systems risk (information infrastructure and networks) 
 Cultural differences 
 
In comparing and ranking Chinese, Ukrainian and Brazilian suppliers, Reuven 
Levary chose to separate risks into four criteria: Supplier reliability, country risk, 
transportation company reliability, and reliability of the suppliers’ suppliers (Levary, 
2007)77. Mahendran et al. presented a paper in 2011 where they categorized numerous 
risks relevant for the Indian market. These were extracted using a case study and semi-
                                                          
77 Hereafter, reliability is defined as “the ability of a system or component to perform its required 
functions under stated conditions for a specified period of time, or even resist failure” (Schmitt & Singh, 
2012) 
66 
 
structured interview of executives in the Indian pharmaceutical industry (Mahendran, 
Narasimhan, Nagarajan, & S, 2011): 
A. Supply Risks: 
 Imports: Transport delays, customs delays, holiday delays, striking laborers 
 Inferior quality of supply 
 Non-availability of resources: raw materials, packaging materials 
 Natural disasters (floods, earthquakes), Monsoon season 
 Man-made disasters (terrorism, insurgencies, political rallies, protests) 
 Selection of supplier 
 Cost risk (increase in fuel cost, taxes, packaging materials) 
B. Production risks: 
 Malfunction of machinery 
 Human risks (negligence, ignorance, labor unrest) 
 Wrong packaging 
 Power shutdown 
C. Demand risks:  
 Forecasting errors 
D. Miscellaneous risks: 
 Transportation risks (delays, does not reach destination, hazardous materials ) 
 Quality risks 
 Storage risks 
 Information sharing risks 
 Government safety regulations 
 
 
The Boston Consulting Group’s India office recently confirmed that Indian 
pharmaceutical companies continue to grapple with “a plethora of local challenges”, for 
instance, poor infrastructure, paucity of skilled manpower, or the policy framework 
(Nandgaonkar & Sebastian, 2012). Tang notes that outsourced manufacturing makes a 
supply chain more vulnerable to disruptions such as natural and man-made disasters. 
He suggests that the supply network design, including supplier selection, supplier order 
allocations and the structure of the supply contracts are important factors in reducing 
the overall supply management risk (C. S. Tang, 2006a).  
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It is often not the damage from the disaster itself that impedes and slows down 
supply chain operations. If an explosion destroys train tracks or a highway, it will have a 
direct impact on that transportation route, but the indirect effects can be more severe, 
such as lengthy delays and intrusive security measures. Mishaps happening within 
supply chains can also have wide ranging consequences for other parts of a company’s 
supply chain. In 2008, the Indian pharmaceutical company Ranbaxy was barred by the 
U.S. Food & Drug Administration from shipping into the U.S. more than 30 different 
drugs made at factories in India. There had been quality lapses at Ranbaxy factories and 
the company lost the confidence of the main U.S. regulator. It is currently selling in the 
U.S. under a consent decree which requires the company to improve manufacturing 
procedures, ensure accurate product data, and undergo extra oversight and review by 
an independent third party for five years (L. A. Johnson, 2012).  
In Tang and Musa’s 2011 paper they separated 138 journal articles written 
between 1995 and 2008 into how they catalogued risk issues. Analyzing the foci of the 
articles, they conveniently organized them into a flow (material, financial and 
information) versus activity (source, make and deliver) perspective. The articles they 
studied contained suggested mitigation solutions (either qualitative or quantitative) for 
each risk issue listed (O. Tang & Musa, 2011). 
Another very comprehensive list of risk categories and their risk triggers is given 
by Tummala and Schoenherr in a 2011 paper. They provide a table of ten risk categories 
and dozens of affiliated risk triggers.  For example, under what they label “sovereign 
risks” they include regional instability, communication difficulties, government 
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regulations, loss of control, and intellectual property breaches as the risk triggers 
(Tummala & Schoenherr, 2011). Their listing is a smorgasbord for researchers and 
practitioners looking for suitable risk categories to use in their analyses and risk 
management processes. 
Thun and Hoenig, as well, divided supply chain risks into external and internal 
risks when they surveyed German automotive executives on vulnerability. Their 
conclusion was that internal supply chain risks were regarded as more likely to occur 
and that such risks would have a greater impact on the supply chain (Thun & Hoenig, 
2011). They identified internal and external risks as follows: 
 Internal: Supplier failure, Malfunction of IT system, Supplier quality problems, 
Transportation failure, Delivery chain disruptions, Increasing raw materials 
prices, Change in customer demand, Machine breakdowns, Technological 
change. 
 External: Accident (e.g. fire), Strike, Terrorist attack, War, Increasing customs 
duty, Import restriction, Natural disaster, Oil crisis. 
 
Some of these risks are overlapping or compounded. Looking at Thun & Hoenig’s 
dichotomy, it appears that the risk element ‘transportation failure’ could be either 
internal or external.  The 2010 volcanic eruptions in Iceland caused transportation 
interruptions and failures, but such geophysical phenomena can hardly be regarded 
“internal” risks. However, if the company’s truck breaks down, this would be an internal 
risk. Looking at the underlying cause should help us in cataloguing the risks and doing 
root-cause analyses. (Elkins, Handfield, Blackhurst, & Craighead, 2005). Root cause 
analyses can reveal wicked problems, characterized by contradictions, ambiguities, 
constraints and conflicting interests, and complex enough to defy simple solutions. 
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There are many challenges in managing risks within interdependent networks (Heal, 
Kearns, Kleindorfer, & Kunreuther, 2006). Viewed as systems of interacting and 
interlocking networks, Helen Peck offers these reasons why supply chain risk is a wicked 
problem (Peck, 2005, 2009): 
 Multiple stakeholders 
 Competing interests and value sets 
 No single common definitive goal 
 No clarity of mission 
 No universal solution 
 To understand the problem you must understand the context 
 
Related to the internal vs. external risk debate is the perspective given by 
Trkman and McCormack. They look at endogenous risk as having its source within the 
supply chain and it can lead to changing relationships between the focal firm and the 
suppliers. Market and technology turbulence are mentioned as the most notable 
endogenous risks (Trkman & McCormack, 2009). Exogenous risks originate from outside 
the supply chain. They divide these risks into discrete events such as terrorist attacks, 
epidemics and workers’ strikes, and continuous risks such as inflation and price changes. 
They point out that mitigation of endogenous risks involve working with the suppliers, 
while exogenous risks cannot generally be reduced but be minimized through a level of 
preparedness and resilience. Most contextual, exogenous risks are beyond the control 
of the company or its supply chain and are less manageable than endogenous risks 
(Ritchie & Brindley, 2007)78. 
                                                          
78 Ritchie and Brindley also use the terms unavoidable or systematic for exogenous risks.  
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Wagner and Bode prefer to classify risks into the three major sources of 
demand-side, supply-side and catastrophic (S. M. Wagner & C. Bode, 2006). (Later they 
added two more classes: regulatory (including legal and bureaucratic) risks and 
infrastructure risks (Wagner & Bode, 2008)). In several ways the risks associated with 
the classic business processes of “source, make and deliver” are intertwined (Yuan et al., 
2012)79. 
From the recent literature we also considered problems such as misaligned 
incentives, moral hazards, adverse selection, lack of accountability, agency relationships 
and goal congruency, and found these issues somewhat useful in preparing our 
empirical survey  (World_Economic_Forum, 2012a; Zsidisin & Ellram, 2003; Zsidisin & 
Smith, 2005). Many of Zsidisin’s papers focus on uncovering and reducing supplier risk, 
suggesting proactive supply management tools to improve supplier quality and 
performance and preventing interruptions (Zsidisin, Ellram, et al., 2004). The supply 
risks he specifically identifies as relevant to in-bound supply are business (financial) risk, 
supplier capacity constraints, quality risk, technological change risk, product design 
change risk, and disasters (Zsidisin et al., 2000). Andreas Norrman points out that as 
agents, suppliers often have different objectives, information and risk attitudes, causing 
the classic pitfalls in agency theory of opportunism, self-interest and asymmetric 
information.  He recommends well-specified contracts, including risk-sharing contracts, 
to prevent this and promote more cooperative, long-term and trusting exchange 
                                                          
79 The material flows of “source, make and deliver” are sometimes expressed as “supply, 
conversion and distribution” (Sheffi & Rice, 2005). 
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relationships (Norrman, 2008). Instead of just pushing risk onto the suppliers, risk and 
gain sharing contracts are encouraged.  
The following classification of risks constitutes a preliminary framework for the 
survey questionnaire used in the empirical portion of this study. The risks eventually 
included in the survey were a distillate of these: 
Table 12: CLASSIFICATION OF RISKS AND EXAMPLES RELEVANT TO INDIA 
Ty
p
e 
Subtype  Examples Internal 
or 
External 
Control-
able? 
Source, 
make or 
deliver 
Litera-
ture 
source 
N
at
u
ra
l d
is
as
te
rs
80
 
Geophysical 
 
Meteorological 
Hydrological 
Climatological 
 
Biological 
 
 Earthquake, 
tsunami 
 Wind storm 
 Flood 
 Drought, heat & 
cold waves 
 Epidemics, 
pandemics 
External No S, M, D (Guha-
Sapir et 
al., 2012) 
M
an
-m
ad
e 
d
is
as
te
rs
 
Transportation 
accidents 
 
 
Industrial 
accidents 
 
 
Human 
misdeeds 
 
 Road 
 Rail 
 Air 
 Water 
 Fire 
 Explosion 
 Spills, leaks 
 Collapses 
 Terrorist attacks 
 Mass murder 
 Warfare 
 Riots  
 Sabotage 
External 
 
 
 
Can be 
both 
 
 
External 
Some S,M,D (EM-DAT, 
2012) 
                                                          
80 It is easy to envision that compound, multifaceted disasters often happen.  In tropical areas, a 
classic domino effect may be an earthquake that sets off a tsunami that causes severe flooding that 
triggers looting and riots and eventually starvation and a cholera epidemic. Later effects may be political 
and fiscal crises. In the words of the World Economic Forum, “the initial event results in a cascading 
disruption or failure across regions or industries” (World_Economic_Forum, 2012b). That organization 
separates the risks into environmental, geopolitical, economic and technological.  
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Se
cu
ri
ty
 
Violent crimes 
 
Property 
crimes 
 
 
 
 
Financial 
crimes 
 
Product crimes 
 Murder & assault 
 Kidnapping 
 Theft, robbery 
 Cargo theft 
 Vandalism 
 I.P. violations 
 Piracy 
 Blackmail 
 Corruption 
 Bribery, kickbacks 
 Contamination 
 Counterfeiting 
Internal 
 
Internal 
 
 
 
 
 
Internal 
 
 
Internal 
Some S,M,D (Burges, 
2011) 
In
st
it
u
ti
o
n
al
 
Governmental 
regulations 
 
 
 
 
Politics 
 
Labor 
regulations 
 
Court system 
 
 Restrictions 
 Licenses & 
permits 
 Red tape81 
 Tax laws 
 Customs delays82 
 Instability 
 Unpredictability 
 Conflicting, 
confusing 
 Restrictive 
 Slow 
 Discriminatory 
Can be 
both 
 
 
 
 
External 
 
Can be 
both 
 
Can be 
both 
No S,M Multiple 
In
fr
as
tr
u
ct
u
re
 
Transportation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Utilities 
 
 
 
Communica-
tions 
 Bad roads 
 Slow rail 
 Congested 
seaports 
 Congested 
airports 
 Poor public 
services 
 Insufficient 
capacity 
 Unsatisfactory 
water supply 
 Unstable power 
supply 
 Internet 
 Telephone 
Can be 
both 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Can be 
both 
 
 
Internal 
Some S,M,D (World_E
conomic
_Forum, 
2012a) 
                                                          
81 “A bureaucracy known for delays, dithering and lack of accountability” in the words of The 
Washington Post (Lakshmi, 2010) 
82 According to APCAC, Customs is still the primary chokepoint for supply chains (APCAC, 2011) 
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O
p
er
at
io
n
al
 
 
Manufacturing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Logistics 
 Equipment 
failure 
 Contamination, 
adulteration83 
 Capacity 
shortages 
 Quality problems 
 Facility problems 
 I.T. problems 
 Transportation 
delays 
 Transport 
damage 
 Storage 
problems84 
Internal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Internal 
Yes S,M,D Multiple 
H
u
m
an
 r
e
so
u
rc
e 
Education, 
training 
Quality 
 
 
 
 
Cultural 
 Skills 
 Language 
 Productivity 
 Poor work ethic 
 Absenteeism 
 High labor 
turnover 
 Misunder-
standings 
 Miscommuni-
cation 
Internal 
 
Internal 
 
 
 
 
Internal 
Yes M (Kumar & 
Sethi, 
2005) 
Fi
n
an
ci
al
 
Macro-
economic 
 
 
 
 
 
Microeconomic 
 Inflation 
 High interest 
rates 
 Unstable 
exchange rates 
 Banking system 
 Bankrupt 
suppliers 
 Access to 
financing 
External 
 
 
 
 
 
Internal 
No 
 
 
 
 
 
Some 
S,M Multiple 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
83 The 2013 European horse meat scandal is bound to become a classic SCRM story (Wise, 2013) 
84 The country’s inefficient cold chain network results in spoilage of almost 40% of its total 
agricultural production (Subin, 2011), while 7% to 15% of wheat and rice stocks are lost each year largely 
due to poor pick up and distribution by the government run Food Corporation of India, FCI (Sen, 2012). 
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3. Assessment 
 
Risk assessment (estimating the likelihood of occurrence and the possible 
impact) aims at evaluating and understanding each risk in detail for its relevancy (Kern 
et al., 2012). Conventionally, the assessment phase of risk management involves 
comparing the probability of a given negative event to the impact such an event may 
have on the organization. The main purpose of such a binary comparison is to help 
managers identify the risks factors that may need more attention and resources to 
mitigate. Risks with both a high probability of occurrence and a high potential impact on 
the firm are obviously not desirable, and some sort of management action will be 
necessary to avoid serious disruptions or catastrophes. As stated by Sheffi and 
Blackhurst et al., the impact of disruptions on a system (i.e. an organization) varies 
depending on the level of resiliency within the supply chain (Blackhurst, Dunn, & 
Craighead, 2011; Sheffi, 2005). Supply chain resilience is the firm’s ability to recover 
from disruptive events (Rice & Caniato, 2003)85. A firm’s resiliency enhancers are 
defined as attributes that increase the ability to quickly and efficiently recover from a 
disruptive event (Blackhurst et al., 2011). These attributes are the resources and 
capabilities that the firm can muster to prevent and recover from unexpected 
disruptions. Jüttner and Maklan found that the four capabilities of flexibility, velocity, 
visibility and collaboration are the most frequently mentioned in the literature (Jüttner 
& Maklan, 2011). Blackhurst et al. use systems theory to regard firms or supply chains 
                                                          
85 Christopher and Peck define resilience as “the ability of a system to return to its original state 
or move to a new, more desirable state after being disturbed” (Christopher & Peck, 2004) 
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that dynamically interact with their environments, and a resource-based view to study 
how firms use a variety of their resources to enhance their defenses against disruptions 
and maintain a desirable resilience for quick recovery. Their research looked at 
resilience enhancers, such as the company’s many resources, vis-à-vis resiliency 
reducers, which mostly came about as a result of the supply chain’s construction and 
operating environment (e.g. complexity, volatilities, constraints, or regulations). 
According to this, the key to sustained success is to find an optimal (or at least a 
dynamic86) way to activate and mobilize the firm’s resources to neutralize or reduce the 
detrimental elements inherent in the supply chain.  
Risk assessment is the third phase of a structured risk management process. In a 
2005 empirical study focusing on supply risk, Blackhurst et al. found that executives felt 
they needed a tool for quantitative assessment applied to the supply chain that could 
identify high probability “nodes” for disruptions. This would possibly give them the tools 
needed for disruption discovery, recovery and eventual supply chain redesign 
(Blackhurst et al., 2005). The executives were looking for models (“dynamic risk index 
tools”87) that could provide early warning signs of potential or increasing supply risks. 
Through a thorough literature search, Vanany et al. found that a variety of assessment 
approaches were used, including brainstorming, process mapping, risk impact analysis, 
                                                          
86 Blackhurst et al. state rather curtly that “the optimization model is no longer valid – it is a 
brittle model. Therefore, dynamic supply-chain models are needed.” (Blackhurst, Craighead, Elkins, & 
Handfield, 2005) 
87 Such an index could contain elements such as location, global calendar, strike negotiations, 
volume and capacity, weather patterns, supplier health measures, etc.  
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scenario planning and a method called FMEA (failure mode and effect analysis) (Vanany 
et al., 2009).  
Assessing probabilities becomes a process of weighing statistical likelihood 
against subjective, experience based “guesstimates”. Unless the estimation of 
probability is a mathematical absolute (like rolling a fair dice, where by necessity the 
long term occurrence of any number is one sixth), any assignment of probability is a 
subjective process. The estimator’s thinking is influenced by perception, mood, 
experience, information access and quality, traditional methodology, and recent events.    
Statistically we may find that India experiences an average of four or five deadly 
terrorist attacks every year, providing an analyst with a certain indication of probability 
for that type of a risk.  However, unless you are a passenger on the train system or live 
in a northwestern state, the impact of such an attack may be minimal, especially on the 
typical supply chain.  The difficulty is to assign probabilities to the risk factors identified, 
so as to gauge the possible impact. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that global 
sourcing often causes the firm to unwittingly be subjected to a greater risk for natural 
disasters, lower safety standards and less reliable legal systems, among other risks 
(Bosman, 2006). The more control and/or visibility the analyst has over the global supply 
chain, the easier it becomes to do the research and assign more realistic disruption 
probabilities and impact assessments. Having good information and understanding risks 
in quantifiable terms provide a roadmap that is crucial for risk management and 
continuity planning (Braun, 2012).  
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While suggesting five generic risk management strategies (accept, avoid, reduce, 
transfer or share), Andersson and Norrman look at sourcing risks through four 
definitional steps: scenario, cause, effect and business impact (Andersson & Norrman, 
2004).  Looking at the chain of cause and effect is useful in understanding risks and their 
sources, although to operationalize this it will be necessary to add some measure of 
probability of occurrence. According to Ellis et al., behavioral research suggests that 
perceptual rather than objective assessments of risk tend to guide decision-making 
behavior (Ellis, Henry, & Shockley, 2010; March & Shapira, 1987). Ellis et al. define 
overall supply disruption risk as an individual’s perception of the total potential loss 
associated with the disruption of supply of a particular purchased item from a particular 
supplier.  This appears to be a very pragmatic way of handling the risk analysis: assess 
each product (or at least product category) by each supplier. Various products will face 
different risk scenarios, as will the various suppliers, depending on their operating 
practices, experience, size, financial situation and geographic location. Ellis et al. define 
probability of supply disruption as the perceived (judged) likelihood that a supply 
disruption will occur and the magnitude of supply disruption as the perception of the 
severity of losses that may result from a disruption. The manager judging probabilities 
and severities is influenced by several factors, including the person’s position, age, 
education, expertise, experience, cognitive ability, mood, the immediacy of disruption, 
risk preference, problem framing, and prior success (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992).  
Giunipero et al. add two more situational factors that determine and influence 
the company’s level of investment in risk management systems: degree of product 
78 
 
technology, and need for security (Giunipero & Eltantawy, 2004). They state that the 
distinguishing characteristics of each purchasing situation are expected to have a 
differential impact on the need for risk management. The degree of product technology 
relates to the item characteristics, such as overall product complexity. High tech 
markets require more extensive risk management than low-tech markets with a slower 
pace of technological change. Up to this point in time India has been a source of 
relatively low tech products (at least merchandise, maybe not services). Under this 
theory an increased technological sophistication will compound the overall risk from 
producing there. For India, the key to capturing more technological manufacturing 
might be to work to reduce the other major risk factors that straddle the country. As for 
the need for security, Giunipero and Eltantawy point to products with high security 
requirements, such as high tech products, foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals and weapons 
systems. China has had problems with the security of its food supply chain, while India 
has recent, published examples of problems with pharmaceutical products (L. A. 
Johnson, 2012).  
The severity or impact on a company can consist of anything from a short-term 
inconvenience to apocalyptic, “Black Swan” events that put the company under. 
Frequent, high probability, low impact disruptions can be dealt with through good 
management practices, while the scarier disruptions are the ones that have relatively 
low probabilities but high and devastating impacts should they happen, and made worse 
if the company is unprepared. Kouvelis et al. suggest that “normal business risks” can be 
79 
 
dealt with by possessing robustness88, while disruption risks require resilience (Kouvelis 
et al., 2012). Risks pose threats to the company’s bottom lines (in a triple bottom line 
sense), as well as brand reputation and stock value. In a 2012 report, IHS divided 
supplier risks into two categories, resting risks and reactive risks. They claimed that the 
resting risks are of the more predictable business-as-usual kind and can be analyzed: 
supplier bankruptcy, lack of supply due to high demand, cost risks, regulatory 
compliance, obsolescence, and counterfeit parts.  The reactive risks cannot be predicted 
in advance and include unforeseen economic conditions, natural disasters like floods 
and earthquakes, and product recalls (IHS, 2012). Such a division between resting risks 
and reactive risks may make sense, although the examples IHS provided did not seem 
overly convincing: In India, annual floods are probably more predictable than supplier 
bankruptcies, for example. In the same report, IHS makes the sensible observation that 
it is seldom one single incident or failure that causes a catastrophe, but a confluence of 
events that in combination leads to significant problems. Events often have a domino 
effect with unpredictable and perhaps exponential consequences.  
Kleindorfer and Saad highlight a few statistically based methodologies used in 
the industry to aid in the “SAM” process (Specifying, Assessing and Mitigating risks). 
(Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005). There are many similar models offered in the literature, all 
stressing the importance of a systematic and quantitative approach to risk assessment 
                                                          
88 Robust supply chain strategies 1) enable the company to manage supply and demand 
fluctuations efficiently in the typical supply chain management context, and 2) help the company sustain 
operations at some basic level during a disruption and restore operations soon after (Manmohan S. Sodhi 
& Tang, 2012) 
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(Knemeyer, Zinn, & Eroglu, 2009). Some authors advocate combining the frequency data 
with expert judgments, scenario planning and subjective probabilities. Some infrequent 
but high impact disasters seem to follow a power law distribution89, while chaos theory 
may also be useful in dispelling notions of linearity, predictability and controllability of 
events (M. Mitchell, 2009). Chaotic systems are sensitive to the initial or starting 
conditions, so while it may be difficult to predict where a disaster will go as soon as it is 
unleashed, it may be useful to study what conditions might trigger such cascading 
events. As Knemeyer et al. point out, while a supply chain manager does not know 
exactly when and where a tornado will strike, he can find out information about what 
conditions typically lead to their occurrence, when and where they are most frequent, 
and their likely paths. Because a chaotic system is not totally random, awareness of the 
initial conditions help in confining a “chaotic” string of events to within a certain range. 
For example, heavy Indian monsoon rains in the month of June will inevitably lead to 
flooding somewhere at some near point in time. The “somewhere” portion can be 
pinpointed fairly accurately by using observed data from previous seasons.  
The consequences of certain major disruptions could be severe. Empirical 
research by Hendricks and Singhal and published over several articles demonstrated 
how major supply chain disruptions negatively affected corporate performance 
(Hendricks & Singhal, 2003, 2005a, 2005b, 2012; Hendricks, Singhal, & Zhang, 2009). 
                                                          
89 Instead of a normal or poisson distribution, a power law follows an exponentially declining 
path (practically a straight line on a log-log plot), implying a much higher probability of an extreme event 
happening than if a normal bell shaped distribution was used as a guide (Watts, 2003). Occasional huge 
failures are more likely to happen than one might think (Banker, 2009).  
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Publicly announced supply chain disruptions had an immediate negative effect on share 
prices (about a 7% drop), but the long term (two years following the announcement) 
damage to shareholder value was much worse, with an almost 40% drop90. They also 
were able to show that firms that suffered from disruptions experienced a lower growth 
rate in revenues, more variable returns, higher total costs, and were regarded as riskier 
by the investors, thus requiring higher returns. Hendricks and Singhal separated what 
they labeled “glitches” from supply chain disruptions, where they found that even 
glitches caused an abnormal decrease in shareholder value of more than 10%. 
Compared to the more dramatic external disruptions such as natural disasters, glitches 
were defined as arising from within the supply chain, and could be a symptom of 
unreliable and unresponsive supply chains. From production or shipment delays, 
glitches91 caused mismatches between supply and demand, and were met with 
punishment by the financial markets.  
Pyke and Tang describe the many and substantial costs incurred in connection 
with a product recall, both during the recall process and in the aftermath of it (Pyke & 
Tang, 2010). They cite Intel Corporation’s loss of $500 million from a 1993 recall of 5.3 
million Pentium microprocessors with calculation flaws. Problems with lead paint in 
products sourced in China prompted toy maker Mattel to recall 967,000 toys, losing two 
Christmas seasons and experiencing a 50% decline in its stock price from 2007 to 2009 
                                                          
90 This was adjusted compared to the market, so that an abnormal return is the difference 
between the return on a stock and the return on an appropriate benchmark (Hendricks & Singhal, 2005b) 
91 Examples of these internal glitches were inaccurate forecasts, poor planning, parts shortages, 
quality problems, production problems, equipment breakdowns, capacity shortfalls, and operational 
constraints (Hendricks & Singhal, 2003) 
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(Dunn, 2011)92. After a series of problems that plagued its global operations over the 
last three years93, Toyota announced in December of 2012 that it was recalling 7.43 
million cars worldwide (NBC, 2012). This particular recall was related to a potentially 
defective power window switch which could cause fires. Although this is as much a 
manufacturing problem as a supply chain problem, the supply chain will be suffering 
mightily from all the costly activities in connection with the recall processing and 
repairs. In addition to bad PR possibly causing loss of market share, Toyota executives 
had to testify in front of the U.S. Congress in 2010, a $17.35 million fine was levied on 
them at the end of 2012, and the Wall Street Journal reported in 2010 that the financial 
impact of the recalls that year could cost Toyota more than $5 billion94.  Based on a 
survey of supply chain executives, the Aberdeen Group reported in 2008 that 58% of 
companies suffered financial losses as a result of supply chain disruptions (Sadlovska, 
Spinks, & Shecterle, 2008). One company surveyed in a 2003 study by MIT’s Center for 
Transportation and Logistics estimated a $50 million to $100 million cost impact for 
each day of disruption in its supply network (Rice & Caniato, 2003).  
The last example in Table 13 illustrates a typical compound risk, or domino 
effect. When the Indian partner was suspected of engaging in corruption to obtain 
                                                          
92 It should be noted here that 2007 to 2009 was a period with generally big declines in the stock 
markets.  
93 The Economist Magazine reported that Toyota suffered through a series of major safety-
related recalls in 2009-10. The underlying causes were lean production methods, unrealistic sales goals 
and overwhelmed (often single source) suppliers. The negative impacts included negative PR, slumping 
sales and market shares, and executives being forced to testify to the US Congress (The_Economist, 2010) 
94 March 9, 2010: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704145904575111341893725992.html  
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licenses (an internal risk), the Supreme Court arguably over-reacted by cancelling the 
licenses, thereby causing the foreign investor to lose hundreds of millions of dollars. 
Foreign investors obviously don’t cherish this type of uncertainty.  
A classic tool in risk assessment is to use a probability versus impact matrix. 
Figure 3 depicts one example that we used in a recent article on supply chain disasters 
Table 13: WIDELY PUBLICIZED DISASTERS 2010 – 2012 AND THEIR IMPACT 
Disaster Underlying cause Impact 
1) Internal to the supply chain: 
Operational: Multiple Toyota 
auto recalls 
Pressures to increase 
production rates and 
market share leading to 
rushed production. 
Customers hurt or killed; 
several billion dollars in 
financial losses. 
Operational and H.R.: E-coli 
outbreak in Germany from 
bean sprouts from an organic 
farm (Fox_News, 2011) 
Contaminated water or 
seeds; ideal growing 
condition for bacteria, 
possibly unhygienic 
practices.  
About 30 deaths; farm shut 
down; Spanish farm sector 
initially suspected lost millions 
of Euros, Russian import 
embargo. 
2) External (environmental) risks: 
Geophysical natural disaster: 
Hundreds of Japanese 
factories shut down for several 
days or weeks (Ramsey & 
Moffett, 2011) 
Severe earthquake and 
tsunami off Japan’s east 
coast.  
Besides loss of 20,000 lives 
and the most expensive 
natural disaster ever ($300 
billion), worldwide plant 
closures due to lack of 
Japanese parts, especially in 
the auto sector (Guha-Sapir et 
al., 2012; McClory, 2012) 
Institutional: Cancellation of 
joint venture Uninor’s mobile 
licenses by India’s Supreme 
Court.  
The Indian partner was 
involved in corruption in 
connection with the award 
of the licenses (arguably an 
internal risk, too) 
Telenor (the Norwegian 
partner) had to write off $721 
million on the joint venture; 
loss of market share (Source: 
Bloomberg.com) 
 
and externalities. The disruptions or risks to be concerned about are found in the 
“management zone”, while companies cannot operate for long in the “unsustainable” or 
“insignificance” zones. (Udbye, 2013). The main usefulness of this two-dimensional 
plotting (aka Vulnerability Map) is that risks can be easily compared.  
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Vulnerability maps will vary from supply chain to supply chain, and risks may be 
added or subtracted as the circumstances prescribe. The results of our survey should 
enable us to imagine an aggregate and current vulnerability map for India, keeping in 
mind that such a “map” will only be an average of the interpretations of risk by the 
companies and managers responding to the survey.  
Figure 2: THE PROBABILITY (LIKELIHOOD) VS. THE IMPACT (CONSEQUENCES) OF 
DISRUPTIONS 
 
Rather than ‘light’ and ‘severe’, Tummala and Schoenherr use four levels to 
categorize the consequence severity: catastrophic, critical, marginal and negligible. And 
instead of ‘low’ and ‘high’, they use these risk probability categories: often, infrequent, 
rare and extremely rare (Tummala & Schoenherr, 2011). It is problematic to find a 
smooth, ordinal scale when using words to describe degrees of anything. These authors, 
did, however, provide qualitative descriptions of their scale, so that catastrophic was 
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defined as a plant closure of more than a month, critical was more than a week, 
marginal was decreased service levels, and negligible was no impact to service levels. 
‘Often’ was defined as once per week, infrequent was once per month, rare was once a 
year, and extremely rare once every ten years. In Tummala and Schoenherr’s research, 
the four consequence levels and four risk probability levels were assigned index scores, 
so that, for example, the catastrophic level would get a 4, while negligible was given a 1.  
Similarly, on the probability scale an ‘often’ was assigned a 4, while ‘extremely rare’ was 
given a 1.  By multiplying the scores for the consequence and the probability, they got 
what they called a “risk exposure value of risk factor”, obviously with a range of 1 to 16. 
By assigning estimated monetary losses to these risks, they were able to compare them 
to the risk control costs (again using an index) and suggest a tool for prioritizing control 
efforts or investments.  
With respect to India, the pharmaceutical company Ranbaxy that shipped out 
Lipitor with glass particles was barred from selling many of its products in the U.S.  This 
obviously caused a substantial loss of revenue in addition to legal costs. The U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration also sanctioned another Indian drug maker (Claris), and the 
U.S. giant Pfizer recalled a veterinary antibiotic from its Pune-based supplier Emcure 
Pharmaceuticals due to contamination (K. Singh, 2010). As India gains prominence as a 
manufacturer to the world, it is likely that the public will hear more about product 
recalls from there over the next few years. Greater investments and more modern 
factories should help reduce the overall incidences of product quality problems. Of the 
grand total of 14,076 product recalls registered with the U.S. Consumer Product Safety 
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Commission between 1985 and June of 2012, as many as 2,412 were for products from 
China, while only 70 were for products from India95. On the surface this sounds 
promising until one realizes that 70 recalls was still the third highest in Asia (after China 
and Thailand), and that merchandise imports from India are still very low compared to 
China.  
Except for negative effects on the people and businesses directly affected by the 
November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, the economies of Mumbai and India were 
not set back significantly after these attacks. Columbia University professor Arvind 
Panagariya wrote in Forbes Magazine in the days after the attack, “the large part of the 
measurable economic costs of the attacks will consist of: the cost of restoring the 
damaged structures of Hotel Taj, Hotel Oberoi and Nariman House; lost income earnings 
for those who lost their lives; expenditures on the care of those injured and suffering 
trauma due to lost family members; and increased expenditures on anti-terrorist 
measures and security precautions… A slight temporary drop in tourist activity and 
foreign investment may also occur” (Panagariya, 2008).  
 
4. Mitigation 
All the activities of mapping our supply chain, identifying relevant risks, and 
assessing the likelihood and impact of these risks give managers suitable information to 
help them figure out what to do about disruptions before and after they happen. Risk 
                                                          
95 Source: www.saferproducts.gov  
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mitigation covers the activities of prevention and continuity management. This section 
of the dissertation will focus on severe risks, including Indian risk factors and how to 
prepare for and avoid the various supply chain disruptions encountered there. In 
general, companies or supply chains can take steps to eliminate risks, reduce risks, 
transfer risks, or decide to assume the risks (Aliahmadi, Jafari, & Amiri, 2006). There is a 
fifth option, and that is to defer the risk – or at least the impact of the risk – to enable 
further analysis and processing. “Kicking the can down the road” may be a justified 
approach if it enables better decision making. A deferment96 strategy may work well to 
avoid rash and expensive decisions, provided there is enough time.  
In order to be effective, risk management strategies require participation of all 
supply chain partners (Bakshi & Kleindorfer, 2009). Cooperation97 within the supply 
chain is crucial for a coordinated approach to all the upstream and downstream 
processes, including the physical, information and monetary flows. Sourcing represents 
a particular challenge in this respect, where inherent disparities and competing interests 
within the supply chain often result in disappointment. The interest of one supply chain 
participant may not be 100% aligned with the other participants, and this divergence 
leads to friction.98  Choosing suppliers solely on price may generate short term 
improvements in profitability, but will often backfire in the form of inferior quality. This 
                                                          
96 We deliberately use the word deferment here, as a possibly better word, postponement, has a 
different and very specific meaning in supply chain management (i.e. delaying the completion of a 
product to enable flexibility)   
97 Bakshi and Kleindorfer made a case for “co-opetition” in their 2009 paper.  
98 This particular wording was adopted from an article about Facebook in the New York Times, 
12-19-2012.  
88 
 
can be regarded a risky strategy in itself (Ritchie & Brindley, 2007). Building on earlier 
articles, Christopher et al. write that any sequences of activities and the control 
mechanisms that support them are potential sources of risk, and they label these 
“process and control” risks (Christopher et al., 2011; Christopher & Peck, 2004; Manuj & 
Mentzer, 2008a). Mismatched, hapless or inappropriate management strategies and 
practices would fit under this category, as would more structural problems such as lack 
of visibility, lack of risk management strategies, dependencies and mistrust.  
Zsidisin et al. suggest four major activities for ensuring supply continuity: 1) 
Creating system awareness, 2) Preventing supply discontinuity, 3) Remediating supply 
interruptions, and 4) Managing knowledge (Zsidisin, Ragatz, et al., 2004).  Many authors 
are discussing the merits of creating a resilient supply chain, or one that can withstand 
disruptions, learn from them, and bounce back even stronger (Ball, 2012; Blackhurst et 
al., 2011; Christopher & Peck, 2004; Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009; Sheffi, 2005; Zsidisin 
& Ritchie, 2008)  The Aberdeen Group defines four foundational pillars for a resilient 
supply chain: 1) visibility, 2) planning and measurement (e.g. having contingency plans), 
3) sourcing and supplier management (e.g. having multiple suppliers in multiple 
locations), and 4) timely execution (Ball, 2012). Resilience is something the supply chain 
exhibits after an event or disruption has taken place. It can be enhanced by having 
redundancies, flexibilities and agility. Prior to a possible event, it is important to have 
processes in place that reduce the likelihood of being victimized by a disruption (Sheffi 
& Rice, 2005).  A workable definition of supply chain visibility it provided by Barratt and 
Oke: “the extent to which actors within a supply chain have access to or share 
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information which they consider as key or useful to their operations and which they 
consider will be of mutual benefit” (Barratt & Oke, 2007). Having good visibility up and 
down the supply chain means that the uncertainties and risks are lowered. The company 
will save money by allowing lower buffer inventories, ordering more accurate 
quantities, using more economical transportation methods, etc.  A recent Ph.D. 
dissertation by Hung Vu Nguyen used empirical survey results to conclude that visibility 
is the critical relationship-specific capability that needs to develop for buying firms to 
mitigate supplier risk proactively (Nguyen, 2011). Visibility is enhanced by promoting 
and ensuring collaborative behavior within the company and within the extended supply 
chain. Such collaboration and communication help break down functional silos and can 
be, for example, between the internal departments of logistics and marketing, or 
externally between important suppliers and the procurement department (Ellinger, 
Keller, & Hansen, 2006). Visibility is primarily accomplished through information sharing, 
and Lee et al. found that both inventory reduction and cost reduction are achieved 
through this (Lee, So, & Tang, 2000). Moberg et al. expand on this and claim that the 
sharing of information and the coordination of activities among firms in supply chains 
can both reduce total logistics costs and enhance value delivered to the customer, 
leading to sustainable competitive advantage for the firm (Moberg, Cutler, Gross, & 
Speh, 2002). Bode et al. use the word “bridging” for these relationship building 
activities, while “buffering” is the term they use for building slack resources such as 
safety inventories, redundant suppliers and flexible production processes (Bode, 
Wagner, Petersen, & Ellram, 2011). Bridging is quite dependent on close relationships 
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and trust, so to be on the safe side, companies often engage in buffering activities as 
additional assurance.  
Another term often seen around the concepts of collaboration and coordination 
is “integration”. According to Frankel et al., the “phenomenon of integration may be 
considered supply chain management’s focal concept of interest” (Frankel et al., 
2008)99. In a 2006 empirical survey, Germain and Iyer found that to achieve better 
supply chain performance through external integration, a company should start with 
internal (inter-departmental) integration first (Germain & Iyer, 2006). They concluded 
their research by stating that “the key for managers is to understand that integration 
should be undertaken both internally and downstream”. We assume that similar 
benefits will be derived from upstream integration, i.e. towards the company’s suppliers 
and logistics providers. As summarized by Richey et al., barriers to successful integration 
efforts include lack of trust, failure to understand the importance of supply chain 
integration, fear associated with losing control, misaligned goals and objectives, poor 
infrastructure systems, short-term as opposed to long-term focus, and supply chain 
complexity issues (Richey Jr., Roath, Whipple, & Fawcett, 2010). For a variety of reasons, 
it is likely that most of these challenges will be present in the process of establishing 
successful supplier relationships in India.   
                                                          
99 They used a definition of integration provided in Webster’s 1966 edition: “the unified control 
of a number of successive or similar economic or especially industrial processed formerly carried on 
independently”. 
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Two other ubiquitous terms in modern supply chain management are flexibility 
and agility. Rice and Caniato stress that an important distinction between flexibility and 
redundancy is that redundancy adds capacity, while flexibility entails redeploying 
previously committed capacity (Rice & Caniato, 2003).  Swafford et al. define supply 
chain agility as the supply chain’s capability to adapt or respond in a speedy manner to a 
changing marketplace environment (Swafford, Ghosh, & Murthy, 2006). They regard 
flexibility as being an antecedent of agility, where agility is seen as an externally focused 
capability and flexibility as an internally generated competency.  
Swafford et al. describe adaptability as the ability to change from one state to 
another state in a timely and cost effective manner. Organizations or supply chains can 
be looked upon as “agents” in complex systems, but to survive in dynamic environments 
the capabilities and decision rules of the agents have to evolve over time. Learning from 
experience is part of this adaptation process (Bowser & Balasubramaniam, 2009; 
Sterman, 2004). Lee writes about the “Triple-A Supply Chain”, where he advocates 
agility, adaptability and alignment as all being integral to sustained competitive 
advantage. Alignment deals with information exchange, collaboration and the division 
of labor among the customers, suppliers and service providers in the supply chain 
network (Lee, 2004). Tang and Tomlin are concerned with “how much flexibility do we 
need?” They use calculus to find that to reduce supply chain risks, only a certain degree 
of flexibility is all it takes. Looking at various flexibility strategies, they show analytically 
that there is no need to go overboard with too much flexibility and too many suppliers 
(C. Tang & Tomlin, 2008). 
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The 2011 paper by Christopher et al. (“Approaches to managing global sourcing 
risk”) was based on fifteen case studies (in-depth semi-structured interviews) with UK 
based companies, and provides four excellent high-level (generic) strategies for dealing 
with typical sourcing risks in several industry sectors (Christopher et al., 2011): network 
re-engineering, collaboration, agility, and a risk management culture.  
Craighead et al. found that the severity of supply chain disruptions appears to be 
positively related to the supply chain density, where density is a measure of the 
geographic proximity of entities within a supply chain (Craighead et al., 2007). When 
something happens to clusters of suppliers, there is potential for more severe 
disruptions. The remedy for this would be to disperse the suppliers geographically. It 
would also make sense to broaden the concept of density to include non-geographic 
variables such as concentration of ownership and even foreign exchange rates. One-
sidedness may provide simplicity and certain economies of scale in the short run, but 
can be risky if something serious disrupts the clusters. This goes for suppliers located in 
one area, transportation modes owned by the same company or goods purchased in the 
same currency.   
In the same article, Craighead et al. found that complexity and the severity of 
supply chain disruptions also appear to be positively related. This has to do with 
interdependencies among the nodes and flows of the supply chain, and how disruptions 
tend to spread within the network when these nodes are tightly connected. While 
simplifying the supply network may be a good mitigation strategy, the supply chain 
manager ought to be mindful of too much simplification, like ending up with only one 
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supplier and one transportation provider. An optimal level of supply chain complexity 
would appear be found in the “sweet spot” between rigidity and “chaos”100. A third 
problem highlighted in Craighead et al.’s article pertains to node criticality. If certain 
nodes (e.g. suppliers or major distribution centers) are highly critical in the supply chain, 
then disruptions to these would naturally have a major negative impact. A critical path 
analysis will help in identifying such critical nodes, and should enable management to 
take actions to reduce risky dependencies. Interventions such as substitute sources and 
rerouting are typical tools to recover capability after disruptions (Craighead et al., 2007). 
To be effective in the recovery efforts, communication and cooperation with the 
suppliers and logistics providers are also needed. To this we must add the importance of 
good internal communication and collaboration, which is especially critical in 
multinational companies.  
In June of 2012, Dow Chemicals presented a paper at a CSCMP conference in 
Mumbai, where they listed the following examples of mitigation actions they are 
applying in markets like India (Dow_Chemicals, 2012) 
 Change specifications to industry standard 
 Qualify new suppliers 
 If single sourced, qualify that supplier’s products which are produced in other 
geographies or plants for backup 
 Concentrate business with suppliers who view Dow as “core” 
 Place more spend under contract 
 Utilize suppliers in “safe” zones (away from hurricanes, earthquakes, etc.) 
 Only do business with suppliers who have net worth over $ 10 million 
                                                          
100 We are dealing here with a version of what George Klir calls the reconstruction problem and 
the basic simplification principle: “a sound simplification of a system should minimize the loss of relevant 
information with respect to the required reduction of its complexity. …the loss of information is measured 
here by the increase in uncertainty” (Klir, 2001), p.465.  
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 Do business with suppliers who have short lead times 
 Pick suppliers where Dow is small % of total capacity 
 
In a 2005 article, Elkins et al. listed eighteen “best practices” for SCRM, based on 
the authors’ own experience and interviews with supply chain executives. The eighteen 
practices were tied to four key functions; 1) Strategic sourcing and advanced 
procurement; 2) Supply-base management; 3) Real-time operations management; and 
4) Enterprise risk management/strategic supply chain design. One important finding 
from this project was that adopting SCRM practices can yield continuous improvement 
of supply chain operations and help staff members gain a better understanding of the 
supply chain structure and interdependencies (Elkins et al., 2005). The process itself is 
useful in getting to know your supply chain. The act of qualifying suppliers is part of the 
important process of supplier development, which includes efforts undertaken by the 
firm to enhance the supplier’s product quality, reliability and financial performance. 
Such efforts include technical assistance, direct investments into supplier operations, 
paying visits to supplier plants, and training their personnel (Matook, Lasch, & 
Tamaschke, 2009).  
In the process of transforming a company to be able to see the big picture and 
think long term, Peter Senge’s famous disciplines to create a true “learning 
organization” may be valuable. In a process of training the supply chain organization to 
be better informed and grasp a more global picture, the five disciplines of personal 
mastery, mental models, building shared vision, team learning and adopting a systems 
perspective can be productive as a starting point for instigating congruence and 
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developing end-to-end visibility within the supply chain organization (Senge, 2006). 
Based on a Marsh Insurance Co. survey, Enslow calls for company-wide strategic risk 
management, which entails process consistency, cross-functional teams and assessment 
procedures (including analytics and risk metrics) for plants, warehouses, stores, 
suppliers, second-tier suppliers, and logistics and transportation providers (Enslow, 
2008). Michael Hammer extends this internal process to encourage the coordination 
and streamlining of intercompany processes for both cost reduction and risk mitigation 
(Hammer, 2001). In 2012 the Aberdeen Group wrote the following conclusion after 
surveying 128 companies about their supply chain visibility status: “It is important that a 
standardized and structured system roadmap is developed to integrate these system 
events and data flows as companies bring on line new capabilities and new event 
tracking” (Heaney, 2012). They find that companies now look further upstream into 
their supply chains to address visibility “blind spots”, and that companies also seem to 
be moving towards centralized supply chain management organizations and moving to 
visibility under centralized control. The Aberdeen Group makes the interesting 
statement that “companies with shared, centralized, and more fully integrated 
information systems tend to be more successful in their connectivity and visibility 
improvement initiatives”. Based on research comparing supply chain resilience to 
vulnerability and SCRM, Jüttner and Maklan suggested that centralized supply chain 
planning with decentralized local capacity could be one of the overarching principles for 
achieving the necessary flexibility, visibility, velocity and collaboration (Jüttner & 
Maklan, 2011). In practical terms this means that a company with operations in India 
96 
 
would institute a company-wide SCRM strategy, but still leave several operational 
problem solving decisions to the managers on the ground. Kinder recommends making 
every employee a risk manager by empowering them to proactively manage risk (Kinder, 
2008).  
Adding credence to this, the Boston Consulting Group’s India office writes that 
“deploying risk management more broadly requires simple, foolproof, and easy-to-use 
systems that make risk transparent to people at the frontline, provides them a toolkit for 
risk mitigation and defines escalation thresholds” (Nandgaonkar & Sebastian, 2012). A 
counterpoint to this view is provided by Swaminathan and Tomlin, who write “if you 
allow the risk attitudes and planning horizons of individual managers to determine 
resiliency, you cannot expect to have a consistent and coherent policy across your 
organization” (Jayashankar M. Swaminathan & Tomlin, 2007). To ensure consistency 
they recommend standardized risk-assessment and risk management procedures across 
the organization.  With respect to Indian operations, it may be beneficial to rely on a 
mixture of expatriates and local management in a crisis situation. Being somewhat 
ambivalent to Indian management skills, Kumar and Sethi write that “in circumstances 
where bold and aggressive action needs to be undertaken fast, with full backing of the 
[foreign] head office, expatriates can provide that extra edge” (Kumar & Sethi, 2005). 
We believe that the nationalities of the management employees are less important than 
providing proper training and internal communication. If branch operations are left to 
their own devices, it is hard to know what might happen in a crisis situation. Corporate 
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procedures and good training and preparation should make any disaster response more 
predictable, thereby reducing the overall risk101 for the corporation.  
Lavastre et al. identified and ranked 21 risk mitigation methods used by French 
managers to “effectively and efficiently” minimize risk (Lavastre et al., 2012). The top 
five were: 
1. Communication and information exchange 
2. Accompanying providers/suppliers in improving their performance 
3. Forecast accuracy 
4. Long term continuity in relations with partners 
5. Safety stocks (e.g. vendor-owned inventory or in-house) 
 
The top four methods were based on close collaboration and the availability of 
solid information. The old “standby”, safety stocks, was only number five on this list. 
The AMR study contained in Table 14 below does not even list safety stocks among its 
top ten mitigation methods. Again, closer collaboration was ranked number one.  
There should be a match or at least a compromise between strategies to 
alleviate supply uncertainties and adjust to demand uncertainties. The ideal scenario is 
alignment between the interests of the customers and the upstream risk mitigation 
methods. Lee writes about such matched strategies (Lee, 2002). Supply chain managers 
also need to tailor the mitigation methods to the prevailing competitive landscape on 
the supply side. For example, there are definite risks in outsourcing that creates 
unilateral dependencies or exposure to supplier opportunism or complacency (Lonsdale, 
1999). It takes two to tango, and collaboration must be based on mutual trust and 
                                                          
101 In this case, the risk of an inappropriate or wrong response to a disruption.  
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shared objectives. Based on interviews with supply chain executives, Manuj and 
Mentzer suggest several appropriate strategies (e.g. postponement, speculation, 
hedging, control/share/transfer, security and avoidance) depending on the supply and 
demand side uncertainty levels. They adopt a systems perspective by including team 
composition, supply chain complexity and inter-organizational learning into this 
formula, thus being mindful of the dynamics between the actors, the proper actions and 
the salient supply chain conditions (Manuj & Mentzer, 2008b). In addition, business 
conditions change, supply chains evolve, and new risks emerge over time (Melnyk et al., 
2005). Even though risk management protocols can handle localized disruptions, some 
high-profile events have such cascading and unintended consequences that they plainly 
cannot be mitigated by just one organization alone, as pointed out by the Supply Chain 
Risk Leadership Council (SCRLC, 2013). Adding to this, the World Economic Forum writes 
that “systemic risks are created or magnified by the way supply chain systems are 
configured”, making then not easily solved by individual actors (Bhatia, Lane, & Wain, 
2013). 
The expenses of protecting against a possible event can exceed the expected 
negative impact of the disruption.  It is worth spending to protect human lives, but 
when it comes to potential economic losses from supply chain activities, restraint is 
often in order. As Norrman and Jansson point out, “to safeguard logistics processes too 
much could be both counteractive to current practice in logistics as well as too costly” 
(Norrman & Jansson, 2004). The cost of prevention may exceed the cost of interruption. 
Measures such as inventory buffers, longer lead times, extra suppliers and physical 
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safeguards often run counter to the prevailing necessity of leaner and more agile supply 
chains. Modern data harvesting and processing make collaboration, visibility and 
flexibility more achievable and popular, partially replacing the need for high levels of 
inventory and many suppliers. Inventory was the primary buffer against uncertainty for 
decades. Pettit et al. warn against a potential state of “unbalanced resilience”, where 
low vulnerabilities are fought with high capabilities, subsequently eroding the firm’s 
profitability (Pettit et al., 2010). However, to assure supply chain security, such as 
protection against criminal actions, there is a definite trade-off between up-front 
security costs versus the potentially catastrophic costs represented by a significant 
discontinuous event (Ritter et al., 2007). In global trade, there is no avoiding the extra 
expenses of physical security and compliance, although determining the “optimal” level 
of investment and supply chain interruption102 is always up for discussion, political 
debate and budgetary constraints. In other words, some disruptions should be 
prevented through regulation while others we just have to take and pay for (Shavell, 
1984). In a world where we know that supply chain disruptions are not a question of if, 
but when, the issue is always how much time, money and effort should be allocated to 
prevention versus response (Robinson, 2012).  
Using buffers such as inventory and lead time are obvious and uncomplicated 
measures to assure fulfillment. For that reason, the customers and sales force usually 
love inventories.  In 2012 Schmitt and Singh published a paper wherein they used a 
                                                          
102 Interruption in terms of compliance requirements, delays for inspections and scanning, 
reporting, etc.  
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discrete simulation program (Arena) to show the benefits of quick responses and buffer 
inventories. Indeed, they showed it was better to have the ability to quickly mobilize 
small buffer quantities than waiting longer for larger quantities. This implies being 
flexible and keeping moderate inventory buffers throughout the supply chain (Schmitt & 
Singh, 2012). The “Theory of Constraints” supports this view of strategically placed 
buffers (Goldratt, 1992). In support of keeping some inventory throughout the system, 
Schmitt and Singh stated that “while minimizing inventory is an important and money-
saving endeavor, it should not be undertaken without consideration that it has a direct 
bearing on increasing both demand side risk and supply chain risk”. Both Tomlin and 
Sodhi & Tang have published articles applying mathematics and statistics to model and 
show how both theoretical risks and inventory levels can be reduced with independence 
and randomness of key variables (Manmohan S. Sodhi & Tang, 2009; Tomlin, 2006). 
Regardless, as the granddaddy of risk mitigation tools, inventory will continue to have a 
place in the toolbox.   
Table 14 presents an interesting comparison to some of the results our own 
research will uncover with respect to the most prevalent Indian supply chain 
disruptions. The four surveys in the table are not focused on India.  
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Table 14: HOW RECENT SURVEYS RANKED SOURCES OF DISRUPTION 
Survey Source and 
notable finding 
Top ranked disruptions Consequences of 
disruptions 
“Supply Chain 
Resilience 
2012” by The 
Business 
Continuity 
Institute. 
International 
survey of 
more than 
530 
organizations 
from over 65 
countries. 
(Glendon, 2012) 
73% 
experienced at 
least one 
disruptive 
supply chain 
incident103 in the 
past 12 months, 
with an average 
level of five 
incidents.  
1. Unplanned IT or telecom 
outages 
2. Adverse weather 
3. Outsourcer service 
provision failure 
4. Earthquake/tsunami104 
5. Currency exchange rate 
volatility105 
6. Energy scarcity 
7. New laws or regulations 
8. Fire 
9. Insolvency in the supply 
chain 
10. Loss of talent/skills 
 
Loss of productivity; 
Increased cost of 
working; Service 
outcome impaired; Loss 
of revenue; Customer 
complaints received; 
Product release delay; 
Delayed cash flows; 
Damage to brand 
reputation & image; 
Stakeholder & 
shareholder concern; 
Expected increase in 
regulatory scrutiny; 
Product recall or 
withdrawal; Payment of 
service credits; Fined 
for non-compliance; 
Share price fall  
McKinsey 
quarterly 
(2006) global 
survey of 
business 
executives 
(Enyinda et al., 
2008; 
Muthukrishnan 
& Shulman, 
2006) 
Two out of three 
executives said 
they face 
increasing risks 
to their ability to 
supply their 
customers with 
goods and 
services 
effectively. 
 
1. Availability of quality 
labor 
2. Regulatory concerns 
3. Reliability of suppliers 
4. Commodity shortages or 
price fluctuations 
5. Fluctuations in foreign 
exchange rates 
6. Intellectual property 
theft 
7. Obsolescence of product 
inventory or technology 
8. War, terrorism, other 
geo-political concerns 
9. Problems with supply 
chain infrastructure 
Inability to supply 
customers.  
                                                          
103 In this dissertation, “incident” is synonymous with “disruption”, as well as “event”. Some 
authors also use the word “glitch” (Hendricks & Singhal, 2003, 2005a), although this is usually used for an 
operational (internal) disruption.  
104 This is unusually high because of the wide impact of the Japanese earthquake and tsunami in 
March of 2011.  
105 The fact that this financial problem pops up in a supply chain survey illustrates the 
interconnected nature of risks and how difficult (and futile?) it is to put risks in functional silos.  
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10. Plant breakdowns or 
mechanical failures 
11. Natural disasters 
Marsh and 
Risk 
Insurance 
Magazine 
survey of 110 
North 
American 
supply chain 
risk managers  
(Enslow, 2008) 
Risks perceived 
as having grown 
more significant, 
complex and 
costly since 
2005, and many 
firms feel 
unprepared to 
deal with the 
elevated 
exposures. Only 
18% of firms had 
consistent, 
company-wide 
processes for 
SCRM.  
1. Pricing risks (55%) 
2. Risks and delays with 
suppliers (50%) 
3. Risks with own plants, 
warehouses, stores (41%) 
4. Logistics delays and 
disruptions (40%) 
5. Natural disasters (40%) 
6. Customer-facing risks 
(e.g. demand volatility) 
(36%) 
7. Brand reputation risk 
(product recalls, fair 
labor) (29%) 
8. IP theft, counterfeiting, 
gray market (26%) 
Fragmentation of risk 
management 
responsibilities within 
the firm, poor 
coordination and knee-
jerk reactions.  
AMR study 
looking at 
real impact of 
risks, with a 
global sample 
of 503 
respondents. 
(Kelly, 2011) 
45% of firms 
experienced a SC 
disruption that 
impacted ability 
to meet demand 
in the past 12 
months.  
1. Supply failure (41%) 
2. Product quality failures 
(29% 
3. Natural disasters (29%) 
4. Commodity price 
volatility (27%) 
5. Lower consumer 
spending (23%) 
6. Volatile transportation 
costs (22%) 
7. SC security breaches 
(21%) 
8. IT risks (21%) 
9. Regulatory compliance 
(20%) 
10. Volatile labor costs (19%) 
11. Intellectual property 
infringement (19%) 
12. Volatile energy costs 
(19%) 
13. Shortage in managerial 
talent (17%) 
Most successful 
mitigation methods: 
1. Closer 
collaboration 
(17%) 
2. Multi sourcing 
(12%) 
3. Vertical 
integration of SC 
(12%) 
4. Outsourcing (10%) 
5. Near-shoring 
(10%) 
6. Performance-
based contracts 
(9%) 
7. Business 
continuity 
planning (8%) 
8. Increased IT & 
visibility (7%) 
9. Commodity 
hedges (6%) 
10. Using modeling 
tools (6%) 
11. Third party 
intelligence (4%) 
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5. Improving 
The last step in the “MIAMI” progression (Map-Identify-Assess-Mitigate-
Improve) is crucial to allow the company and extended supply chain to learn from their 
experiences and adapt their operating procedures to the changing environments. It is 
not necessary to view this as a linear or chronological process, as learning, improvement 
and adaptation should be permeating the whole risk management area. As Closs and 
McGarrell put it, “supply chain security is a journey, not a destination” (Closs & 
McGarrell, 2004). While Lean Six Sigma has its DMAIC106 wheel, our MIAMI wheel’s 
improvement step has similarities to the Six Sigma Improve and Control steps in that it 
deals with improving the operational metrics  and procedures, including optimization 
and sensitivity analyses where practical (Martin, 2007).  
Supply chain risk management often entails ”learning the hard way. A painful 
and expensive ($400 million) experience with a supply chain accident made Swedish 
telecommunications giant Ericsson realize the importance of proactive SCRM and taking 
prompt and localized action when incidents are experienced (Norrman & Jansson, 
2004).  
After interviewing 20 companies, Rice and Caniato found that the survey 
respondents with the most progressive security and resilience initiatives had already 
suffered meaningful losses from previous disruptions.  Subsequently these companies 
                                                          
106 DMAIC = define, measure, analyze, improve, control 
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wised up and developed business continuity plans and more secure and resilient 
operations (Rice & Caniato, 2003). They could no longer rely on luck.  
“If you can't measure it, you can't manage it” is a quote accredited to several 
people107. Tracking and monitoring should enable management to review both the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the risk management efforts. There is high utility from 
such monitoring and subsequent tweaking of the risk management practices for both 
frequent operational glitches, and infrequent low probability, high impact disruptions. 
Even though disasters play out differently each time, they represent learning 
opportunities for future improvement, both with respect to warning systems, 
prevention efforts and business continuity programs. The ability to learn and improve 
will build greater supply chain resilience. Closs and McGarrell’s guiding thesis in a 2004 
paper is that both security and supply chain efficiencies can be maximized, but to 
achieve this will require changes in thinking, sustained leadership, and continual 
learning (Closs & McGarrell, 2004). Having an internal way of detecting and 
communicating potential hazards – a warning capability – is an important step towards 
agility and the ability to not only avoid and deflect disruptions, but also recover from the 
ones that the company cannot escape from.   
Implicitly or explicitly, cost-benefit considerations are part of a SCRM monitoring 
process. Aiming for a risk free existence is expensive and erodes the profitability of the 
firm. Being better than the competitors in managing the various risks is what is needed 
                                                          
107 See, for example http://www.quotationspage.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=225  
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for sustained profitability. Being better at risk management entails excelling at 
identifying and mitigating the risks that could really cause severe damage. The 
monitoring, controlling and improving processes involve the estimation of the cost 
impacts (efficiencies) of the mitigation efforts.  Several methods are used, including 
balanced scorecards (Olson, 2012), TCO and NPV108 calculations, as well as optimizations 
comparing the marginal cost of disruption to the marginal cost of mitigation. Most of 
these types of calculations involve using estimates or forecasts, making them subject to 
statistical errors and only as good as the assumptions and data used.  
For newcomers to a country like India it will take some time to get used to the 
various risk scenarios encountered there, and it will take time to figure out which 
mitigation efforts are most useful and economical. It is likely that Indian companies or 
foreign companies that have been there for a while will have better evolved systems for 
evading and handling risks. They have adapted to the Indian business and supply chain 
risk environments. As one of its aims, this dissertation attempts to check whether Indian 
domicile and/or longevity in the country have any bearing on the negative impacts 
experienced by supply chain disruptions, and whether there are significant differences 
in the mitigation methods.  
  
                                                          
108 TCO = Total Cost of Ownership; NPV = Net Present Value 
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND METHODOLOGY: 
 
In our investigation of which sourcing and production risks are currently 
encountered in India, what the operational impacts of these risks may have been, what 
mitigation methods may have been deemed useful, and what the risk expectations are 
for the future, we performed primary research on the ground in India. A survey 
questionnaire to a targeted group of at least four thousand high level managers, incl. 
supply chain professionals, was distributed109. The processes of defining risks in a supply 
chain management context and of refining the MIAMI framework were useful in 
extracting the right questions to ask and structuring our questionnaire. We also received 
useful feedback from industry experts practicing in India, as well as the Indian diaspora 
residing in Seattle.  
By running a search on either India supply chain risk or Indian supply chain risk in 
Google Scholar110, the top twenty111 search results produced the following works, 
summarized in Table 15 and roughly in order of appearance (“relevance”).  
With one exception, all of the twenty papers were conceptual articles that 
mostly mentioned India as an example to illustrate a point. The paper by Sutton was 
based on surveys of car manufacturers in China and India, and only six companies in 
India were polled.  Empirical or survey based supply chain management articles based 
on Indian data are in limited supply, and even more scarce when it comes to the 
                                                          
109 This is an estimated number, as the four supporting organizations guard their membership 
information closely and were not willing to share exact numbers with us.  
110 Done on January 14, 2013 
111 Top twelve from each, but four of them were the same 
107 
 
emerging field of SCRM.  Of the over 400 articles and books we reviewed, quantitative 
surveys were used only in the papers cited in Table 16. These results are in line with  
Table 15: ARTICLE SEARCH RESULTS FOR “INDIA(N) SUPPLY CHAIN RISK”: 
Author: Title: Type: Citation: 
Faisal, et al. Supply chain risk 
mitigation: modeling the 
enablers 
Conceptual (M. N. Faisal, D. K. 
Banwet, & R. 
Shankar, 2006) 
Chopra & Sodhi Managing Risk to Avoid 
Supply-Chain Breakdown 
Conceptual (Sunil Chopra & 
Sodhi, 2004) 
Manuj & Mentzer Global supply chain risk 
management 
Conceptual (Manuj & Mentzer, 
2008a) 
Manuj & Mentzer Global supply chain risk 
management strategies 
 
Conceptual and 
qualitative study 
(14 interviews in 
the US) 
(Manuj & Mentzer, 
2008b) 
Swaminathan, et al. Modeling supply chain 
dynamics: A multiagent 
approach 
Conceptual and 
modeling (not 
risk focused) 
(J.M. Swaminathan, 
Smith, & Sadeh, 
1998) 
Wu & Olson Supply chain risk, 
simulation, and vendor 
selection 
Conceptual and 
simulation 
(Wu & Olson, 2008) 
Trkman & 
McCormack 
Supply chain risk in 
turbulent environments - 
A conceptual model for 
managing supply chain 
network risk 
Conceptual (Trkman & 
McCormack, 2009) 
Humphrey Globalization and supply 
chain networks: the auto 
industry in Brazil and 
India 
Case studies (not 
risk focused) 
(Humphrey, 2003) 
Giunipero & 
Eltantawy 
Securing the upstream 
supply chain: a risk 
management approach 
Conceptual (Giunipero & 
Eltantawy, 2004) 
Waters Supply chain risk 
management: 
vulnerability and 
resilience in logistics 
Book (Waters, 2011) 
Faisal, et al. Mapping supply chains 
on risk and customer 
sensitivity dimensions 
Conceptual, 
modeling 
(M. N. Faisal, D. 
Banwet, & R. 
Shankar, 2006) 
Seuring & Müller From a literature review 
to a conceptual 
framework for 
Conceptual, not 
risk related 
(Seuring & Müller, 
2008) 
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sustainable supply chain 
management 
Laeequddin, et al. Supply chain partners' 
trust building process 
through risk evaluation: 
the perspectives of UAE 
packaged food industry 
Conceptual 
framework and 
survey in United 
Arab Emirates 
(Laeequddin, 
Sardana, Sahay, 
Waheed, & Sahay, 
2009) 
Harland, et al. Risk in supply networks 
 
Conceptual, 4 
case studies 
(Harland et al., 2003) 
Ellram, et al. Understanding and 
managing the services 
supply chain 
Conceptual, not 
risk focused 
(Ellram, Tate, & 
Billington, 2006) 
Sutton The Auto-component 
Supply Chain in China 
and India-A Benchmark 
Study 
Surveyed six car 
manufacturers in 
India 
(Sutton, 2004) 
Faisal, et al.  Supply chain risk 
management in SMEs: 
analysing the barriers 
Conceptual and 
model 
development 
(Faisal, Banwet, & 
Shankar, 2007) 
Rahman Use of internet in supply 
chain management: a 
study of Indian 
companies 
Not risk related (Rahman, 2004) 
Jiang, et al. An analysis of job 
dissatisfaction and 
turnover to reduce 
global supply chain risk: 
Evidence from China 
Empirical study 
in China 
(Jiang, Baker, & 
Frazier, 2009) 
Chopra, et al.  The importance of 
decoupling recurrent and 
disruption risks in a 
supply chain 
Conceptual, 
mathematical 
(S. Chopra, Reinhardt, 
& Mohan, 2007) 
 
recent and extensive literature reviews performed by several authors (Ghadge et al., 
2011; Monroe et al., 2012; Rao & Goldsby, 2009; Singhal et al., 2011; Manmohan S. 
Sodhi et al., 2012; O. Tang & Musa, 2011; Vanany et al., 2009; Williams et al., 2008). 
32 papers published since 1999 describe empirical research studies pertaining to 
supply chain risk management (summarized in Table 16 in chronological order). All of 
these studies considered were survey (questionnaire) based.  Another 30 papers 
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described studies based on qualitative research techniques, such as case studies, 
structured interviews and the Delphi technique.  
 
Table 16: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH STUDIES (SURVEY BASED) 
Authors & Year Purpose Sampling frame 
(Laios & 
Moschuris, 1999) 
Assess the risk of making erroneous 
make or buy decisions.  
Senior executive with companies 
in Greece.  85 respondents (28%) 
(Svensson, 2002) Develop a set of dimensions of 
vulnerability in firms’ inbound 
logistics flows from their first-tier 
suppliers, and the vulnerability in the 
firms’ outbound logistics flows to 
their first-tier customers. 
Triangulation through 2 phases: 
Interviews with 17 Volvo 
executives and survey to 
managers in the Swedish 
automobile industry. 418 
responses (83.2%) 
(Zsidisin & 
Ellram, 2003) 
Uses agency theory to assess 
management behavior in response to 
supply risk and the impact of 
detrimental events.  
U.S. purchasing professionals 
associated with the Institute for 
Supply Management (ISM).  261 
responses (28%) 
(P. J. Singh et al., 
2005) 
Exploratory study with a view to 
articulate contemporary supply chain 
issues organizations in the industry 
face. 
Managers from the Australian 
automotive industry. 18 semi-
structured interviews with 28 
managers, then follow-up 
seminars. 
(Jüttner, 2005) Explore the state of knowledge and 
current practices of SCRM, and 
examine the business requirements 
for assessing and managing SC risks. 
Members of the UK-based 
Chartered Institute for Logistics 
and Transport with an interest in 
SCM. 137 respondents (8%) 
(Hendricks & 
Singhal, 2005a, 
2005b) 
Investigate the long term stock price 
effects and equity risk effects of 
supply chain disruptions.  
Qualifying companies trading on 
U.S. stock exchanges (NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ).  The effect 
of 827 disruption 
announcements between 1989 
and 2000.   
(Blackhurst et al., 
2005) 
Seeks insights into issues within 
global sourcing and supply-chain 
disruptions, incl. disruption 
discovery, recovery, and supply chain 
redesign.  
U.S. automotive supply chain 
executives (case studies), 
executives from various 
industries (semi-structured 
interviews), and focus groups.  
(Fitzgerald, 2005) Survey the low-cost country sourcing 
strategies (incl. risk mitigation) supply 
management executives prioritized 
for the next 3 years (Aberdeen Group 
study) 
U.S. procurement and supply 
chain executives who source in 
low cost countries.  187 
enterprises.   
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(Sahay et al., 
2006; Sahay & 
Mohan, 2003) 
Assessing whether Indian companies 
have aligned their supply chain 
objectives with their business 
objectives. Found that Indian 
companies carry huge inventories.  
Senior management of large 
member organizations of CII and 
ASSOCHAM in India. 156 valid 
responses (9%) 
(Smyrlis, 2006) Harris Interactive survey of financial 
executives on how they perceive and 
address risks, including supply chain 
disruptions.  
600 financial executives from 
around the world.  
(S. Wagner & C. 
Bode, 2006; 
Wagner & Bode, 
2008) 
Study SC characteristics as drivers of 
SC vulnerability and the relationship 
between these drivers and negative 
impacts experienced by firms as a 
result of SC disruptions.  Also, 
examine link between SC risk sources 
and SC performance.  
Top-level German executives in 
logistics and supply chain 
management.  760 responses 
(15.4%) 
(Kocabasoglu, 
Prahinski, & 
Klassen, 2007) 
Assess the linkages between reverse 
supply chain investments, 
organizational risk propensity and 
business uncertainty. 
Plant managers in Canadian 
manufacturing companies.  
126 respondents (27%) 
(Ferrer, Hintlian, 
& Karlberg, 2007) 
(Accenture) 
Explore whether corporations have 
implemented integrated global 
operations strategies and capabilities 
(i.e. risk control) while taking 
advantage of low-cost sourcing and 
manufacturing.  
Corporations with revenues of 
$500 million or more and with 
global operations. 300 phone 
interviews resulted in 100 usable 
responses.  
(Sadlovska et al., 
2008) 
An Aberdeen Group survey to assess 
degree of SCRM resilience among 
companies.  
Online and interview survey of 
executives with 138 companies, 
worldwide, but 63% in North 
America.  
(Enslow, 2008) Asking whether perception of supply 
chain risk has increased, whether 
financial impact has grown, and 
whether firms are prepared. 
Survey of 110 North American 
risk managers.  
(Jiang et al., 
2009) 
Identify root causes of job 
dissatisfaction leading to turnover 
and labor-related supply chain risks 
in Chinese factories. 
Chinese migrant workers from 
different industries and factories 
in Guangzhou.  634 responses 
(21.3%) 
(Hendricks et al., 
2009) 
Examines whether operational slack, 
business diversification, geographic 
diversification, and vertical 
relatedness influence the stock 
market reaction to supply chain 
disruptions.  
Qualifying companies trading on 
U.S. stock exchanges (NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ).  The effect 
of 307 disruption 
announcements between 1987 
and 1998.  
(Braunscheidel & 
Suresh, 2009) 
Investigates the impact of market 
orientation and learning orientation, 
Executives who were members of 
the Institute of Supply 
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and three organizational practices on 
firms’ SC agility for risk mitigation 
and response.  
Management (ISM), mostly U.S.   
218 responses (7.4%) 
(Laeequddin et 
al., 2009) 
Assessing whether to build trust to 
reduce supply chain risk, or reduce 
risk to increase supply chain trust. 
Senior managers in the UAE 
packaged food industry. 102 
respondents.  
(Ellis et al., 2010) Investigate the causal relationships 
amongst situation, representations of 
supply disruption risk, and decision 
making within purchasing.  
U.S. purchasing managers and 
buyers of direct materials (ISM 
members).  223 respondents 
(7.1%) 
(Arntzen, 2010a, 
2010b) (Arntzen, 
2010c) through 
MIT’s CTL.  
Survey business and supply chain 
managers on their opinions about the 
importance of risk prevention 
compared to response preparedness, 
frequency and importance of internal 
and external risks, and whether they 
have SCR managers or practices.  
1,461 valid responses from 70 
countries, including 65 in India.  
(Speier et al., 
2011) 
Investigate the security actions taken 
by firms and the resulting response 
to possible disruption threats.  
Survey of executives from the 
U.S. food industry. 199 usable 
responses (14%) 
(Bode et al., 
2011) 
Assessing why, how and under what 
conditions firms respond to 
disruptions, looking for buffering and 
bridging strategies.  
Survey of sr. supply chain 
managers in 3,945 firms in 
Germany, Austria and 
Switzerland. 455 usable 
responses (11.5%) 
(Rizzon, 2011) A.T. Kearney’s 2011 Assessment of 
Excellence in Procurement to survey 
sourcing and purchasing 
performance, incl. risk management 
(vulnerability, supply surety, 
transportation network frailty, 
supplier monitoring, crisis planning 
and management) 
Executives from more than 200 
companies worldwide, incl. more 
than 20 in Australia, from a 
variety of industries.  
(Nguyen, 2011) Link key relationship-specific 
capabilities (e.g. visibility) to 
proactive supplier risk mitigation.  
U.S. manufacturing firms 
sourcing abroad.  66 
respondents.  
(Gualandris & 
Kalchschmidt, 
2011) 
Assess the relationships among risk 
conditions, postponement and firm 
perception of supply risks.  
Supply chain managers in 
medium-sized Italian 
manufacturing companies.  54 
respondents (18%) 
(Thun & Hoenig, 
2011) 
Analyze the supply chain risk 
management practices and 
measuring differences between 
reactive and preventative SCRM. 
Supply chain and logistics 
managers at companies in the 
German automotive industry.  67 
responses.  
(Markmann et 
al., 2011) 
Identify the most relevant topics and 
dimensions (changes and challenges) 
Security experts (industry, 
academia, public sector & 
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in SC security management until 
2030.  
associations) from 25 countries.  
80 experts participated in online 
Delphi survey.   
(Vilko & Hallikas, 
2011) 
Illustrate the network relationships 
and centrality of different actors in 
SCRM.  
Managerial practitioners in SCM 
in Finland.  Structured interviews 
with 27 experts, plus panel 
discussion.  
(Kern et al., 
2012) 
Assessing whether supply chain risk 
identification, assessment, mitigation 
and continuous improvement 
activities have a positive impact on 
supply chain risk performance.  
Senior supply chain executives of 
medium to large German 
manufacturing companies. 162 
responses (14.1%).  
(Lavastre et al., 
2012) 
Assess attitudes toward risk, tools 
used to understand risk, and the 
ways in which decisions are made.  
General managers and logistics 
and supply chain managers in 50 
different French companies. 142 
respondents. 
(Manmohan S. 
Sodhi et al., 
2012) 
Survey supply chain management 
researchers on definitional, process 
and methodology gaps in the SCRM 
literature.  
Supply chain management 
researchers from worldwide 
attending 2009 INFORMS 
meeting. 133 responses.  
(Heaney, 2012) Aberdeen Group survey of supply 
chain visibility practices.  
Surveyed 128 enterprises in 
North America (64%), Europe 
and Asia-Pacific.  
 
Only two of the 32 papers in Table 16 performed any sort of empirical survey in 
India (highlighted above). One, Arntzen and MIT’s global risk management practices 
study, included 65 responses from India out of more than 1,400 valid responses world-
wide. The other, Sahay and Mohan’s survey, was conducted more than ten years ago, 
and analyzed whether Indian companies had aligned their supply chain objectives with 
their business objectives. Their research was less risk oriented, although a byproduct 
was a finding that Indian companies kept large physical inventories as a precaution.   
In February of 2013, the Indian office of the consulting firm AT Kearney 
published a report summarizing the results of interviews with nearly thirty C-level 
executives and senior supply chain professionals. This useful report touched upon the 
complexities and challenges of operating in India, but did not specifically address the 
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many supply chain risks and their mitigation (Madhavan, Doshi, Chandra, & Pansari, 
2013). 
The Sample Population 
 
India now has a large enough population of supply chain managers that a 
questionnaire-based survey would be appropriate. After traveling to Mumbai at the end 
of February 2013 and visiting with relevant organizations, the author received 
commitments from the following trade associations and chambers to participate in this 
study: 
1. The Bombay Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BCCI) 
2. The Indian Merchants’ Chamber (IMC) 
3. The Indo-American Chamber of Commerce (IACC) 
4. Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals (CSCMP) India 
5. All India Association of Industries (AIAI) 
6. AmCham India 
7. World Trade Centre Mumbai 
8. U.S. India Importers' Council (USIIC) 
  
The first four organizations (BCCI, IMC, IACC and CSCMP), with a combined 
membership of several thousand companies, eventually participated fully in the study 
by sending out e-mail broadcasts to their memberships (or portions of their 
memberships), containing links to the electronic questionnaire. These four organizations 
have members that are involved in international trade (sourcing and producing in India), 
most of whom constitute a highly relevant sampling frame for this study. We feel the 
target population of managers in India working with upstream supply chain 
management issues is very well represented with a sampling frame consisting of the full 
or partial membership rosters of these four organizations. It was not deemed critical 
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that the respondents were all supply chain managers, as acceptable and informed 
answers could also be obtained from people within the organizations involved in general 
management or the finance function, for example. The mailing lists of the supporting 
organizations contain mostly top executives of the member companies, ensuring that 
the questionnaires reached personnel with a strategic and big-picture perspective.   
The e-mails sent out by the four supporting organizations contained a brief 
explanation of the project followed by a link (button style) to the actual questionnaire. 
In an attempt to standardize the introductory explanations, we provided the 
organizations with appropriate content that they could copy and paste into their e-
mails. The introductory comments contained no statements or claims that could 
potentially bias the responses.  
The four Indian trade associations sent the e-mail broadcasts out to their 
members in May and June of 2013. They each sent one reminder out after a few 
weeks112. We closed the survey by the middle of July, 2013.  
The Survey Instrument 
 
The electronic survey instrument (questionnaire) was administered using 
Qualtrics Survey Software, to which Portland State University is a subscriber. When the 
Indian managers and potential respondents clicked on the link embedded in the e-mail 
from one of the trade associations mentioned above, they were automatically routed to 
our questionnaire lodged on Qualtrics’ server. For added credibility, the questionnaire 
                                                          
112 When we requested a second reminder be sent out, a couple of the associations balked.  
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contained the logos of Portland State University and the supporting organization in the 
top banner. We feel the overall sample design was very appropriate and effective in 
reaching out to relevant professionals and practitioners dealing with supply chain 
management issues in India. The responses were completely anonymous. We had no 
intention or desire to track or identify individual respondents. 
A full copy of the questionnaire is attached as Appendix A to this dissertation. 
The first sixteen questions established the profile of the respondent. These questions 
answer some of the “MAPPING” concerns (who, what, where, when, etc.)  Several 
options were offered for each question.  
Q1. Is your company sourcing in India or producing goods or services in India? 
Q2. What is your organizational level? 
Q3. What is your functional area within the company? 
Q4. What is your company's general sector(s)? 
Q5. In which country is your company's global headquarters located? 
Q6. What is your company's ownership? 
Q7. The company...   [Owns and operates its own production or development facilities in 
 India] or [Sources from Indian companies] or [Other or none of the above] 
Q8. Which businesses are your company involved with globally (incl. India)? 
Q9. What are your company’s annual global sales in U.S. dollars? 
Q10. What kind of activity does your company do in India? 
Q11.  Which categories of goods or services does your company source or produce in 
 India?  
Q12.  What is the annual value of what your company is sourcing, producing or 
 developing (incl. services) in India, in Indian Rupees? 
Q13.  How many persons does your company directly employ in India?   
Q14.  What percentage of your company’s products or services sourced or produced in 
 India is exported out of India (i.e. sold abroad)?  
Q15.  Where are the locations of your major Indian suppliers and/or your major Indian 
 production facilities (incl. services)? 
Q16.  For how many years has your company been sourcing or producing in India?  
 
After the initial profiling questions, the respondents encountered a string of four 
questions meant to measure their recent supply chain disruption experience, the impact 
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of the disruptions, whether certain mitigation methods were useful, and which 
disruptions they expected to experience the next three years: 
1. How many times the past three years (since early 2010) was your Indian supply 
chain affected by the following supply chain disruptions? (thirteen alternatives 
were offered here, plus two write-in options)    “IDENTIFYING” 
2. Please indicate the operational impact of the disruptions you checked in the 
previous question (the choices offered were no, minor, moderate, major and 
catastrophic)         “ASSESSING” 
3. In your opinion, how useful were these mitigation methods in preventing or 
limiting the negative impact on your supply chain of the [disruption chosen]? (the 
mitigation methods we stipulated were buffering, redundancy, flexibility, 
visibility and insourcing)       “MITIGATING” 
4. How frequently do you expect the following disruptions will affect your supply 
chain in India over the next three years (as compared to the previous three 
years)? (the same thirteen alternatives were offered here, plus two write-in 
options)          “IMPROVING” 
 
Questions 2 and 3 (impact and mitigation methods) were only asked for the 
disruptions the respondents checked in question 1. In structuring this survey and 
formulating the questions, the methodologies and suggestions outlined in Robert 
Groves et al. (Groves et al., 2009) and the “Improving Survey Questions” book by Floyd 
Fowler were found to be useful (Fowler, 1995).  The questionnaire went through many 
iterations and tests before we arrived at the final version. 
Beginning with the disruptions discussed in the literature review and listed in 
Table 12, for our survey instrument the disruptions were limited to thirteen types, as 
shown in the first column of Table 17.  This table also shows how the mitigation 
methods were simplified based on a careful evaluation of risks reported in India and 
feedback from experts and practitioners. Five categories of mitigations were included in 
the survey: buffering, redundancy, flexibility, visibility/collaboration, and insource.  
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Table 17: DISRUPTION AND MITIGATION MATRIX 
      Mitigation: 
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Flooding and 
weather related 
             
Major 
Accidents 
             
Terrorism, riots 
 
             
Transportation 
infrastructure 
             
Logistics 
infrastructure 
             
Utilities 
infrastructure 
             
Property or 
violent crimes 
             
Intellectual 
property crimes 
             
Corruption or 
bribery 
             
Bureaucracy 
and red tape 
             
Labor problems              
Tax system 
problems 
             
Supplier 
problems 
             
 
Simplified to: 
BUFFERING REDUN-
DANCY 
      FLEXIBILITY         VISIBILITY IN-
SOURCE 
 
 
Guidelines were provided in the questionnaire regarding the five categories 
presented: 
Buffering:  Have safety inventories, extended lead times or excess capacity 
Redundancy: Have multiple suppliers, sites or equipment  
Flexibility: Have suppliers or facilities that can quickly respond, adjust or change over 
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Visibility/ 
collaboration: Collaborate with and get timely information from trusted suppliers,  
  customers and service providers 
Insource: Produce and source internally instead of relying on outside suppliers or  
  sources; or integrate vertically 
 
 
An early version of the questionnaire was reviewed by students in a graduate 
class at the Engineering & Technology Management Department of Portland State 
University. They provided critical remarks and very useful feedback for improving the 
questionnaire and making it less ambiguous. Travels to India in the spring of 2013 were 
useful in pretesting and obtaining feedback on the survey instrument. We attended a 
two-day conference of the Indian chapter of CSCMP (Council of Supply Chain 
Management Professionals), and after many constructive conversations further changes 
to the survey were made.  About twenty of the conference delegates received draft 
versions of the questionnaire to review.  Also, managers with the supporting trade 
associations were helpful in providing suggestions and feedback. All of these executives 
were based in India and presumably had a good grasp of the operational realities there.  
All-in-all, the feeling is that the questionnaire was well vetted before the final version 
was sent out113.  
                                                          
113 It was suggested by the author’s Indian contacts that there is “survey fatigue” in India, and 
that attention needed to be paid to how the questionnaire was presented to potential respondents. First 
of all, it should be endorsed by one of more of the organizations, and there should be a way to reward 
people who completed the questionnaire with something. One of the Indian contacts (a board member of 
two of the organizations) suggested using live telephone surveyors – for example, Indian college students 
– to produce a higher response rate. This was an option that was considered, but eventually rejected with 
the expectation that the e-mail broadcasts went out to a sufficient number of people.  
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Statistical validity refers to how well the data measure what they are supposed 
to measure (Triola, 2008). Using direct and unambiguous questions, we asked the 
managers to self-report about the construct we are measuring (Indian supply chain risk 
management, as manifested through risk factors, frequencies, impacts, remedies and 
expectations). Because of the difficulty (perhaps impossibility) of obtaining objective 
data on risk severities and mitigation, asking a representative sample of managers about 
this is an excellent way to measure the underlying risk environment. The assumption is 
that what is reported is what was experienced. The questionnaire struck a balance 
between a level of detail and the time demanded of the respondents. We feel that the 
questionnaire integrated the crucial areas of the construct we intended to measure, and 
both construct and content validity were achieved.  
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CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS AND RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The survey structure resembled the MIAMI template we utilized and discussed in 
the main body of the dissertation (it is not a perfect resemblance, but very useful as a 
logical and chronological framework): 
 Mapping:   Developing a respondent profile, e.g. ownership, size, industry,  
  etc. (questions 2 - 16) 
 Identifying: Respondents chose relevant risks and how frequently these  
  were encountered the past three years (a measure of disruption 
   probabilities) (question 17) 
 Assessing: To measure impact, respondents indicated how seriously they 
   were affected by the chosen risks (question 18). The frequencies 
   and impacts were subsequently combined into a “severity” score  
 Mitigating: Respondents let us know which of five methods were useful in  
  mitigating the identified risks (question 19) 
 Improving: Respondents let us know which risks they expect to encounter the 
   next three years, and whether these would occur with greater  
  frequency than in the recent past (from an improving/monitoring  
  standpoint, this may imply that they are somewhat prepared) 
  (question 20) 
 
Based on information from the four cooperating associations, we estimate the e-
mail broadcasts went out to 4-5,000 people (but possible more)114 (see footnote 109.) 
119 people started the survey, but usable responses were only 43.  This is a relatively 
low number115, but because of the length and detail of the questionnaire, we find that 
the sample still yields a rich amount of valid and high quality information. A total of 
4,020 “data points” were collected, which is an average of 93.5 per respondent.  
                                                          
114 BCCI had 4,539 members as of 3-31-2013; IACC reported “more than 2,000”, CSCMP said “almost 1,000 
people”, and IMC claims more than 3,000. Only a portion of these were engaged in supply chain activities.  
115 An article by Hoskisson et al. discusses various difficulties with sampling and data collection in 
emerging economies, but we feel that corporate India anno 2013 is fully up to speed in terms of 
communications and research sophistication. Our problem may have been the length and detail of the 
self-administered questionnaire, in addition to the issue brought up in the previous footnote (Hoskisson, 
Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000). 
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This was an exploratory survey, so no pre-survey hypotheses were postulated. 
Besides descriptive statistics, the results lent themselves to a certain amount of 
statistical manipulation such as pairwise comparisons of means, ANOVA (group 
comparisons) and factor analysis. There was no discernable difference between early 
and late responses. Of the 43 usable responses, 22 of them submitted their responses in 
the month of May, and the remaining 21 between June 3 and July 14.  We ran an 
independent samples t-test, where the two groups (early and late responses) were 
compared with respect to equality of means and homogeneity of variances. We ran this 
against the responses to the six most frequent disruptions. Table 18 shows that none of 
the means or variances were significantly different at the 95% confidence level.  
 
TABLE 18: OUTPUT FROM SPSS SHOWING NO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EARLY AND LATE 
RESPONSES 
 
 
 
Frequencies of six highest 
ranked disruptions: 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
F_Transport 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.314 .579 .038 40 .970 .018 .480 
F_Logistics 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.553 .461 -.490 39 .627 -.224 .457 
F_Utilities 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.000 .996 1.361 39 .181 .646 .474 
F_RedTape 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.214 .646 -.584 39 .563 -.261 .447 
F_Labor 
Equal variances 
assumed 
2.235 .143 -1.253 40 .217 -.577 .461 
F_Suppliers 
Equal variances 
assumed 
2.310 .136 .338 41 .737 .156 .461 
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Because some of the supporting organizations sent out the links to the 
questionnaire later than others, it is impossible to know whether the late responders 
acted upon the first e-mail, or whether they started the survey after receiving 
reminders.  
When tabulating the results and to obtain high enough sample sizes for 
meaningful group comparisons, we decided to compress seven of the profile categories 
asked in the beginning of the survey. We can call these descriptors predictor variables. 
The first sixteen questions asked factual information about the respondents and the 
companies. Appendix D shows a summary of the responses to the profile questions. The 
two questions regarding types of business and categories of products offered up to 22 
alternatives, but the responses were too scattered to provide enough observations to 
perform meaningful analyses of group differences.  However, seven of the other 
questions provided us with answers that could sensibly be lumped into two main 
groups, with the number of responses shown below in Table 19. When doing this 
simplification, we tried to arrive at a fairly equal number of respondents in each group, 
within reasonable bounds. 
Possible co-linearity between any of the remaining predictor variables was a 
concern. For any two variables very closely correlated – for example with coefficients of 
0.8 or higher – it makes sense to prune one of them away. It would not add much value 
to the ensuing statistical analysis and the remaining variable can serve as its “proxy”.   
Using Kendall’s tau (for non-parametric data) and running a correlation matrix 
with all of the eight variables, it was evident that location of the headquarters and 
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ownership were closely and significantly related. The correlation coefficient was .813 
and significant at the 0.01 level. We consequently decided to ignore the variable 
location and let the variable ownership represent both in the subsequent analysis. None 
of the remaining seven predictor variables were more closely correlated than about .48, 
and we decided to retain all seven116. While working on simplifying the predictor 
variables, we also ran them through a factor analysis to look for underlying components. 
It was not surprising that two components were identified: 1) a cluster consisting of 
sales, value of Indian sourced, number of employed, years in India, and to a lesser 
extent percentage exported; and 2) a cluster consisting of location and ownership.  The 
former can be dubbed “size” and the latter “Indian”. They had eigenvalues of 2.24 and 
2.09 respectively, for a cumulative variance explanation of 61.7%. However, we found 
that the ANOVA and comparison of means gave more meaningful information. 
 
Table 19: SIMPLIFICATION OF THE SEVEN PREDICTOR VARIABLES 
 
1.  Question 4: What is your company’s general sector(s)? 
 Non-durable goods or consumables   8   SIMPLIFIED INTO:  
 Durable goods    10   Goods  31 
 Capital goods      7   Services  16 
 Natural resources     6 
 Services, incl. IT    16 
 
 
2.  Question 6: What is your company’s ownership? 
 Fully Indian    28   SIMPLIFIED INTO: 
 Fully foreign      5   Indian owned 32 
 Mixed, with majority Indian owned      4   Mixed, with majority  
        foreign owned   6 
 
                                                          
116 In Table 32 we added back the “Industry” question to take a closer look at the service sector. 
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3.  Question 9: What are your company’s annual global sales in US dollars? 
 Less than $1,000,000     9 
 $1,000,000 - $10,000,000   14   SIMPLIFIED INTO:  
 $10,000,000 - $100,000,000    7   Small (< $10 mill)   23 
 $100,000,000 - $1,000,000,000    3   Large (> $10 mill)   17 
 $1,000,000,000 - $10,000,000,000     1 
 More than $10,000,000,000    6 
This grouping compared roughly to the categorization used by the Small & Medium Enterprise 
Chamber of India, which defines SME’s as companies with an annual turnover less than 25 crore, or about 
US$ 4.2 million at current exchange rates.  
 
 
4.  Question 12: What is the annual value of what your company is sourcing, producing or 
developing in India? 
 Less than 10 lakhs     0    
 10 lakhs to 1 crore     6   SIMPLIFIED INTO: 
 1 crore to 10 crores   11   Low (<10 crores)  17 
 10 crores to 100 crores   10   High (>10 crores)  23 
 100 crores to 1,000 crores     6 
 More than 1,000 crores     7 
 
5.  Question 13: How many persons does your company directly employ in India? 
 None       1  
 1 – 10       4   SIMPLIFIED INTO: 
 11 – 100     14   Few (< 100) 19 
 101 – 1,000    11   Many (> 100) 23 
 1,001 – 10,000      8 
 10,000 – 100,000      2 
 More than 100,000     2 
 
6.  Question 14: What percentage of your company’s products or services sourced or produced in 
India is exported out of India? 
 100%       7 
 75 – 99%      2   SIMPLIFIED INTO: 
 50 – 74%      8   High % (25% +) 24 
 25 – 49%      7   Low % (< 25%) 19 
 1 – 24%     12 
 0%       7 
 
7.  Question 16: For how many years has your company been sourcing or producing in India? 
 Less than 3 years      6   SIMPLIFIED INTO:  
 3 – 10 years      6   Short time (<20) 20 
 10 – 20 years      8   Long time (>20) 22 
 More than 20 years   22 
 
 
125 
 
In this research we are dealing with categorical variables, and in some cases 
ordered (“ordinal”) categorical data.  
Summary of Results 
 
In this section we will review and discuss the findings related to: 
a) Frequency of disruptions 
b) Impact of disruptions 
c) Severity of disruptions 
d) Mitigation of disruptions 
e) Expected disruptions 
 
a) Frequency of Disruptions 
 
We asked how many times the past three years the Indian supply chain had been 
affected by thirteen different categories of disruptions. In addition, responders could 
write in additional disruptions they may have encountered. Table 20 lists these other 
disruptions. Many of them we safely reclassified to one of the existing categories, as 
noted in the last column.  
Table 21 lists the thirteen disruptions in the order they appeared on the 
questionnaire. For most of the disruptions, the “Zero times” alternative was chosen, as 
those risks were presumably not encountered the past three years. For tabulation, the 
“10+ times” presents a bit of a dilemma, as the actual number could be from 10 to 
infinity. For the rest of this analysis, we have chosen a very conservative approach, 
where “10+” has been interpreted as 10 times.  
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TABLE 20: WRITE-INS WITH RESPECT TO FREQUENCIES OF DISRUPTIONS. 
 
OTHER DISRUPTION (verbatim) REPORTED 
FREQUENCY 
WE RECLASSIFIED IT 
AS 
Machine Breakdowns 10+ times None 
Draught 1-3 times Flooding & weather 
related 
Fluctuating fuel cost. 7-9 times Supplier related 
Miscommunication between different logistics 
providers (wrong deliveries since no tracking 
method provided) 
4-6 times Supplier related 
Qualified human resources No frequency given Labor related (1-3 
times) 
Strike due to Telangana issue in Andhra 
Pradesh State 
10+ times Labor related 
Strikes by vendors 4-6 times Supplier related 
Uttarakhad flood this time. No frequency given Flooding & weather 
related (1-3 times) 
Within Department Coordination 4-6 times None 
Lack of proper packaging care taken (different 
materials have to be handled differently) 
4-6 times None 
Rising Inflation 7-9 times None 
Strikes at ports/ IT failure at customs 4-6 times Supplier related 
Spare parts Non Availability No frequency given Supplier related (1-3 
times) 
 
Table 22 ranks and summarizes the frequency information in the form of a total 
number of reported occurrences of each risk, and the weighted average of each. For 
example, 4.35 times is the average per respondent frequency of disruptions due to 
insufficient transportation infrastructure over the past three years. To be able to 
calculate sums and averages, the following logical conversions were applied (keeping in 
mind the “10+” dilemma): 
Zero times = 0 
1-3 times =  2 
4-6 times =  5 
7-9 times =  8 
10+ times = 10 
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Table 21: FREQUENCY OF DISRUPTIONS (in the same order as in the questionnaire): 
 
Disruption: Valid Missing  Zero 
times  
1-3 
times  
4-6 
times 
7-9 
times 
10 + 
times 
Flooding and weather related 
events 
40 3 14 23 2 1 0 
Major accidents, incl. fires, 
explosions, structural collapses, 
or spills 
40 3 25 13 2 0 0 
Terrorism, riots or civil unrest 40 3 30 8 2 0 0 
Inadequate or slow 
transportation infrastructure 
(road, rail, ports or air) 
42 1 11 10 7 4 10 
Inadequate logistics 
infrastructure (distribution, 
warehousing, or cold storage) 
41 2 14 6 10 5 6 
Inadequate utilities 
infrastructure (electricity, water, 
sewer, telephone or internet) 
41 2 14 8 7 4 8 
Property or violent crimes 
(theft, robbery, hijackings, 
vandalism, computer viruses or 
fraud) 
40 3 31 6 1 1 1 
Intellectual property crimes 
(counterfeiting, copyright 
violations, or hacking) 
39 4 36 2 1 0 0 
Corruption or bribery 41 2 21 10 6 1 3 
Bureaucracy (red tape, unclear, 
inconsistent restrictions or 
regulations) 
41 2 14 10 8 3 6 
Labor problems (strikes, skills 
shortages, incompetence, 
turnover, absenteeism) 
42 1 12 14 3 4 9 
Tax system (burdensome, 
arbitrary, or inconsistent) 
41 2 19 14 3 4 1 
Supplier problems (quality, 
reliability, timeliness, or 
financial strength) 
43 0 13 10 6 5 9 
Other disruptions written in 
(before redistribution) 
12 31 5 1 3 1 2 
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TABLE 22: RANKING, SUMMARY AND AVERAGE OF OCCURRENCES: 
 
Disruption: Total 
reported 
occurrences 
Average 
occurrences 
(n=43) 
Inadequate or slow 
transportation infrastructure 
(road, rail, ports or air) 
187 times 4.35 times 
Supplier problems (quality, 
reliability, timeliness, or financial 
strength) 
180 4.19 
Labor problems (strikes, skills 
shortages, incompetence, 
turnover, absenteeism) 
165 3.84 
Inadequate utilities 
infrastructure (electricity, water, 
sewer, telephone or internet) 
163 3.79 
Inadequate logistics 
infrastructure (distribution, 
warehousing, or cold storage) 
162 3.77 
Bureaucracy (red tape, unclear, 
inconsistent restrictions or 
regulations) 
144 3.35 
Corruption or bribery 88 2.05 
Tax system (burdensome, 
arbitrary, or inconsistent) 
85 1.98 
Flooding and weather related 
events 
64 1.49 
Major accidents, incl. fires, 
explosions, structural collapses, 
or spills 
36 0.84 
Property or violent crimes (theft, 
robbery, hijackings, vandalism, 
computer viruses or fraud) 
35 0.81 
Terrorism, riots or civil unrest 26 0.61 
Intellectual property crimes 
(counterfeiting, copyright 
violations, or hacking) 
9 0.21 
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b) Impact of Disruptions: 
The next step in traditional risk assessment and analysis is to estimate the 
operational and financial impact of the disruptions experienced. The respondents were 
asked to indicate the operational impact of the disruptions they checked on the 
question about frequencies. In Table 23, the numbers of respondents in the third 
column, “Missing”, are high because impact data was not asked for disruptions that 
were not checked (the electronic questionnaire automatically skipped those). In 
addition, some respondents who checked frequencies did not follow through by 
indicating the impacts of those disruptions. However, the disruptions with the highest 
frequencies (Table 21) are also the ones with the highest valid counts in Table 23.  
The various impacts were given categorical scores from zero to 4, as follows: 
No impact =    0 
Minor impact =   1 
Moderate impact =   2 
Major impact =   3 
Catastrophic impact =  4 
 
Table 24 provides a ranking of the impacts, showing average impact scores and 
an interpretation of these. The calculated scores show the average impact for the 
respondents who provided impact data (so n varies from 1 to 25). In the table, an 
average impact score of 1.91 is close to 2.0, which is equivalent to “Moderate impact” 
on our scale.  
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Table 23: IMPACT OF DISRUPTIONS (in the same order as in the questionnaire): 
 
 Impact: 
Disruption: Valid Missing  No  Minor   Mode-
rate  
Major  Cata-
strophic  
Flooding and weather 
related events 
18 25 0 11 5 2 0 
Major accidents, incl. 
fires, explosions, 
structural collapses, or 
spills 
12 31 1 5 4 2 0 
Terrorism, riots or civil 
unrest 
6 37 2 3 0 1 0 
Inadequate or slow 
transportation 
infrastructure (road, rail, 
ports or air) 
25 18 2 8 7 8 0 
Inadequate logistics 
infrastructure 
(distribution, 
warehousing, or cold 
storage) 
22 21 0 7 10 5 0 
Inadequate utilities 
infrastructure (electricity, 
water, sewer, telephone 
or internet) 
21 22 1 9 7 4 0 
Property or violent crimes 
(theft, robbery, hijackings, 
vandalism, computer 
viruses or fraud) 
9 34 0 5 2 2 0 
Intellectual property 
crimes (counterfeiting, 
copyright violations, or 
hacking) 
1 42 0 1 0 0 0 
Corruption or bribery 15 28 1 4 9 1 0 
Bureaucracy (red tape, 
unclear, inconsistent 
restrictions or regulations) 
22 21 1 5 11 5 0 
Labor problems (strikes, 
skills shortages, 
incompetence, turnover, 
absenteeism) 
24 19 1 8 8 6 1 
Tax system (burdensome, 
arbitrary, or inconsistent) 
15 28 2 5 6 2 0 
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Supplier problems 
(quality, reliability, 
timeliness, or financial 
strength) 
23 20 2 7 9 5 0 
Other disruptions written 
in (before redistribution) 
13 30 0 1 4 8 0 
 
TABLE 24: RANKING AND SUMMARY OF IMPACT SCORES 
 
Disruption: Average 
impact 
Interpretation of average 
score 
Inadequate logistics infrastructure 
(distribution, warehousing, or cold storage) 
1.91  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moderate impact 
 
Bureaucracy (red tape, unclear, 
inconsistent restrictions or regulations) 
1.91 
Inadequate or slow transportation 
infrastructure (road, rail, ports or air) 
1.84 
Supplier problems (quality, reliability, 
timeliness, or financial strength) 
1.83 
Labor problems (strikes, skills shortages, 
incompetence, turnover, absenteeism) 
1.80 
Corruption or bribery 1.69 
Inadequate utilities infrastructure 
(electricity, water, sewer, telephone or 
internet) 
1.67 
Major accidents, incl. fires, explosions, 
structural collapses, or spills 
1.55  
 
 
 
Minor to moderate impact 
 
Tax system (burdensome, arbitrary, or 
inconsistent) 
1.53 
Property or violent crimes (theft, robbery, 
hijackings, vandalism, computer viruses or 
fraud) 
1.50 
Flooding and weather related events 1.45 
Terrorism, riots or civil unrest 1.29  
 
Minor impact 
 
Intellectual property crimes 
(counterfeiting, copyright violations, or 
hacking) 
1.00 
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As can be seen from Table 24, the seven highest ranked impacts represented the 
same disruptions as the seven highest ranked frequencies, albeit in a slightly different 
order. They consist of the three infrastructure related risks, labor and supplier problems, 
the bureaucracy/red tape risk, and corruption/bribery. Figure 4 shows how these cluster 
on a frequency versus impact chart (“vulnerability map”). The diameter of the circles 
indicates the number of responses under those risks (the bigger the circle, the more 
responses were provided under the impact question). The frequency of corruption is 
low enough that it falls into the “medium” risk cluster, joining the other four risks of 
taxes, flooding/weather, accidents and crimes.  Located in the lower left hand corner, 
terrorism and intellectual property crimes are not deemed very severe to the 
participants in this study.   
Figure 4 shows a distinct relatively high severity cluster consisting of six risks: the 
three infrastructure risks (transportation, logistics and utilities), the two risks related to 
labor and supplier problems, and bureaucracy/red tape.  
c) Severity of disruptions (“risk assessment score”): 
In this dissertation, severity is the multiplication of two factors, the individual 
frequency score multiplied by the individual impact score. The “Sum of individual 
severity scores” in Table 25 is the sum of these multiplications for the respondents 
where we had both frequency and impact data. The main usefulness of this information 
is that it signifies how much more the companies have been affected by the top half of 
the risks than the bottom half. For example, there is an enormous difference in 
aggregate severity between supplier problems and intellectual property violations, 
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FIGURE 3: FREQUENCY VERSUS IMPACT CHART FOR EACH DISRUPTION 
 
 
 
the latter of which in our sample affected only one company. The average scores are 
calculated for the companies reporting both frequency and impact on any one risk (n 
varies from 1 to 25). Naturally, the six top risks (shaded) are the ones we recognize from 
the cluster in the upper right hand corner of Figure 4.  
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Table 25: COMPOSITE SEVERITY OF DISRUPTIONS 
Disruption: Sum of 
individual 
severity 
scores: 
Average 
severity 
(frequency x 
impact) 
score:117 
Supplier problems (quality, reliability, timeliness, or financial 
strength) 
325 14.13 
Inadequate logistics infrastructure (distribution, 
warehousing, or cold storage) 
296 14.10 
Inadequate or slow transportation infrastructure (road, rail, 
ports or air) 
344 13.76 
Labor problems (strikes, skills shortages, incompetence, 
turnover, absenteeism) 
324 13.50 
Bureaucracy (red tape, unclear, inconsistent restrictions or 
regulations) 
254 11.55 
Inadequate utilities infrastructure (electricity, water, sewer, 
telephone or internet) 
235 11.19 
Corruption or bribery 133 8.31 
Tax system (burdensome, arbitrary, or inconsistent) 90 6.00 
Property or violent crimes (theft, robbery, hijackings, 
vandalism, computer viruses or fraud) 
47 5.88 
Intellectual property crimes (counterfeiting, copyright 
violations, or hacking) 
5 5.00 
Major accidents, incl. fires, explosions, structural collapses, 
or spills 
57 4.75 
 
Flooding and weather related events 76 4.00 
Terrorism, riots or civil unrest 21 3.00 
 
Not surprisingly, there is a statistically significant difference between the severity 
of utilities infrastructure (ranked No. 6) and corruption (No. 7). A paired samples t-test 
produced a t-score of 2.77 and a significance level of 0.02 with 10 degrees of freedom. 
                                                          
117 The reason these scores are not equal to the product of the average frequency and average 
impact scores is they were calculated with pairwise data, as well as different denominators (43 for the 
frequency averages, and from 1 to 25 for the impact averages) 
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The top six, as reported, are significantly more severe than the bottom seven 
disruptions.   
When considering the reported frequencies and impacts, we find that some 
companies report more frequent and severe disruptions than others. The histogram 
(density function) in Figure 5 shows a concentration of companies with severity scores 
of less than 50, while some reported a variety of risks and accumulated scores of up to 
about 200. Five companies which reported frequencies of particular risks did not 
indicate their impacts, resulting in severity scores of zero.   
Figure 4: HISTOGRAM OF SEVERITY SCORES 
 
 
 
 
We looked at the profiles of the four respondents with the highest severity 
scores (the last bar in figure 5), but the characteristics of the four varied a lot. In a later 
section we will take a closer look at group differences.  
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d) Mitigation of disruptions: 
This section takes a look at the findings pertaining to the mitigation methods 
that respondents may have found beneficial or useful in preventing or limiting the 
supply chain disruptions they previously reported. The discussion around Table 17 
explains how we arrived at the five general methods we offered as alternatives.  
The question we asked was: “In your opinion, how useful were these mitigation 
methods in preventing or limiting the negative impact on your supply chain of the [one 
of 13] problem?”  The choices were: 
Not useful at all 0  
Somewhat useful 1 
Useful    2 
Very useful   3 
 
The electronic questionnaire only asked for mitigation methods for risks that the 
respondents had earlier marked with a frequency. Also, some respondents who 
indicated frequency did not follow up with a responses on the mitigation methods, or 
gave only partial responses to these questions.  
Table 26 summarizes the mitigation method responses by listing the average 
scores (on the usefulness scale from 0 to 3) on each of the five methods offered. The 
highest score for each disruption is in bold print.  
The highest score (2.10 in the first row) was given to redundancy in fixing 
supplier problems, and can be interpreted as an average usefulness of a tad more than 
“useful”. The average of the weighted average scores was 1.11, or a smidgen higher 
than “somewhat useful”. The last line shows that on average, buffering and redundancy 
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were considered about the same, while flexibility and visibility also had practically 
identical average scores. Insourcing scored quite far behind the others.  
Table 26: USEFULNESS OF MITIGATION METHODS 
  Average Mitigation Score 
Disruption: Respondents 
affected by 
this 
disruption (n) B
u
ff
er
in
g 
R
e
d
u
n
-
d
an
cy
 
Fl
e
xi
b
ili
ty
 
V
is
ib
ili
ty
 
In
so
u
rc
in
g 
Supplier problems (quality, reliability, 
timeliness, or financial strength) 
 
20 
 
1.85 
 
2.10 
 
1.60 
 
1.55 
 
1.20 
Inadequate logistics infrastructure 
(distribution, warehousing, or cold 
storage) 
 
 
22 
 
 
1.77 
 
 
1.48 
 
 
1.25 
 
 
1.33 
 
 
1.14 
Inadequate or slow transportation 
infrastructure (road, rail, ports or air) 
 
24 
 
1.67 
 
1.43 
 
1.43 
 
1.57 
 
0.83 
Labor problems (strikes, skills 
shortages, incompetence, turnover, 
absenteeism) 
 
 
25 
 
 
1.13 
 
 
1.29 
 
 
1.28 
 
 
1.21 
 
 
1.16 
Bureaucracy (red tape, unclear, 
inconsistent restrictions / regulations) 
 
21 
 
0.62 
 
0.67 
 
0.76 
 
0.76 
 
0.57 
Inadequate utilities infrastructure 
(electricity, water, sewer, telephone 
or internet) 
 
 
21 
 
 
1.38 
 
 
1.24 
 
 
1.14 
 
 
1.05 
 
 
0.65 
Corruption or bribery  
14 
 
0.31 
 
0.50 
 
0.36 
 
0.43 
 
0.21 
Tax system (burdensome, arbitrary, 
or inconsistent) 
 
16 
 
0.69 
 
0.63 
 
0.63 
 
0.63 
 
0.38 
Flooding and weather related events  
21 
 
1.52 
 
1.20 
 
1.35 
 
1.15 
 
0.50 
Major accidents, incl. fires, explo-
sions, structural collapses, or spills 
 
14 
 
1.50 
 
1.85 
 
1.83 
 
1.50 
 
0.83 
Property or violent crimes (theft, 
robbery, hijackings, vandalism, 
computer viruses or fraud) 
 
 
9 
 
 
0.44 
 
 
0.63 
 
 
0.75 
 
 
1.14 
 
 
0.50 
Terrorism, riots or civil unrest  
8 
 
1.50 
 
1.13 
 
0.88 
 
1.13 
 
0.75 
Intellectual property crimes 
(counterfeiting, copyright violations, 
or hacking) 
 
 
2 
 
 
0.50 
 
 
0.50 
 
 
0.50 
 
 
0.50 
 
 
0.50 
WEIGHTED AVERAGE OF 
MITIGATION METHODS 
  
1.25 
 
1.22 
 
1.15 
 
1.14 
 
0.77 
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For the top cluster of six risks, the following methods were found to be the most 
useful: 
TABLE 27: SUMMARY OF MITIGATION USEFULNESS FOR TOP SIX RISKS 
 
Disruption: Mitigation: Score: Usefulness 
Supplier problems Redundancy 2.10 Useful 
Inadequate logistics infrastructure Buffering 1.77 Useful 
Inadequate transportation 
infrastructure 
Buffering 1.67 Useful 
Labor problems Redundancy 1.29 Somewhat useful 
Bureaucracy Flexibility 
Visibility 
0.76 
0.76 
Somewhat useful 
Somewhat useful 
Inadequate utilities infrastructure Buffering 1.38 Somewhat useful 
 
Another way to look at the popularity of mitigation methods is to separate the 
respondents who found them useful or very useful (i.e. gave them scores of 2 or 3). 
Table 28 shows what percentage of the total respondents found the various methods 
useful or very useful for the six top ranked risks (top score for each in bold print): 
Overall, redundancy has a slight edge on the other five methods, with insourcing 
in a clear last place. Buffering, redundancy, flexibility and visibility/collaboration are all 
solidly established and recognized methods for handling supply chain risk. In the survey 
we asked how useful the various mitigation methods were in preventing or limiting the 
negative impact of particular risks, and we tend to believe that the answers reflect 
experiences the respondents have actually had, and not just what they thought might 
be useful methods.  
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Table 28: MITIGATION METHODS DEEMED USEFUL OR VERY USEFUL FOR THE TOP SIX RANKED 
DISRUPTIONS 
Disruption: Mitigation Method: Deemed useful 
or very useful: 
Supplier problems (quality, reliability, 
timeliness, or financial strength) 
Buffering 
Redundancy 
Flexibility 
Visibility/Collaboration 
Insourcing 
 
65% 
76% 
55% 
57% 
35% 
Labor problems (strikes, skills shortages, 
incompetence, turnover, absenteeism) 
Buffering 
Redundancy 
Flexibility 
Visibility/Collaboration 
Insourcing 
 
24% 
44% 
42% 
28% 
28% 
Inadequate or slow transportation 
infrastructure (road, rail, ports or air) 
Buffering 
Redundancy 
Flexibility 
Visibility/Collaboration 
Insourcing 
 
58% 
52% 
48% 
61% 
22% 
Inadequate logistics infrastructure 
(distribution, warehousing, or cold storage) 
Buffering 
Redundancy 
Flexibility 
Visibility/Collaboration 
Insourcing 
 
64% 
52% 
45% 
52% 
36% 
Bureaucracy (red tape, unclear, inconsistent 
restrictions or regulations) 
Buffering 
Redundancy 
Flexibility 
Visibility/Collaboration 
Insourcing 
 
14% 
24% 
33% 
33% 
24% 
Inadequate utilities infrastructure 
(electricity, water, sewer, telephone or 
internet) 
Buffering 
Redundancy 
Flexibility 
Visibility/Collaboration 
Insourcing 
 
43% 
38% 
43% 
38% 
15% 
Average “useful” or “very useful” scores 
for the six top ranked disruptions 
Buffering 
Redundancy  
Flexibility 
Visibility/Collaboration 
Insourcing  
45% 
48% 
44% 
45% 
27% 
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e) Expected disruptions 
The last portion of the survey asked the respondents to indicate the frequency of 
supply chain risks they expect to experience over the next three years. Asking what risks 
to expect implies that the managers are aware of potential upcoming disruptions and 
that they have somehow taken implicit or explicit steps to minimize them. This fits into 
the “Improvement” part of the MIAMI template. If nothing else, thinking ahead of which 
risks may occur should trigger some sort of preparatory moves by management. Of 
course, the level of preparedness and proactivity vary a lot between firms. As evident 
from Table 29, of the 43 respondents, between 30 and 33 elected to provide answers to 
each of our questions about upcoming risks.  
While many of the respondents chose to indicate that they did not expect 
specific risks to happen, the remaining provided risks estimates of frequency (less, same 
or more). We chose to scale this as follows: 
Less frequent than previously =  - 1 
Same frequency as previously =    0 
More frequent than previously =  + 1 
 
 This will give us a feel for how far from zero (same frequency) the average 
consensus is for each disruption118. The lower the number, the less frequent the risk is 
expected, relative to the current situation. The disruptions offered are the same 
thirteen we have used throughout this survey. In addition, respondents could write in 
additional disruptions they expected.  
                                                          
118 The average of the “less”, “same” or “more” responses, excluding the “does not expect”. 
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Table 29: EXPECTED FREQUENCY OF DISRUPTIONS THE NEXT THREE YEARS 
Disruption:  
 
 
n 
D
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’t
 
ex
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t 
Le
ss
 
fr
e
q
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y 
Sa
m
e
 
fr
e
q
u
en
cy
 
M
o
re
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e
q
u
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y 
A
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ra
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sc
o
re
 
Flooding and weather related events 30 13 9 7 2 -0.39 
Major accidents, incl. fires, 
explosions, structural collapses, or 
spills 
 
 
31 
 
 
17 
 
 
12 
 
 
2 
 
 
1 
 
 
-0.73 
Terrorism, riots or civil unrest 31 20 9 3 0 -0.75 
Inadequate or slow transportation 
infrastructure (road, rail, ports or 
air) 
 
 
33 
 
 
11 
 
 
15 
 
 
6 
 
 
1 
 
 
-0.64 
Inadequate logistics infrastructure 
(distribution, warehousing, or cold 
storage) 
 
 
32 
 
 
12 
 
 
15 
 
 
6 
 
 
0 
 
 
-0.71 
Inadequate utilities infrastructure 
(electricity, water, sewer, telephone 
or internet) 
 
 
31 
 
 
13 
 
 
11 
 
 
7 
 
 
0 
 
 
-0.61 
Property or violent crimes (theft, 
robbery, hijackings, vandalism, 
computer viruses or fraud) 
 
 
31 
 
 
23 
 
 
6 
 
 
3 
 
 
0 
 
 
-0.67 
Intellectual property crimes 
(counterfeiting, copyright violations, 
or hacking) 
 
 
31 
 
 
23 
 
 
6 
 
 
2 
 
 
1 
 
 
-0.56 
Corruption or bribery 31 16 7 8 1 -0.38 
Bureaucracy (red tape, unclear, 
inconsistent restrictions or 
regulations) 
 
 
30 
 
 
12 
 
 
7 
 
 
11 
 
 
1 
 
 
-0.32 
Labor problems (strikes, skills 
shortages, incompetence, turnover, 
absenteeism) 
 
 
32 
 
 
11 
 
 
10 
 
 
10 
 
 
2 
 
 
-0.36 
Tax system (burdensome, arbitrary, 
or inconsistent) 
 
32 
 
12 
 
14 
 
3 
 
3 
 
-0.55 
Supplier problems (quality, 
reliability, timeliness, or financial 
strength) 
 
 
32 
 
 
12 
 
 
12 
 
 
6 
 
 
2 
 
 
-0.50 
 
On average, all thirteen risks were expected to occur less frequently the next 
three years compared to the past three. But there are differences in the degree of 
optimism, as Table 30 shows. This lists the disruptions in order of expectation: 
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TABLE 30: EXPECTED DISRUPTIONS BY RANK 
Disruption: Average 
score: 
% of Respondents who 
expect it same or more: 
Bureaucracy (red tape, unclear, inconsistent 
restrictions or regulations) 
 
-0.32 
 
40% 
Labor problems (strikes, skills shortages, 
incompetence, turnover, absenteeism) 
 
-0.36 
 
38% 
Corruption or bribery -0.38 29% 
Flooding and weather related events -0.39 30% 
Supplier problems (quality, reliability, 
timeliness, or financial strength) 
 
-0.50 
 
25% 
Tax system (burdensome, arbitrary, or 
inconsistent) 
 
-0.55 
 
19% 
Intellectual property crimes (counterfeiting, 
copyright violations, or hacking) 
-0.56 10% 
Inadequate utilities infrastructure (electricity, 
water, sewer, telephone or internet) 
 
-0.61 
 
23% 
Inadequate or slow transportation 
infrastructure (road, rail, ports or air) 
 
-0.64 
 
21% 
Property or violent crimes (theft, robbery, 
hijackings, vandalism, computer viruses or 
fraud) 
 
-0.67 
 
10% 
Inadequate logistics infrastructure 
(distribution, warehousing, or cold storage) 
 
-0.71 
 
19% 
Major accidents, incl. fires, explosions, 
structural collapses, or spills 
 
-0.73 
 
10% 
Terrorism, riots or civil unrest -0.75 10% 
 
The risks making up the cluster of six are scattered throughout this ranking. The 
three least expected to improve (bureaucracy, labor problems, and corruption) are all 
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related to human behavior (or misbehavior). For example, as many as 40 per cent 
expected bureaucracy/red tape to continue at the same or higher frequency. We 
already found that bureaucracy and labor problems exhibited high severity (frequency x 
impact), and the expectations are that supply chain managers will continue to be 
affected by these two risks to a high degree over the next three years. The 
infrastructure risks (utilities, transportation, logistics) are ranked quite a bit better with 
respect to future expectations, perhaps reflecting a belief that these impediments are 
easier to fix through anticipated investments and construction.  
Table 31 shows which disruptions the respondents did not expect to experience 
or expected to experience less over the next three years, ranked in order of the “don’t 
expect” gauge of optimism. The visible disruptions covered by the media (i.e. crimes, 
terrorism, accidents and to an extent flooding/weather) are apparently not the ones 
that supply managers expect to encounter or suffer from. The more mundane risks that 
typically are not written about in the media are the ones that cause operational and 
financial worries.  
By studying tables 29, 30 and 31 closer, one gets the impression that supply chain 
managers are split on the issue of upcoming risks. This is perhaps not so strange, as 
every supply chain is different. No firm has the same risk exposure or profile. Future 
expectations are shaped by the recent experiences of the subjects and what businesses 
they are in, so a great deal of variation would be expected.  
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Table 31: RISKS NOT EXPECTED THE NEXT THREE YEARS: 
 
Disruption % of respondents who 
Don’t expect next 
three years 
Expect less next three 
years 
Crimes 74% 16% 
I.P. crimes 74% 16% 
Terrorism 65% 25% 
Accidents 55% 35% 
Corruption 52% 19% 
Flooding/weather 43% 27% 
Utilities 42% 35% 
Bureaucracy 40% 20% 
Logistics 38% 43% 
Taxes 38% 43% 
Suppliers 38% 37% 
Labor 34% 28% 
Transportation 33% 46% 
 
Some respondents wrote in further comments as to which risks they expected 
the next three years (the comments are cited verbatim):  
1. Rising Population 
2. Shipping 
3. Debt or finance problems (cost of loans or capital) 
4. India has got many potential ways to improve its supply chain infrastructure. Multi-
faceted problems are faced today and they cannot be attributed to any one factor 
only. India must work hard and subjugate vested personal interests and must think 
long-term. Policies to improve infrastructure should be fast-tracked and it must 
become easy to invite foreign inflows in India (of course keeping welfare of Indian 
people in mind first) 
5. Mitigation methods in preventing or limiting the negative impact MUST BE 
REDEFINED. 
6. Better discipline required 
7. Quality  human resources 
8. Those companies in the middle of Supply Chain get hammered from both ends of the 
Supply chain-the customers as well as suppliers 
9. The impact on our business is not that high. Of course my customers business 
sometimes major way gets affected.  
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Comment number 5 regarding mitigation methods is interesting because it 
illustrates the potential deficiency in using classic supply chain mitigation methods in 
fighting socio-economic or cultural impediments such as corruption, bureaucracy and 
the tax system. Our five suggested mitigation methods are likely most useful for tangible 
challenges such as delays and damage caused by suppliers or infrastructure problems.  
Further Statistical Analysis 
 
Our findings lend themselves to some interesting statistical evaluations. We will 
look at: 
1) Are there group differences with respect to the severity of disruptions? For 
example, does it matter whether a company is Indian or foreign owned on 
how it reported severity? We will use Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to study 
this.  
2) Are the predictor (profile) variables related or correlated, so that certain 
combinations of factors (Indian/foreign, small/large, etc.) possess a certain 
proclivity for severity of disruptions?  
3) Can the company profile predict severity of disruptions? We will use multiple 
regression to study that. 119 
                                                          
119 We attempted a dimension reduction by running a Principal Component Analysis using the 
Factor function in SPSS. Our first run with nine of the disruptions resulted in a “non-positive definite” 
correlation matrix, due to too few data points for that many variables. We tried again with the top seven 
disruptions, which gave us results, but did not properly satisfy the KMO (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin) measure of 
sampling adequacy (the combined measure was only 0.511, and none of the coefficients in the anti-image 
matrix exceeded the recommended 0.5 threshold). We therefore decided against factor analysis on this 
data. 
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1. Group comparisons 
 
In Table 19, we kept seven profile variables, each split into two groups.  The two 
groups for each predictor variable were: 
 General sector: Goods or Services 
 Ownership:  Indian or Foreign 
 Global sales:  Small or Large 
 Value sourced: Low or High 
 Employed:  Few or Many 
 Exported:  High % or Low % 
 Years in India:  Short time or Long time 
 
In addition, we revisited the data to categorize respondents into two groups: 
manufacturing and service. This categorization is somewhat different than the “general 
sector” above, and is created by putting firms with activities in the first six categories of 
NIC 2008 into one group, and firms in the remaining 15 activities into another group 
(see question 8 under Appendix A). Therefore, 
 Industry:  Manufacturing or Service 
 
Of the 43 respondents, 65% were found to be representing manufacturing, and 
the remaining 35% the service industry.  
To check for significant group differences, these eight profile (predictor) 
variables were compared to the seven disruptions with the most severity, from Table 
25, as well as a summarized assessment variable.  This last variable is the sum of the 
severity scores on all the disruptions for each respondent. The histogram in Figure 5 
showed that respondents varied a lot with respect to combined severity over all thirteen 
disruptions. We find that it makes more sense to run group comparisons on the 
combined severity scores rather than either the reported frequency or impact scores 
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separately. As explained, the severity score is a better measure of overall risk. Table 32 
displays the significance levels found after running an ANOVA between the seven  
Table 32: CHECKING FOR SIGNIFICANT GROUP DIFFERENCES USING SIGNIFICANCE 
SCORES 
            Risk 
 
 
 
Predictor Su
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Sector: 
Goods or 
Services 
.176 .792 .072 
Services 
.362 .909 .235 .253 .110 
Industry: 
Manuf. or 
Services 
.320 .908 .103 .033 
Services 
120 
.984 .094 
Services 
.931 .298 
Ownership: 
Indian or 
Foreign 
.076 
Indian 
121 
.720 .728 .383 .089 
Indian 
.064 
Indian122 
.404 .824 
Sales: 
Small or 
Large 
.017 
Small 
123 
.102 .124 .012 
Small 
124 
.001 
Small 
125 
.425 .852 .070 
Small 
Sourcing $: 
Low or 
High 
.697 .920 .331 .238 .853 .680 .207 .751 
Employees: 
Few or 
Many 
.679 .947 .714 .330 .698 .881 .427 .975 
Exported: 
Hi % or 
Low % 
.508 .077 
Low 
% 
.143 .960 .867 .695 .144 .660 
Longevity: 
Short or 
Long 
.755 .802 .070 
Short 
.363 .149 .923 .966 .309 
                                                          
120 This particular group comparison violated the Levene test for homogeneity of variances, with 
a significance score of 0.049 
121 This particular group comparison violated the Levene test for homogeneity of variances, with 
a significance score of 0.022.  
122 Violation of the Welch robust test for equality of means, with significance score 0.025 
123 Violation of the Welch robust test for equality of means, with significance score 0.011. 
124 Violation of the Welch robust test for equality of means, with significance score 0.006. 
125 Violation of the Welch robust test for equality of means, with significance score 0.000.  
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Explanation: Table 32 shows statistical significance scores, where scores lower than 0.10 are 
considered significant at the 90% confidence level. Such scores are shown in the lightly shaded 
boxes, in bold print, followed by the direction of the relationship. For example, the interpretation 
of the bolded box in the first row is that services sector firms were significantly more affected by 
transportation disruptions than firms in the goods sector.  
 
predictors and the eight disruption factors. This analysis checks if there is a significant 
difference between the severity scores between two groups, for example between 
companies involved in goods versus companies involved in services. As this is a one-way 
analysis, values of 0.100 or lower would be statistically significant at the 90% confidence 
level. We decided to use the 90% level because combined with the low sample sizes, the 
resulting wide confidence intervals give us appropriate guidance for management 
purposes.  
Table 32 indicates 12 significant group differences at the 90% confidence level:  
a) Sector (is the company selling goods or services): 
Companies selling services experienced more severe transportation infrastructure 
disruptions.  
 
b) Industry (is the company in the manufacturing or services industry): 
Companies in the services industry experienced more severe logistics and utilities 
infrastructure disruptions.  
 
c)  Ownership (is the company Indian or foreign owned): 
Companies with Indian or predominantly Indian ownership experienced more severe 
supplier problems, bureaucracy/red tape, and utilities infrastructure problems. 
 
d)  Sales (does the company have small or large global sales, i.e. less or more than 
US$ 10 million p.a.): 
Companies with small sales experienced more severe supplier problems, more severe 
logistics infrastructure problems, more bureaucracy/red tape, and were more severely 
affected overall by supply chain disruptions. 
 
e)  Exported (high or low percentage of total sales): 
Companies with a low proportion of exports out of India (< 25%) experienced more 
severe labor problems.  
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f)  Longevity (long or short tenure in India): 
Companies which have operated in India less than 20 years experienced more severe 
transportation infrastructure problems.  
 
As for the “Summarized” (last) column in Table 32, it is noteworthy to look at the 
general direction of the relationships, whether the group differences were significant or 
not. We already observed that small firms were more prone to disruptions overall (with 
93% confidence), while the other seven factors show: 
TABLE 33: DIRECTION OF RELATIONSHIP 
FACTOR GROUP Summarized highest disruption 
severity experienced by: 
Sector               Goods or Services Services 
Industry Manufacturing or Services Services 
Ownership        Indian or Foreign Indian 
Sales                       Small or Large Small  (SIGNIFICANT; sig  = 0.070) 
Sourcing $                  Low or High Low 
Employees               Few or Many No difference (sig = 0.975) 
Exported                Hi % or Low % Low % 
Longevity              Short or Long Short  
 
Perusing tables 32 and 33, one gets the impression that by being small, or being Indian 
owned, or being in the services sector will significantly expose such firms to more supply 
chain disruptions.  
 
2. Combinations of Predictor Variables? 
 
We ran a correlation matrix with the basic seven predictor variables that we 
used, and found statistically significant correlations (at the 95% level) between the 
following four126: 
 
                                                          
126 As a correlation coefficient Kendall’s tau was used, due to the non-parametric nature and 
small dataset.  
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TABLE 34: SIGNIFICANT CROSS-CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PREDICTOR VARIABLES 
PREDICTOR Value of items 
sourced in India 
Employed in India Years in India 
Global Sales .484 .564 .396 
Value of items 
sourced in India 
- .587 .327 
Employed in India 
 
- - .510 
 
This means that companies with high global sales also tend to source heavily in 
India, have many employees in India, and will have been in India for quite a while. These 
four variables have a tendency to move in unison. Comparing these findings to the 
group comparisons in Table 32 does not give us much additional information. It showed 
that companies with low global sales were more prone to report supply chain problems, 
including more severe supplier, logistics infrastructure and bureaucracy disruptions. 
Because of the close correlation with value sourced, Indian employment and tenure in 
India, it is likely that smaller and younger companies experience more of these 
problems. Table 34 shows the whole cross-correlation matrix for the predictor variables.  
3. Prediction and Multiple Regression 
The seven predictor variables were run against the summarized severity score as 
the dependent variable. The purpose was to assess how much of the variability in the 
summarized severity could be explained from the seven predictors. The first model 
summary in Table 35 includes all seven predictors and show that the explanatory power 
(R Square) is 33.9%. However, it is worrisome that the adjusted R square is 17.9%, or 
only about half. Only two of the slope (beta) coefficients were significant at the 95% 
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TABLE 35: COMPLETE PREDICTOR VARIABLE CROSS-CORRELATION TABLE 
 
Correlations 
 SECT
OR 
OWN
ER 
SALES
_2 
VALUE
_2 
EMPLO
YED_2 
EXPOR
TED_2 
YEARS
_2 
SECTOR 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
1.000 -.021 .074 -.005 .042 .174 -.106 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .892 .650 .974 .793 .266 .501 
N 42 42 39 40 41 42 41 
OWNER 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
-.021 1.000 .263 .076 -.003 .122 -.191 
Sig. (2-tailed) .892 . .100 .633 .987 .428 .221 
N 42 43 40 40 42 43 42 
SALES_2 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.074 .263 1.000 .484** .564** -.083 .396* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .650 .100 . .003 .001 .606 .015 
N 39 40 40 39 39 40 39 
VALUE_2 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
-.005 .076 .484** 1.000 .587** -.079 .327* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .974 .633 .003 . .000 .621 .044 
N 40 40 39 40 39 40 39 
EMPLOYED
_2 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.042 -.003 .564** .587** 1.000 .057 .510** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .793 .987 .001 .000 . .714 .001 
N 41 42 39 39 42 42 41 
EXPORTED
_2 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.174 .122 -.083 -.079 .057 1.000 .100 
Sig. (2-tailed) .266 .428 .606 .621 .714 . .521 
N 42 43 40 40 42 43 42 
YEARS_2 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
-.106 -.191 .396* .327* .510** .100 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .501 .221 .015 .044 .001 .521 . 
N 41 42 39 39 41 42 42 
 
 
confidence level: global sales had a negative coefficient, and employment a positive 
coefficient.  In the bottom panel of Table 35 we ran the regression with only the four 
relatively highly correlated variables from Table 33. The adjusted R square rose a bit, 
and the same two predictors (global sales and employment) had significant slope 
coefficients. 
With such a low predictive ability, the multiple regression analysis is of limited 
benefit, if any. It seems that group comparisons using ANOVA and one-way analysis are 
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a better way to predict overall supply chain risk severity, at least predictor by predictor.  
It would be hard to imagine a formula where a company could plug in its profile data 
and obtain a robust prediction of its supply chain risk exposure. Nevertheless, much of 
the information uncovered in the many tables above can be of great use.  
TABLE 36: MODEL SUMMARIES OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R 
Squa
re 
Adjuste
d R 
Square 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics Durbin-
Watson R Square 
Change 
F 
Change 
df1 df2 Sig. F 
Change 
1 
.582
a 
.339 .179 51.622 .339 2.125 7 29 .073 1.461 
a. Predictors: (Constant), YEARS_2, EXPORTED_2, SECTOR, OWNER, VALUE_2, 
SALES_2, EMPLOYED_2 
b. Dependent Variable: S_Total 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R 
Squar
e 
Adjuste
d R 
Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics Durbin-
Watson R Square 
Change 
F 
Change 
df1 df2 Sig. F 
Change 
1 
.555
a 
.308 .222 50.274 .308 3.565 4 32 .016 1.308 
a. Predictors: (Constant), YEARS_2, VALUE_2, SALES_2, EMPLOYED_2 
b. Dependent Variable: S_Total 
 
 
It is worth stating that any of the correlations we found do not imply causation. For 
example, small firms do not cause supplier problems.  All we can observe is that there 
are a few statistically significant relationships, as illustrated in Table 32, which may give 
us an indication of possible exposure rather than any cause and effect associations.   
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
 
This chapter draws some conclusions from the findings in this study. It will also 
touch upon additional and supporting information gathered from industry professionals 
and people familiar with today’s India.  
Table 37 is a helpful comparison of the frequencies, impacts, severity, most 
useful mitigation methods, and expected frequency. It is color coded so that the 
disruptions can be visually tracked.  
Table 37: COMPARISON OF RANKING OF FREQUENCY, IMPACT, SEVERITY, MITIGATION 
AND EXPECTED RISKS 
Rank Highest 
frequency last 
3 years 
Highest 
impact last 3 
years 
Highest 
severity last 3 
years 
Most useful 
mitigation 
for most 
severe risk 
Expected least 
likely to fall next 
3 years 
1 Transportation 
infrastructure 
Logistics 
infrastructure  
Supplier 
problems 
Redundancies Bureaucracy  
2 Supplier 
problems 
Bureaucracy Logistics 
infrastructure  
Buffering Labor problems 
3 Labor 
problems  
Transportation 
infrastructure 
Transportation 
infrastructure 
Buffering Corruption 
4 Utilities 
infrastructure 
Supplier 
problems 
Labor 
problems 
Redundancies Flooding/weather  
5 Logistics 
infrastructure 
Labor 
problems 
Bureaucracy Flexibility 
Visibility (tie) 
Supplier 
problems  
6 Bureaucracy Corruption  Utilities 
infrastructure 
Buffering Tax system 
7 Corruption Utilities 
infrastructure 
Corruption Redundancy I.P. Crimes 
 
Even though supplier problems were not ranked first in frequency or impact, the 
combined effect caused this risk to place highest in severity. The pairwise multiplication 
of frequency and impact is the reason for this, illustrating clearly that neither frequency 
nor impact by themselves are sufficient to fully assess risk. From a management 
standpoint, severity is what hurts, and both frequency and impact must be controlled.  
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The seven top ranked risks are the ones that grind at managers day in and day 
out. Individually, they are undramatic disruptions that hardly get written about in the 
newspapers. For supply chain managers, the newsworthy disruptions like terrorism, 
major accidents and major crimes do not frequently bother them. Although the impact 
of such events could be catastrophic, they are few and far between, and tend to be 
insurable. The chronic infrastructure inadequacies, supplier/labor problems, red tape 
and corruption are ubiquitous impediments that managers operating in India are forced 
to deal with and find appropriate solutions to. Interestingly, a risk that did not rank 
highly in the experience ratings – flooding and weather related events – came in fourth 
as an expected disruption for the next three years. In conversations with industry 
professionals they expressed a general concern that global climate change would start 
to affect their operations. Perhaps unease with what is going on with the weather is 
what elevates this risk factor.  
The seven top ranked risks can be lumped onto three main categories: 
1) Operational problems internal to the supply chain (supplier and labor problems) 
2) Problems due to inadequate infrastructure (transportation, logistics and utilities) 
3) Bureaucracy/red tape and corruption  
Problems related to suppliers and labor are usually considered internal to a 
company’s extended supply chain, while infrastructure, bureaucracy and corruption 
disruptions are primarily externally thrust upon a firm. That said, supply chains are not 
closed systems, and some of the underlying causes of labor and supplier problems may 
well be problems considered exogenous, such as national labor strikes, road closures 
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and shortages of raw materials. The supplier and labor problems embody a complex 
web of systems, management, technical, cultural and operational glitches and systemic 
impediments. The risks are also intertwined, meaning that the same disruption (for 
instance, a late delivery) can be characterized as both a supplier and infrastructure 
problem. One company’s labor problem becomes its customer’s supplier problem. The 
nature of closely coupled supply chains means that disruptions spread beyond the 
borders of the individual firms.  
The fact that the three infrastructure related disruptions did not rank highly in 
the expectation column either points towards a certain optimism that these are 
problems that are being remedied and expected to improve, or at least a certain hope 
that they won’t get worse. In a November 2012 statement, India’s Minister for Urban 
Development and Parliamentary Affairs, Kamal Nath, said India will spend USD 1 trillion 
on infrastructure development in the country over the next five years127. The spending 
on transportation, logistics and utilities has historically been low, so perhaps this 
represents a bit of a tidal change for the country. Leading business associations, 
business executives and surveys like these keep reiterating the fact that the 
infrastructure is deficient, pushing for a greater political will, urgency and ability to 
allocate more resources to it.  Insufficient infrastructure is a substantial drain on the 
Indian economy and a competitive disadvantage. Executives with a visiting Indian 
delegation felt that infrastructure problems should be listed as the top future concern, 
                                                          
127 http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-11-06/news/34946433_1_kamal-nath-
india-house-private-sector  
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in particular the insufficient transportation infrastructure. Hopefully, what Stanley 
Wolpert calls Indians’ “general lack of action-mindedness” won’t prevail when it comes 
to these needed infrastructure improvements (Wolpert, 2009). 
The results of this survey were presented to several insightful Indian managers 
and practitioners. These experts were invited to comment on the results and 
encouraged to contribute background information and suggestions for root causes. The 
conversations with these experts confirmed the intertwined nature of risks. For 
example, the visiting delegation of Indian business executives128 suggested that labor 
problems were related to political problems, meaning that political maneuvering often 
results in strikes and work stoppages. One root cause for labor problems may therefore 
be political instability and jockeying. In fact, some of the delegates felt that “ineffective 
political system” should have been included as a separate choice in this survey. 
In November of 2013, we presented the findings to another seven industry 
experts129 and asked them to comment on possible root causes and contributing factors. 
We were especially interested in learning more about underlying dynamics and details 
surrounding the highly ranked risks of supplier and labor problems. These seven experts 
on Indian supply chains possessed extensive hands-on experience and knowledge of 
                                                          
128 A delegation of eighteen members of the Mumbai based US-India Importers Council (USIIC) 
visited Washington State in early November, 2013.  
129 Of the seven, six resided in the Seattle area, and one in Bangalore. Two were owners and 
operators of a mid-sized importing company with extensive and frequent sourcing from India, one was a 
franchise executive working on setting up U.S. franchises in India, one was an Indian-American software 
consultant currently working out of Bangalore, one was a commercial lawyer specializing in U.S.-Indian 
business transactions, one was a leader of an U.S.-Indian trade association, and one was the former 
Commercial Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Delhi.  
157 
 
current business conditions in India130. Besides what we already knew and have written 
about in this study, the communication with the experts resulted in the following useful 
comments and observations, summarized here in bullet point style: 
 None of the seven were surprised that supplier and labor problems were ranked 
as severe 
 The two problems are intertwined, meaning that labor problems may be behind 
the purported supplier problems 
 Structurally, Indian manufacturing is quite labor intensive, meaning that 
relationship and union issues are always at the forefront 
 Strong growth in sales and orders causes “growing pains”, meaning that 
suppliers, especially small and medium sized businesses, are not able to keep up 
with customer demand and provide good service 
 The growth in orders has several negative effects, including difficulty of finding 
or retaining qualified labor, corner cutting and lowering of overall quality, 
“sacrifice” of smaller customers if somebody bigger comes along with a major 
order (smaller importers compete against the large, international buyers, like 
chain stores) 
 Many of these large, international importers negotiate so hard on prices and 
terms that quality eventually suffers 
 Many Indian export articles are still hand-made and produced locally in small 
factories. Most of the producers have capacity limits and a hard time scaling up 
their operations 
 It is becoming more difficult for these firms to recruit younger workers willing to 
work with their hands in relatively low-paid positions, as many seek white collar 
jobs in the cities 
 The strong growth has caused a lack of managerial experience, skills and talent. 
Managers are often not properly empowered, and are frequently distrusted by 
workers 
 Small and mid-sized firms find it difficult to obtain the necessary financing to 
expand and automate their operations, including procuring machinery that 
would improve output and quality 
 Infrastructure problems pay a certain role, and the lack of sufficient 
warehousing, transportation hubs and other facilities make it harder for 
suppliers to deliver 
 There exists an educational gap in India, with a lack of vocational and trade 
programs to educate and prepare workers in emerging and growing industries 
                                                          
130 The main forum was a working luncheon with five of the experts, while the input from the 
remaining two were obtained through a personal meeting and a Skype conversation. 
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 Larger companies are more prone to being affected by politically motivated 
labor strikes and other union actions 
 The definition of “inadequate” (as used to characterize the transportation, 
logistics and utilities infrastructure) in our questionnaire is subjective, and raises 
the question “compared to what?”   
Their suggestions for alleviating some of these risks include maintaining close 
relationships with trusted suppliers, ensuring worker loyalty and creating a feeling of 
family among employees, making frequent visits to suppliers’ factories, and having a 
quality control or inspection mechanism in place before items are exported out of India. 
Also, competitive advantage can often be maintained by cultivating close bonds with 
suppliers manufacturing unique and high quality niche products. Cost pressures and 
commoditization efforts will fuel quality and delivery problems. One expert also 
suggested that businesses not focus so much on changing India as on changing their 
management and operating procedures when doing business there. India undoubtedly 
needs to change to remain competitive in the global business environment. However, 
this expert did raise a good point regarding the requisite resilience that is required to 
successfully navigate the Indian business landscape. To thrive and survive, businesses do 
what they have to do in the environment that surrounds them.  
Depending on the nature of “internal” problems such as supplier and labor 
disruptions, a piece of good news is that they might be fixable with better management 
and internal control systems. Supplier and labor problems are not unique to India, and 
more sophisticated management structures and I.T. systems may help in alleviating 
them. As one of the experts commented, all companies operating in India are faced with 
the same set of supplier and labor problems, and this constitutes a “level playing field” 
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amongst competitors. The winners will be the companies best able to manage and 
mitigate the various operational risks. However, we have seen from the data in this 
survey that there are differences in how categories of companies perceive risk, as 
manifested through frequencies and impact. Notably, and as seen in Table 32, Indian 
owned companies reported significantly more severe supplier, bureaucracy and utilities 
problems, while smaller companies were more severely affected by supplier, logistics, 
bureaucracy and overall disruptions. Companies doing services were also more prone to 
experience risks. We can only make educated guesses as to why this is so. Somewhat 
counterintuitively, being Indian owned does not seem to be of benefit in repelling 
problems, and small firms report being bothered more than large firms with respect to 
disruption severity. Perhaps the ownership of the firm is of little relevance in managing 
local risks, as most of the managers are Indian anyway whether the firm is Indian or 
foreign. Whether large and/or foreign firms are able to hire and pay for better managers 
remains an issue that our survey cannot answer. Whether foreign firms interpret risks 
differently than Indian firms is another interesting question, but we don’t have enough 
information in this study to verify whether this implies some sort of cultural difference.  
The respondents to this survey suggested that redundancies would be the best 
mitigation method for both supplier and labor disruptions. Redundancies imply having 
multiple suppliers, sites or equipment, rendering the company with available backup 
capabilities. Possessing redundancies is usually costlier than single source, but in the 
long run considered economically wiser from a risk management standpoint.  The other 
stalwart, buffering (holding inventory and adding lead times) was popular for the 
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logistics and utilities infrastructure problems. Overall, the four methods of buffering, 
redundancies, flexibility and visibility/collaboration ranked very closely in perceived 
usefulness (44% to 48% of the respondents ranked them useful or very useful), while 
insourcing was not highly ranked. The latter is possibly a more strategic step, which puts 
it out of immediate reach for most supply chain managers dealing with operational 
issues. It is also worth keeping in mind the feedback we got on the relevancy of our five 
suggested mitigation methods with respect to some of the more pesky risks 
encountered in India, like bureaucracy, the tax system and corruption. Holding 
inventory or having several suppliers are hardly the best methods for circumventing red 
tape and bribery. The respondent who added the note did not suggest suitable 
mitigation steps for these non-physical problems, but it is evident that the supply chain 
manager’s classic tool box may be lacking suitable methods for dealing with such 
impediments.  
If we check back with Table 14 (“How recent surveys ranked sources of 
disruption”), we see that three of those global studies ranked labor and supplier 
disruptions on top (the fourth had utilities infrastructure ranked first). The results of our 
research, therefore, seem consistent with major global studies performed by 
multinational consulting or insurance companies. We are the first study which 
specifically looked at India. Paradoxically, the consultancy A.T. Kearney in a 2010 study 
gave India the best relative score in “people skills and availability”, which was quantified 
as “suppliers’ experience and skills, labor-force availability, education and language 
proficiency, and attrition rate” (Cavusgil, Knight, & Riesenberger, 2011). The same 
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consulting firm, however, this year downgraded India in their bi-annual Foreign Direct 
Investment Confidence Index. While holding the second best ranking in 2005, 2007, and 
2012, India fell to fifth place in 2013 (Kearney, 2013). 
Bureaucracy and corruption placed lower than some of our experts would have 
thought. This may have to do with the profile of our respondents, who mostly dealt with 
supply chain problems. It is possible that they were less involved with management 
situations exposing them to activities typically susceptible to bureaucracy and bribery, 
such as bidding processes, sales, licensing and permitting.  
As discussed, dramatic, Black Swan events did not flourish in our sample. One 
manager commented that the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks did not slow down 
business or supply chains at all.  It certainly slowed down public transportation for a few 
days and tourism for a great deal longer, but from a purely operational supply chain 
standpoint, terrorism against soft targets tends to be of lesser concern. It was also 
encouraging to see that our sample was not affected by major crimes or intellectual 
property (IP) violations. Although IP violations are most commonly associated with 
China, India has for several years appeared on the U.S. Trade Representative’s Priority 
Watch List for intellectual property violations, with nine other countries (Marantis, 
2013). Because IP infringements are not directly physical or necessarily acute problems, 
they may not often rise to the attention of supply chain managers.  
Some of the visiting delegates felt that the category “flooding or weather related 
problems” was a bit too limiting, and suggested a broader label such as “climate change 
problems” or “environmental impact”. They speculated that perhaps the responses to 
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the flooding question could have been influenced by the timing of the survey. The 
presence and immediacy of the annual monsoon season may have colored the 
responses. The survey was distributed in May-July, which is usually in the midst of this 
season, but flooding was still not listed as a top risk. Thus it appears seasonality was not 
a problem with respect to this question.  
If there is a silver lining to the fact that supplier, labor and infrastructure 
disruptions were found to be the most severe supply chain problems, it may be that 
country experience and skillful management practices go a long way in remedying them.  
Supply chain managers have to be resourceful, diplomatic and smart when navigating 
the every-day business climate and impediments found in India. Companies with 
talented local management should be able to succeed and gain competitive advantage 
in this environment. In a recent report, the well regarded firm company Kohlberg Kravis 
Roberts stated that India would not achieve its full potential until it does at least three 
things better, and the first thing listed was “invest more in infrastructure” (KKR, 2012). 
The interconnected nature of many of India’s challenges means that a seriously 
upgraded physical infrastructure should help reduce other problems, such as supplier 
reliability and corruption.  
Significance, Contribution and Limitations of this Work 
 
With its resources, India will continue to grow as a supplier of goods and services 
to the world. This dissertation has outlined a method for treating supply chain risk 
management by applying a template called MIAMI for analyzing risks in India. MIAMI is 
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an acronym for mapping, identifying, assessing, mitigating and improving. We decided 
to use the template in a somewhat modified form to conduct an empirical survey of 
supply chain risks in India, with particular emphasis on the upstream portion (sourcing 
and operations). While a few international studies were useful in formulating our survey 
questions, only three studies partially touched upon our subject area and India (Arntzen, 
2010a, 2010b, 2010c; Madhavan et al., 2013; Sahay et al., 2006; Sahay & Mohan, 2003). 
These studies kept the emphasis at a more general and strategic level, and did not 
specifically drill into supply chain risk frequencies, impacts, mitigation methods or 
expectations. Ours is the only study so far to query supply chain managers about these 
fairly detailed risk considerations, and is the only study to present a current picture of 
supply chain risk severity in India.  
The utility of the study is evidenced by the fact that it gives supply chain 
managers crucial information on which risks to expect while operating in India, and an 
assessment of the severity of these risks. This information will prove useful in preparing 
for and managing the day-to-day challenges of this complex business environment.  
We set up an empirical survey using the practical MIAMI framework to frame the 
questions and ensure construct validity. A significant contribution lies in the fact that we 
have uncovered Indian supply chain risks and their severities by querying supply chain 
managers on the ground in India. The outcome of the study revealed some unexpected 
and also not-so-surprising results. For instance, it is noteworthy that companies are 
most severely affected by the chronic, relatively low-grade risks of inadequate 
infrastructure, supplier and labor problems, and bureaucracy. None of the highly 
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publicized risks of natural disasters, terrorism, accidents and serious crimes were ranked 
highly overall. The significance of this from a management standpoint is that competent, 
day-to-day management will go a long way in remedying the chronic, societal risks.  
We had great cooperation from four leading trade associations in India, and they 
were willing to send links to our questionnaire out to their members. However, even 
after reminders, we were only able to garner 43 usable responses, for a very low 
response rate. These organizations guard their membership data closely, and did not 
share with us how many people the broadcasts went out to. We believe 5,000 or so may 
be a realistic number. 119 people started the survey, but perhaps they discontinued 
after realizing the level of detail and the time it would take to complete it properly. A 
complete survey would take about 15-30 minutes to do, and that is too long for most 
busy practitioners. Regardless, the 43 responses gave us a rich amount of data, and we 
feel the sample is representative of the target population of supply chain managers.  
 
On disruption severities, please keep in mind a few dilemmas or limitations: 
1)  The open-endedness of frequencies of 10+: 
If somebody wanted to report that a risk happened 36 times in the past three 
years, we were limited to record that as 10 times, thus understating the frequency or 
likelihood of any such risks. If a disruption did happen 36 times it would presumably 
have a minor or moderate impact, as it would be difficult for any organization to survive 
or stomach major or catastrophic disruptions on a monthly basis.  
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2) Individual or combined impacts: 
Do the reported impacts pertain to each and every of the reported frequencies, 
or did the respondents report the aggregate impact? For example, if a company 
experienced eight risks within the three-year period, did they all have a moderate 
impact, or were they eight minor disruptions that combined produced a moderate or 
major impact (“death by a thousand cuts”)?  Ideally, a survey would ask for the specific 
impact of each and every event, but getting into such detail would require a different 
type of investigative tool, probably more akin to an audit.  
3) Subjectivity when assessing and comparing impact: 
Somebody risk averse with a low threshold may have stipulated “major” on a risk 
that another would characterize as “minor”. We did not ask the respondents to provide 
monetary impact estimates, which may have given us a more objective comparison (and 
an even longer questionnaire to complete). However, as we discussed earlier, risk 
assessments are highly subjective by nature, so perhaps leaving the severity estimates 
without clear benchmarks is fine after all. Statistical averaging tends to even out 
individual proclivities for over or understating.  
4) The scaling problem: 
How do you compare a catastrophic disruption to a minor disruption? Using our 
scale it may seem like a catastrophe is only five times more serious than a minor event, 
while in reality it could be thousands of times worse from a financial and operational 
standpoint. We elected not to assign arbitrary values to weigh the various impacts, so a 
plain ranking from 0 to 4 is what we stayed with. The benefit of not inflating major or 
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catastrophic impacts is that we avoid suffocating the rest of the data, thereby making 
everyday disruptions seem insignificant. Again, at the risk of too lengthy a survey, 
maybe monetary impacts should have been asked for.  
Because our survey covers a variety of business sectors and industries, and with 
only a few respondents representing each, it is difficult to use the results to detect 
differences down to such a detailed level.  For example, segments of the Indian I.T. 
industry are considered world class, but this survey does not have enough I.T. firms 
responding – only 4 – to justify any conclusions. A limitation of this research is its 
coarseness, and that only the eight general group comparisons we looked at in tables 32 
and 33 would be meaningful. 
We suggest that further research on the topic of Indian supply chain risks 
attempts to segregate both the industry sectors and the risk categories. Ours is a broad 
study, while what seems needed now is detailed research into particular risks affecting 
particular sectors. For example, combined with quantitative surveys, qualitative 
research such as case studies and interviews can be used to unearth problems relevant 
to important sectors of the Indian economy.  Case on point: It seems appropriate to 
investigate and decipher underlying elements and causes of the intertwined supplier 
and labor risks. If this is done in a sectorial context (e.g., I.T.), it would shed important 
light on exposures and provide platforms for effective remedies.  
  
167 
 
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This dissertation helps fill an information gap regarding supply chain risks in the 
emerging nation of India. By performing a quantitative, empirical study we have 
established certain traits based on the hands-on experience of Indian supply chain 
manager and experts. Focusing on the upstream portion of the supply chain, we 
uncovered which disruptions have the highest frequency, impact and ensuing severity.  
We have explored which mitigation methods were the most useful in alleviating the 
risks. Lastly, we gathered information on which risk factors the supply chain profession 
expects to encounter over the coming three years.  
We built our research approach on a modified version of a time tested model for 
risk management and control.  The stepwise and logical methodology of MIAMI – 
mapping, identifying, assessing, mitigating and improving – was found immensely useful 
in structuring the survey. The questionnaire was built around the MIAMI framework and 
roughly asked five main questions: 
1. Tell us about your Indian supply chain (Mapping) 
2. What went wrong in your supply chain? (Identifying risks) 
3. How did this impact your operations? (Assessing) 
4. What did you do about it? (Mitigating) 
5. Which risks do you expect to encounter in the future? (Improving) 
The results showed that Indian supply chains are most severely affected by the 
chronic risks of inadequate infrastructure, supplier and labor problems, and stifling 
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bureaucracy. We broke the infrastructure risks into three categories – transportation, 
logistics, and utilities – and although all three came out as highly ranked problems, 
transportation infrastructure was deemed the worst. Potential disruptions that we read 
about in the press, such as natural disasters, terrorism and crime, were not ranked as 
that severe by our sample of managers. Dramatic episodes and disasters may 
individually cause a major impact, but the daily grind of poor infrastructure, labor/ 
supplier problems and bureaucracy is what relentlessly takes up management time and 
chips away at a company’s bottom line.  
 We learned that certain categories of firms are exposed to different degrees of 
severity when it comes to particular disruptions. For example, Indian owned companies 
reported greater severity (defined as frequency times impact) in the areas of supplier 
problems, bureaucracy/red tape and inadequate utilities infrastructure. Smaller 
companies (in terms of global sales) reported significantly more severe disruptions 
overall, and specifically in the categories of supplier problems, logistics infrastructure, 
and bureaucracy/red tape. Service companies seemed more affected by logistics and 
utilities infrastructure risks. Is it possible that foreign owned and/or large firms and/or 
manufacturers possess greater resources and perhaps better supply chain talent to 
properly manage and fend off these problems? Without more research and 
investigation, we just don’t know yet what the underlying causes of these disruptions 
are, and why certain categories of companies are more exposed.  
As for useful and appropriate risk mitigation methods, our sample ranked 
buffering and redundancies on top for problems related to suppliers, labor and 
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infrastructure. For bureaucracy, flexibility and visibility/collaboration were found to be 
the most useful. Comments from respondents and other industry experts indicated that 
the traditional supply chain mitigation methods (buffering, redundancies, flexibility, 
visibility/collaboration) were not sufficient to lessen many of the risks experienced in 
India. Keeping extra inventories helps little to alleviate corruption, the remnants of the 
“permit Raj” and various tax challenges.  
The knowledge that most of the serious supply chain risks are either 
infrastructure related or internal to the supply chain (supplier and labor problems) 
should help companies in prioritizing their efforts and organizational practices. A silver 
lining is that such problems are partially fixable through competent management 
practices. Resilient companies gradually learn how to successfully navigate the 
challenging Indian business environment. This takes resources in the form of superb 
managers, robust information systems, and strong internal routines for how to handle 
and dissipate disruptions.  
Future research should attempt to further dissect the nature of the individual 
disruptions. As we suggested, a qualitative study of the supplier and labor problems 
would be very valuable in uncovering subcategories, root causes and the intertwined 
nature of these serious risks. A qualitative or case based approach will enable 
researchers to analyze individual instances of disruptions and limited to specific sectors 
of the Indian economy. The financial impact of disruptions should also be explored 
further. It would moreover be valuable to investigate which mitigation methods work 
best to tackle India’s non-physical supply chain impediments, such as the regulatory 
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conditions, corruption/bribery, and the complex and opaque interstate tax regimes. The 
purpose of all of this research is to make managers better prepared and to suggest 
realistic venues for policy makers.  
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APPENDIX A: COPY OF THE SURVEY 
 
Indian Supply Chain Risks Survey 
 
Q1. Is your company sourcing in India or producing goods or services in India? 
 Yes (1)  
 No (2)  
If No Is Selected, Then Skip To End of Survey 
 
Q2. What is your organizational level? (Choose one) 
 Chair, Owner, CEO, President (1)  
 Managing Director, VP, General Manager, C-Level Executive (2)  
 Director, Senior Manager (3)  
 Manager (4)  
 Analyst, Specialist, Coordinator, Consultant (5)  
 Other (6)  
 
Q3. What is your functional area within the company? (Choose all that apply) 
 General management (1)   
 Supply chain management (incl. procurement, logistics, transportation) (2)  
 Financial management (incl. accounting and I.T.) (3) 
 Sales and marketing management (4)   
 Production and manufacturing management (5)   
 Engineering and product development (6)  
 Human resource management (7)  
 Other (8)  
 
Q4. What is your company's general sector(s)? (Choose all that apply) 
 Non-durable goods or consumables (1) 
 Durable goods (2)   
 Capital goods (buildings, machines, heavy equipment, etc.) (3)    
 Natural resources (4)  
 Services, incl. software, IT, education and government (5)  
 
Q5. In which country is your company's global headquarters located? (Write in) 
 India (1) 36 
 Other than India (write in): ________________________________ 
 
Q6. What is your company's ownership? (Choose one) 
 Fully Indian (1)  
 Fully foreign (2) 
 Mixed, with majority Indian owned (4) 
 Mixed, with majority foreign owned (5) 
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Q7. The company...   (Choose all that apply) 
 Owns and operates its own production or development facilities in India (1)  
 Sources from Indian companies (2)  
 Other or none of the above (3)  
 
Q8. Which businesses are your company involved with globally (incl. India)? (Choose all that 
apply) [The categories correspond to the National Industrial Classification 2008] 
 A. Agriculture, forestry or fishing (1)  
 B. Mining or quarrying (2)   
 C. Manufacturing (3)  
 D. Electricity, gas, steam or air conditioning supply (4)  
 E. Water supply, sewerage, waste management or remediation activities (5)  
 F. Construction (6)  
 G. Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles or motorcycles (7)  
 H. Transportation or storage (8)  
 I. Accommodation or food service activities (9)  
 J. Information or communication, incl. software or IT services (10)  
 K. Financial or insurance activities (11)  
 L. Real estate activities (12)  
 M. Professional, scientific or technical activities (13)  
 N. Administrative or support service activities (14)  
 O. Public administration or defense; compulsory social security (15) 
 P. Education (16)   
 Q. Human health or social work activities (17)  
 R.  Arts, entertainment or recreation (18)   
 S. Other service activities, incl. trade associations (19)  
 T. Activities of households as employers, indifferentiated goods- and services producing 
activities of households for own use (20) 
 U. Activities of extraterritorial organizations or bodies (21) 
 
Q9. What are your company’s annual global sales in U.S. dollars? (Choose one)  Approximate 
exchange rate is 50 INR to the dollar. 
 Less than US$ 1,000,000 (1)  
 US$ 1,000,000 – 10,000,000 (2)   
 US$ 10,000,000 – 100,000,000 (3)  
 US$ 100,000,000 – 1,000,000,000 (4)  
 US$ 1,000,000,000 – 10,000,000,000 (5)  
 More than US$ 10,000,000,000 (6)  
 
Q10. What kind of activity does your company do in India? (Choose all that apply) 
 Production or development, incl. goods or all kinds of services (1)  
 Marketing and Sales (2)  
 Sourcing (3)  
 Other (4)  
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Q11.  Which categories of goods or services does your company source or produce in 
India?  (Choose all that apply) [The categories correspond to the official ones used by Reserve 
Bank of India and the International Monetary Fund] 
 Agricultural and allied products (incl. meat, fish) (1)  
 Ores and minerals (2)  
 Leather and manufactures (3)  
 Chemicals and related products (incl. pharmaceuticals, cosmetics) (4)   
 Engineered goods (incl. transportation equipment, machinery) (5)   
 Textiles and textile products (6)  
 Gems and jewelry (7)  
 Handicrafts (8)  
 Other manufactured goods (9)  
 Petroleum products (10)  
 Electricity, gas or water supply (11)  
 Other products (12)  
 Transportation services (goods or passengers) (13)  
 Travel, hospitality, tourism (14) 
 Telecommunications, computer or information services (incl. IT, software, BPO, ITES, 
media) (15)  
 Construction services, incl. architecture (16)  
 Insurance services (17)  
 Financial services, incl. banking (18) 
 Other business services, (incl. accounting, law, consulting, R&D, storage) (19) 
 Personal, cultural or recreational services (incl. audiovisual, educational) (20)  
 Government goods or services (21)  
 Maintenance, repairs or manufacturing services (22)  
 
Q12.  What is the annual value of what your company is sourcing, producing or developing (incl. 
services) in India, in Indian Rupees? (Choose one) 
 Less than INR 10,00,000 (10 lakhs) (1) 
 INR 10,00,000 – 1,00,00,000 (10 lakhs to 1 crore) (2)  
 INR 1,00,00,000 – 10,00,00,000 (1 crore to 10 crores) (3) 
 INR 10,00,00,000 – 1,00,00,00,000 (10 crores to 100 crores) (4)  
 INR 1,00,00,00,000 – 10,00,00,00,000 (100 crores to 1,000 crores) (5)  
 More than INR 10,00,00,00,000 (more than 1,000 crores) (6)  
 
Q13.  How many persons does your company directly employ in India?  (Choose one) 
 None (7)  
 1-10 (1)  
 11-100 (2)  
 101-1,000 (3)  
 1,001-10,000 (4)  
 10,001-100,000 (5)  
 100,001 or more (6)  
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Q14.  What percentage of your company’s products or services sourced or produced in India is 
exported out of India (i.e. sold abroad)?  (Choose one) 
 100% (1)  
 75-99% (2)  
 50-74% (3)  
 25-49% (4)  
 1-24% (5)  
 0% (6)  
 Don't know (7) 
 
Q15.  Where are the locations of your major Indian suppliers and/or your major Indian 
production facilities (incl. services)? (Choose all that apply) 
 Central India (1) 
 East India (2)  
 North India (3)  
 North-East India (4)  
 South India (5)  
 West India (6)  
 
Q16.  For how many years has your company been sourcing or producing in India?  (Choose one) 
 Less than 3 years (1)  
 3 – 10 years (2)  
 10 – 20 years (3)  
 More than 20 years (4)  
 Don't know (5)  
 
You are now presented with thirteen categories of disruptions that could affect supply chain 
operations in India. We ask how often any of these disruptions may have affected your company 
for the past three years, what the negative impacts may have been, whether any of five 
mitigation methods helped to prevent or limit the impact, and which of these disruptions you 
expect to encounter over the next three years. There is also room to write in up to two 
additional disruptions or risks if you don't find them on the list.       ("Disruption" can be defined 
as an unexpected event that throws the supply chain into minor or major disorder.) 
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Q17  How many 
times the past 
three years 
(since early 
2010) was your 
Indian supply 
chain affected 
by the following 
supply chain 
disruptions? (If 
there are 
significant 
disruptions we 
have missed, 
you can write in 
up to two at the 
bottom) 
Zero times 
(2) 
1 - 3 times 
(3) 
4 - 6 times 
(4) 
7 - 9 times 
(5) 
10 or more 
times (6) 
Flooding (incl. 
weather related 
events) (7) 
          
Major accidents 
(incl. fires, 
explosions, 
structural 
collapses, or 
spills) (8) 
          
Terrorism, riots, 
or civil unrest 
(9) 
          
Inadequate or 
slow 
transportation 
infrastructure 
(road, rail, 
ports, or air) 
(10) 
          
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Inadequate 
logistics 
infrastructure 
(distribution, 
warehousing, 
or cold storage) 
(11) 
          
Inadequate 
utilities 
infrastructure 
(electricity, 
water, sewer, 
telephone, or 
internet) (12) 
          
Property or 
violent crimes 
(theft, robbery, 
hijackings, 
vandalism, 
computer 
viruses or 
fraud) (13) 
          
Intellectual 
property crimes 
(counterfeiting, 
copyright 
violations, or 
hacking) (14) 
          
Corruption or 
bribery (15) 
          
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Bureaucracy 
(red tape, 
unclear, 
inconsistent 
restrictions or 
regulations) 
(16) 
          
Labor problems 
(strikes, skills 
shortages, 
incompetence, 
turnover, or 
absenteeism) 
(17) 
          
Tax system 
(burdensome, 
arbitrary, or 
inconsistent) 
(18) 
          
Supplier 
problems 
(quality, 
reliability, 
timeliness, or 
financial 
strength) (19) 
          
Write in 
additional 
significant 
disruption: (4) 
          
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Write in 
additional 
significant 
disruption: (5) 
          
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Q18  Please indicate the 
operational impact of the 
disruptions you checked in the 
previous question (choose one per 
risk): 
No 
impact 
(1) 
Minor 
impact 
(2) 
Moderate 
impact 
(3) 
Major 
impact 
(4) 
Catastrophic 
impact (5) 
Flooding (incl. weather related 
events) (1) 
          
Major accidents (incl. fires, 
explosions, structural collapses, or 
spills) (2) 
          
Terrorism, riots, or civil unrest (3)           
Inadequate or slow transportation 
infrastructure (road, rail, ports, or 
air) (4) 
          
Inadequate logistics infrastructure 
(distribution, warehousing, or cold 
storage) (5) 
          
Inadequate utilities infrastructure 
(electricity, water, sewer, 
telephone, or internet) (6) 
          
Property or violent crimes (theft, 
robbery, hijackings, vandalism, 
computer viruses or fraud) (7) 
          
Intellectual property crimes 
(counterfeiting, copyright 
violations, or hacking) (8) 
          
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Corruption or bribery (9)           
Bureaucracy (red tape, unclear, 
inconsistent restrictions, or 
regulations) (10) 
          
Labor problems (strikes, skills 
shortages, incompetence, 
turnover, or absenteeism) (11) 
          
Tax system (burdensome, 
arbitrary, or inconsistent) (12) 
          
Supplier problems (quality, 
reliability, timeliness, or financial 
strength) (13) 
          
Other 1 (14)           
Other 2 (15)           
 
 
MITIGATION METHODS 
 
Were any mitigation methods useful in preventing or limiting the negative impact of the 
disruptions you picked? Mitigation in this context means "efforts that help to prevent a 
disruption or make it less severe or painful".  The mitigation methods we ask you to evaluate 
are:        
 
Buffering:             Have safety inventories, extended lead times or excess capacity        
Redundancy:       Have multiple suppliers, sites or equipment        
Flexibility:            Have suppliers or facilities that can quickly respond, adjust, or change over        
Visibility:              Collaborate with and get timely information from trusted suppliers, customers 
and service providers    
Insource:              Produce and source internally instead of relying on outside suppliers or 
sources, or integrate vertically 
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Q19a. Flooding: 
In your opinion, how useful were these mitigation methods in preventing or limiting 
the negative impact on your supply chain of the flooding (incl. weather related events)? 
 
Not useful 
at all (1) 
Somewhat 
useful (2) 
Useful (3) 
Very useful 
(4) 
Not 
applicable (5) 
Buffering:  
Inventory, 
lead time  or 
capacity (1) 
          
Redundancy: 
Multiple 
suppliers,  
sites or 
equipment (2) 
          
Flexibility: 
Quick 
response or 
change-overs 
(3) 
          
Visibility: 
Collaboration 
and timely 
info from  
supply chain 
partners (4) 
          
Insource : 
Produce 
internally or 
vertical 
integration (5) 
          
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Q19b. Major accidents: 
In your opinion, how useful were these mitigation methods in preventing or limiting 
the negative impact on your supply chain of the major accidents (fires, explosions,structural 
collapses or spills)? 
 
Not useful 
at all (1) 
Somewhat 
useful (2) 
Useful (3) 
Very useful 
(4) 
Not 
applicable (5) 
Buffering:  
Inventory, 
lead time  or 
capacity (1) 
          
Redundancy: 
Multiple 
suppliers,  
sites or 
equipment (2) 
          
Flexibility: 
Quick 
response or 
change-overs 
(3) 
          
Visibility: 
Collaboration 
and timely 
info from  
supply chain 
partners (4) 
          
Insource : 
Produce 
internally or 
vertical 
integration (5) 
          
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Q19c. Terrorism, riots or civil unrest: 
In your opinion, how useful were these mitigation methods in preventing or limiting 
the negative impact on your supply chain of the terrorism, riots or civil unrest? 
 
Not useful 
at all (1) 
Somewhat 
useful (2) 
Useful (6) 
Very useful 
(3) 
Not 
applicable (4) 
Buffering:  
Inventory, 
lead time  or 
capacity (1) 
          
Redundancy: 
Multiple 
suppliers,  
sites or 
equipment (2) 
          
Flexibility: 
Quick 
response or 
change-overs 
(3) 
          
Visibility: 
Collaboration 
and timely 
info from  
supply chain 
partners (4) 
          
Insource : 
Produce 
internally or 
vertical 
integration (5) 
          
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Q19d. Inadequate or slow transportation infrastructure: 
In your opinion, how useful were these mitigation methods in preventing or limiting 
the negative impact on your supply chain of the inadequate or slow transportation 
infrastructure ? 
 
Not useful 
at all (1) 
Somewhat 
useful (2) 
Useful (3) 
Very useful 
(4) 
Not 
applicable (5) 
Buffering:  
Inventory, 
lead time  or 
capacity (1) 
          
Redundancy: 
Multiple 
suppliers,  
sites or 
equipment (2) 
          
Flexibility: 
Quick 
response or 
change-overs 
(3) 
          
Visibility: 
Collaboration 
and timely 
info from  
supply chain 
partners (4) 
          
Insource : 
Produce 
internally or 
vertical 
integration (5) 
          
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Q19e. Inadequate logistics infrastructure: 
In your opinion, how useful were these mitigation methods in preventing or limiting 
the negative impact on your supply chain of the inadequate logistics infrastructure (distribution, 
warehousing or cold storage)? 
 
Not useful 
at all (1) 
Somewhat 
useful (2) 
Useful (3) 
Very useful 
(4) 
Not 
applicable (5) 
Buffering:  
Inventory, 
lead time  or 
capacity (1) 
          
Redundancy: 
Multiple 
suppliers,  
sites or 
equipment (2) 
          
Flexibility: 
Quick 
response or 
change-overs 
(3) 
          
Visibility: 
Collaboration 
and timely 
info from  
supply chain 
partners (4) 
          
Insource : 
Produce 
internally or 
vertical 
integration (5) 
          
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Q19f. Inadequate utilities infrastructure: 
In your opinion, how useful were these mitigation methods in preventing or limiting 
the negative impact on your supply chain of the inadequate utiities infrastructure (electricity, 
water, sewer, telephone, internet)? 
 
Not useful 
at all (1) 
Somewhat 
useful (2) 
Useful (3) 
Very useful 
(4) 
Not 
applicable (5) 
Buffering:  
Inventory, 
lead time  or 
capacity (1) 
          
Redundancy: 
Multiple 
suppliers,  
sites or 
equipment (2) 
          
Flexibility: 
Quick 
response or 
change-overs 
(3) 
          
Visibility: 
Collaboration 
and timely 
info from  
supply chain 
partners (4) 
          
Insource : 
Produce 
internally or 
vertical 
integration (5) 
         
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Q19g. Property or violent crimes: 
In your opinion, how useful were these mitigation methods in preventing or limiting 
the negative impact on your supply chain of the property or violent crimes (theft, robbery, 
hijackings, vandalism, computer viruses or fraud)? 
 
Not useful 
at all (1) 
Somewhat 
useful (2) 
Useful (3) 
Very useful 
(4) 
Not 
applicable (5) 
Buffering:  
Inventory, 
lead time  or 
capacity (1) 
          
Redundancy: 
Multiple 
suppliers,  
sites or 
equipment (2) 
          
Flexibility: 
Quick 
response or 
change-overs 
(3) 
          
Visibility: 
Collaboration 
and timely 
info from  
supply chain 
partners (4) 
          
Insource : 
Produce 
internally or 
vertical 
integration (5) 
          
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Q19h. Intellectual property crimes: 
In your opinion, how useful were these mitigation methods in preventing or limiting 
the negative impact on your supply chain of the intellectual property crimes (counterfeiting, 
copyright violations or hacking)? 
 
Not useful 
at all (1) 
Somewhat 
useful (2) 
Useful (3) 
Very useful 
(4) 
Not 
applicable (5) 
Buffering:  
Inventory, 
lead time  or 
capacity (1) 
          
Redundancy: 
Multiple 
suppliers,  
sites or 
equipment (2) 
          
Flexibility: 
Quick 
response or 
change-overs 
(3) 
          
Visibility: 
Collaboration 
and timely 
info from  
supply chain 
partners (4) 
          
Insource : 
Produce 
internally or 
vertical 
integration (5) 
          
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Q19i. Corruption or bribery: 
In your opinion, how useful were these mitigation methods in preventing or limiting 
the negative impact on your supply chain of the corruption or bribery? 
 
Not useful 
at all (1) 
Somewhat 
useful (2) 
Useful (3) 
Very useful 
(4) 
Not 
applicable (5) 
Buffering:  
Inventory, 
lead time  or 
capacity (1) 
          
Redundancy: 
Multiple 
suppliers,  
sites or 
equipment (2) 
          
Flexibility: 
Quick 
response or 
change-overs 
(3) 
          
Visibility: 
Collaboration 
and timely 
info from  
supply chain 
partners (4) 
          
Insource : 
Produce 
internally or 
vertical 
integration (5) 
          
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Q19j. Bureaucracy: 
In your opinion, how useful were these mitigation methods in preventing or limiting 
the negative impact on your supply chain of the bureaucracy (red tape, unclear, inconsistent 
restrictions or regulations) 
 
Not useful 
at all (1) 
Somewhat 
useful (2) 
Useful (3) 
Very useful 
(4) 
Not 
applicable (5) 
Buffering:  
Inventory, 
lead time  or 
capacity (1) 
          
Redundancy: 
Multiple 
suppliers,  
sites or 
equipment (2) 
          
Flexibility: 
Quick 
response or 
change-overs 
(3) 
          
Visibility: 
Collaboration 
and timely 
info from  
supply chain 
partners (4) 
          
Insource : 
Produce 
internally or 
vertical 
integration (5) 
          
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Q19k. Labor problems: 
In your opinion, how useful were these mitigation methods in preventing or limiting 
the negative impact on your supply chain of the labor problems (strikes, skills shortages, 
incompetence, turnover, or absenteeism)? 
 
Not useful 
at all (1) 
Somewhat 
useful (2) 
Useful (3) 
Very useful 
(4) 
Not 
applicable (5) 
Buffering:  
Inventory, 
lead time  or 
capacity (1) 
          
Redundancy: 
Multiple 
suppliers,  
sites or 
equipment (2) 
          
Flexibility: 
Quick 
response or 
change-overs 
(3) 
          
Visibility: 
Collaboration 
and timely 
info from  
supply chain 
partners (4) 
          
Insource : 
Produce 
internally or 
vertical 
integration (5) 
          
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Q19l. Tax system: 
In your opinion, how useful were these mitigation methods in preventing or limiting 
the negative impact on your supply chain of the tax system (burdensome, arbitrary or 
inconsistent)? 
 
Not useful 
at all (1) 
Somewhat 
useful (2) 
Useful (3) 
Very useful 
(4) 
Not 
applicable (5) 
Buffering:  
Inventory, 
lead time  or 
capacity (1) 
          
Redundancy: 
Multiple 
suppliers,  
sites or 
equipment (2) 
          
Flexibility: 
Quick 
response or 
change-overs 
(3) 
          
Visibility: 
Collaboration 
and timely 
info from  
supply chain 
partners (4) 
          
Insource : 
Produce 
internally or 
vertical 
integration (5) 
          
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Q19m. Supplier problems: 
In your opinion, how useful were these mitigation methods in preventing or limiting 
the negative impact on your supply chain of the supplier problems (quality, reliability, timeliness 
or financial strength)? 
 
Not useful 
at all (1) 
Somewhat 
useful (2) 
Useful (3) 
Very useful 
(4) 
Not 
applicable (5) 
Buffering:  
Inventory, 
lead time  or 
capacity (1) 
          
Redundancy: 
Multiple 
suppliers,  
sites or 
equipment (2) 
          
Flexibility: 
Quick 
response or 
change-overs 
(3) 
          
Visibility: 
Collaboration 
and timely 
info from  
supply chain 
partners (4) 
          
Insource : 
Produce 
internally or 
vertical 
integration (5) 
          
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Q19n. Other 1: 
In your opinion, how useful were these mitigation methods in preventing or limiting 
the negative impact on your supply chain of the Other 1 problem? 
 
Not useful 
at all (1) 
Somewhat 
useful (2) 
Useful (3) 
Very useful 
(4) 
Not 
applicable (5) 
Buffering:  
Inventory, 
lead time  or 
capacity (1) 
          
Redundancy: 
Multiple 
suppliers,  
sites or 
equipment (2) 
          
Flexibility: 
Quick 
response or 
change-overs 
(3) 
          
Visibility: 
Collaboration 
and timely 
info from  
supply chain 
partners (4) 
          
Insource : 
Produce 
internally or 
vertical 
integration (5) 
          
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Q19o. Other 2: 
In your opinion, how useful were these mitigation methods in preventing or limiting 
the negative impact on your supply chain of the Other 2 problem? 
 
Not useful 
at all (1) 
Somewhat 
useful (2) 
Useful (3) 
Very useful 
(4) 
Not 
applicable (5) 
Buffering:  
Inventory, 
lead time  or 
capacity (1) 
          
Redundancy: 
Multiple 
suppliers,  
sites or 
equipment (2) 
          
Flexibility: 
Quick 
response or 
change-overs 
(3) 
          
Visibility: 
Collaboration 
and timely 
info from  
supply chain 
partners (4) 
          
Insource : 
Produce 
internally or 
vertical 
integration (5) 
          
 
 
211 
 
Q20. Lastly, how frequently do you 
expect the following disruptions will 
affect your supply chain in India over 
the next three years (as compared to 
the previous three years)? 
Don't 
expect it 
to affect 
our 
supply 
chain (1) 
Less 
frequent 
than 
previously 
(2) 
Same 
frequency 
as 
previously 
(3) 
More 
frequent 
than 
previously 
(4) 
Flooding (incl. weather related events) 
(1) 
        
Major accidents (incl. fires, explosions, 
structural collapses, or spills) (2) 
        
Terrorism, riots, or civil unrest (3)         
Inadequate or slow transportation 
infrastructure (road, rail, ports, or air) 
(4) 
        
Inadequate logistics infrastructure 
(distribution, warehousing, or cold 
storage)  (5) 
        
Inadequate utilities infrastructure 
(electricity, water, sewer, telephone, 
or internet) (6) 
        
Property or violent crimes (theft, 
robbery, hijackings, vandalism, 
computer viruses or fraud) (7) 
        
Intellectual property crimes 
(counterfeiting, copyright violations, or 
hacking) (8) 
        
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Corruption or bribery (9)         
Bureaucracy (red tape, unclear, 
inconsistent restrictions, or 
regulations) (10) 
        
Labor problems (strikes, skills 
shortages, incompetence, turnover, or 
absenteeism) (11) 
        
Tax system (burdensome, arbitrary, or 
inconsistent) (12) 
        
Supplier problems (quality, reliability, 
timeliness, or financial strength) (13) 
        
Other 1 (14)         
Other 2 (15)         
Any other disruption you expect? 
(write in) 
 
_____________________________ 
(16) 
        
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Q21. OPTIONAL: Any other observations or comments you would like to add regarding supply 
chain disruptions in India? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you very much!  That completes this survey. If you would like a summary report of the 
aggregate results, please e-mail us at udbye@pdx.edu and request a copy. Any other feedback 
would also be appreciated. 
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APPENDIX B: SUPPORTING INFORMATION ON NATURAL DISASTERS IN INDIA 
 
Table 38: EXAMPLES OF FREQUENT SUPPLY CHAIN RISKS IN INDIA 
 
Type of 
disruption 
Description Source 
Tropical 
cyclones 
Of the 30 deadliest tropical cyclones in world 
history, 22 happened in the Bay of Bengal and 
affected India, Bangladesh and Myanmar, killing 
about 2.5 million people 
Weather Underground: 
www.wunderground.co
m/hurricane/deadlyworl
d.asp 
(Tatham, Oloruntoba, & 
Spens, 2012) 
 
Power outages In one of the world's worst power blackouts ever, 
more than 600 million people across India lost 
electricity July 31, 2012, the second massive grid 
failure in two days.  
(Lavelle, Smith, & Byerly, 
2012) 
Earthquakes Between 1960 and 2007, India registered 209 
earthquakes with a magnitude between 4.5 and 
7.6, causing 20,023 deaths, 5 landslides, 1 
tsunami and temporarily displaced almost 50 
million people.131 
EXPO-CAT_2007: 
http://earthquake.usgs.g
ov/research/data/pager/ 
 
Flooding During late summer and early fall of 2011, there 
were four major floods caused by heavy rains in 
the states of Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, West 
Bengal, Orissa and Bihar. These killed 240 people, 
destroyed several hundred thousand houses, 
damaged croplands, and caused registered 
damage for more than $1.2 billion 
(Swiss-Re, 2012) 
Draught Huge areas of India are undergoing sustained 
draught, with a significant impact on agricultural 
outputs. This may shave 0.5% off the country’s 
GDP, or about $8.4 billion.  
(Maplecroft, 2012a) 
Terrorism The two most serious recent attacks happened in 
Mumbai in July of 2006 and November of 2008, 
when Islamic militants targeted public 
transportation and hotels, killing 187 and 183 
people, respectively. The Indian rail system seems 
to be a popular target for extremists, with several 
attacks over the past 20 years.  
(Global_Integrity, 2012; 
IFEP, 2012) 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
131 This is a lot less than China, which tends to have more, stronger and much deadlier earthquakes.   
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Table 39: SUMMARY OF INDIAN NATURAL DISASTERS FROM 1900 TO 2012132 
 
Type Sub-type # of 
events 
Killed total 
& average 
Total affected 
& average 
Damage total  
& average 
Drought Drought 14 4,250,320 
303,594 
1,061,841,000 
75,845,786 
$2,441,122,000 
$174,366,000 
Seismic 
activity 
Earthquake 26 61,817 
2,378 
27,840,383 
1,070,784 
$4,079,900,000 
$156,919,000 
Tsunami133 1 16,389 
16,389 
654,512 
654,512 
$1,022,800,000 
$1,022,800,000 
Epidemic Unspecified 6 293 
49 
95,997 
16,000 
- 
Bacterial 
infectious 
diseases 
24 4,103,948 
170,998 
70,856 
2,952 
- 
Parasitic 
infectious 
diseases 
5 3,411 
682 
57,135 
11,427 
- 
Viral infect. 
diseases 
33 436,222 
13,219 
197,485 
5,984 
- 
Extreme 
temperature 
Cold wave 26 4,979 
192 
25 
1 
$144,000,000 
$5,539,000 
Extreme 
winter cond 
1 180 
180 
- - 
Heat wave 23 8,869 
386 
225 
10 
$400,000,000 
$17,391,000 
Flood Unspecified 93 30,536 
328 
455,269,954 
4,896,375 
$11,673,059,000 
$125,517,000 
Flash flood 22 7,419 
337 
23,431,206 
1,065,055 
$416,200,000 
$18,918,000 
General 
flood 
125 22,471 
180 
323,180,129 
2,585,441 
$23,437,929,000 
$187,503,000 
Stormsurge, 
coast flood 
4 569 
142 
11,500,000 
2,875,000 
$275,000,000 
$68,750,000 
Insect infest. Locusts 1    
Dry mass 
movement  
Avalanche 1 12 
12 
  
Landslide 1 45 
45 
  
                                                          
132 To qualify as a disaster, at least one of the following criteria has to be fulfilled: 10 or more people 
reported killed; 100 or more people reported affected; a call for international assistance; declaration of a 
state of emergency.  
133 This is the Indian Ocean tsunami around Christmas 2004 that was caused by an earthquake off Sumatra 
and killed more than 220,000 people in total. It hit the Indian east coast hard (Perry, 2007) 
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Wet mass 
movement 
Avalanche 7 828 
118 
10,456 
1,494 
$50,000,000 
$7,143,000 
Landslide 35 3,934 
112 
3,828,660 
109,390 
$4,500,000 
$129,000 
Storm Unspecified 32 2,702 
84 
5,337,261 
166,789 
$225,000,000 
$7,031,000 
Local storm 27 2,406 
89 
565,175 
20,932 
$2,226,000,000 
$82,444,000 
Tropical 
cyclone134 
98 159,177 
1,624 
87,642,126 
894,307 
$8,976,525,000 
$91,597,000 
Wildfire Forest fire 2 6 
3 
 $2,000,000 
$1,000,000 
Source: (EM-DAT, 2012) 
 
 
 
  
Table 40: IMPACTS OF NATURAL DISASTERS BY REGION, 1975 – 2011 
 
Region Popula-
tion  
Popul. 
density 
per km2 
Occur-
rences 
(share in %) 
Killed  
(share in 
%) 
Affected 
(share in %) 
Damage 
US$ million 
(share %) 
Africa 1,033 
mill. 
30.5 2,057 
(19.6%) 
728,621 
(25.5%) 
393,800,705 
(6.5%) 
$27,308 
(1.2%) 
Americas 911 mill. 42.5 2,498 
(23.8%) 
418,484 
(14.6%) 
210,406,943 
(3.5%) 
$757,763 
(33.9%) 
Asia 3,879 
mill. 
87 4,041 
(38.6%) 
1,521,599 
(53.3%) 
5,402,771,764 
(89.0%) 
$1,086,756 
(48.7%) 
Europe 739 mill. 10.2 1,390 
(13.3%) 
182,721 
(6.4%) 
42,065,797 
(0.7%) 
306,022 
(13.7%) 
Oceania 36 mill. 4.2 489 
(4.7%) 
5,999 
(0.2%) 
20,552,254 
(0.3%) 
55,801 
(2.5%) 
TOTAL   10,473 
(100%) 
2,857,424 
(100%) 
6,069,597,463 
(100%) 
$2,233,649 
(100%) 
Source: (Asian_Disaster_Reduction_Center, 2012) 
  
                                                          
134 The ability to forecast tropical cyclones (their path and point of landing) is much better now than 
previously. According to the World Meteorological Organization, the 3 days forecasts are now as good as 
were the 48 hour forecasts just a few years ago (WMO, 2012). This has significant positive consequences 
for supply chain risk management and preparation.  
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Figure 2: EARTHQUAKE FREQUENCIES IN ASIA: INDIA NOT PART OF THE RING OF FIRE 
 
Seismicity Maps – 1900 to present: 
 
 
 
Source: http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/india/seismicity.php (public domain) 
  
The red dots indicate occurrences of earthquakes  
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Figure 3: INDIA CLIMATIC DISASTERS RISK MAP 
 
    
Source: 
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/35/India_climatic_disaster_risk_map_en.svg 
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An alternative typology of natural disasters is provided by USAID and CRED 
(Guha-Sapir et al., 2012). They divide events into five subgroups of disasters135: 
Table 41: SUBGROUPS OF NATURAL DISASTERS 
 
Disaster Subgroup Definition Disaster main types and 
examples 
Geophysical Events originating from solid 
earth 
Earthquake, volcano, dry 
mass movement 
Meteorological Events caused by short-
lived/small to meso scale 
atmospheric processes (in 
the spectrum from minutes 
to days) 
Storm 
Hydrological Events caused by deviations 
in the normal water cycle 
and/or overflow of bodies of 
water caused by wind set-up 
Flood, wet mass movement 
Climatological Events caused by long-
lived/meso to macro scale 
processes (in the spectrum 
from intra-seasonal to multi-
decadal climate variability) 
Extreme temperature, 
drought, wildfire 
Biological Disaster caused by the 
exposure of living organisms 
to germs and toxic 
substances. 
Epidemic, insect infestation, 
animal stampede 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
135 CRED defines a disaster as “a situation or event which overwhelms local capacity, 
necessitating a request to a national or international level for external assistance; an unforeseen and 
often sudden event that causes great damage, destruction and human suffering”. Such an event is 
obviously in a different league than a freight pallet tipping over. A broader definition provided in 
Webster’s dictionary may also be instructive: “a sudden or great misfortune” (Merriam-Webster, 1976). In 
supply chain management we are concerned with disruptive and costly events, making both natural 
disasters and various mishaps events of interest to us.  
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APPENDIX C: SUPPORTING INFORMATION ON MANMADE DISASTERS IN INDIA 
 
 
Table 42: SUMMARY OF INDIAN TECHNOLOGICAL DISASTERS FROM 1900 TO 2012 
 
Type Sub-type # of 
events 
Killed total 
& average 
Total affected 
& average 
Damage total  
& average 
Industrial 
accident 
Chemical 
spill 
2 2 
1 
100,460 
50,230 
- 
Collapse 9 203 
23 
11 
1 
- 
Explosion 39 2,075 
53 
4,913 
126 
$228,000,000 
$5,836,000 
Fire 19 381 
20 
126,596 
6,663 
$470,900,000 
$24,784 
Gas leak 3 2,500 
833 
300,751 
100,250 
- 
Other 7 164 
23 
  
Poisoning 14 980 
70 
1,743 
125 
 
Misc. 
accidents 
Collapse 40 2,798 
70 
151,103 
3,778 
$10,000,000 
$250,000 
Explosion 10 301 
30 
214 
21 
- 
Fire 33 1,636 
50 
63,667 
1,929 
- 
Other 26 1,733 
67 
6,187 
238 
- 
Transport 
accident 
Air 22 1,415 
64 
101 
5 
$36,000,000 
$1,636,000 
Rail 111 4,694 
42 
6,664 
60 
$2,000,000 
$18,000 
Road 242 8,241 
34 
3,578 
15 
- 
Water 81 4,958 
61 
354 
4 
- 
Source: (EM-DAT, 2012) 
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Table 43: 2011: A TYPICAL YEAR IN INDIA? 
 
(as tabulated by the insurer Swiss Re, (Swiss-Re, 2012)) 
When Place Event No. of 
victims/amount of 
damage in US$ 
1) Natural Disasters 
 
  
June-July Uttar Pradesh, 
Uttarakhand 
Floods caused by heavy 
monsoon rains 
50 dead 
$ 20 mill. damage 
August West Bengal Floods caused by heavy rains; 
several rivers burst their banks; 
damage to houses and croplands 
100 dead 
$239 mill. damage 
September  Orissa Floods caused by heavy rains; 
over 100,000 houses destroyed 
39 dead 
$430 mill. damage 
Sept. – Oct. Orissa, Bihar, 
Uttar Pradesh 
Floods caused by heavy rains; 
50,000 houses destroyed; over 
200,000 hectares of cropland 
destroyed 
51 dead 
$527 mill. Damage 
May Uttar Pradesh, 
Shahjahanpur, 
Lakhimpur-Kheri, 
Budaun, 
Ambedka, Bareilly 
Thunderstorm with winds up to 
70 km/h; heavy rains 
42 dead 
50 injured 
December Cuddalore (Tamil 
Nadu) 
Tropical cyclone Thane with 
winds up to 125 km/h; 200,000 
houses damaged 
47 dead 
September Sikkim (and Nepal 
and China) 
Earthquake magnitude 6.9; 
aftershocks; over 100,000 
houses damaged  
At least 88 dead 
154 injured 
30,000 homeless 
$20 mill. Damage 
January Many northern 
states 
Cold wave with -23 C 
temperatures 
80 dead 
December Uttar Pradesh, 
Punjab, Haryana 
Cold wave with temperatures 
below 0 degrees C; heavy snow; 
damage to croplands and travel 
disruptions 
 
 
 
 
132 dead 
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2) Man-made disasters136 
 
  
September Calcutta Fire in hospital 89 dead 
July Uttar Pradesh Train hits bus at railway crossing 35 dead 
39 injured 
July Uttar Pradesh Kalka Mail passenger train 
derails 
68 dead 
100 injured 
$2 mill. damage 
September Chennai Two trains collide 10 dead 
52 injured 
October Darjeeling Overcrowded bridge collapses 
during public gathering 
32 dead 
132 injured 
October Arunachal 
Pradesh 
Suspension footbridge collapses 
while people are crossing it 
30 dead 
January Kerala Stampede at Sabarimala Temple 100 dead 
January Kalapet Poisonous chlorine leak at 
chemical plant 
300 injured 
July Assam Bomb explosion causes train to 
derail; 200 meters of rail track 
destroyed 
100 injured 
July Mumbai Triple bomb explosions  31 dead 
137 injured 
September Delhi Bomb explosion at Delhi High 
Court 
13 dead 
76 injured 
November Haridwar Stampede at religious festival 20 dead 
50 injured 
December Rajasthan Hospital patients die for lack of 
care following doctors’ strike 
60 dead 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
136 The man-made disasters are categorized as major fires or explosions, aviation disasters, 
maritime disasters, rail and cableway disasters, collapses of buildings or bridges, and miscellaneous (such 
as terrorist acts, riots or stampedes) 
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Table 43 highlights half a dozen, highly publicized supply chain disruptions that 
happened in India over the past few years: 
Table 44: RECENT EXAMPLES OF INDIAN SUPPLY CHAIN DISRUPTIONS 
 
When Company or 
industry 
affected 
Nature of 
disruption 
Impact Underlying 
cause 
Source 
Nov. 
2008 
Entire nation November 
terrorist attack 
on several 
high-profile 
Mumbai 
targets. 
Loss of life 
(160+ fatalities), 
property 
damage, 
political 
repercussions 
Security risk: 
Conflict with 
Pakistan over 
Kashmir 
(terrorism 
threat) 
Procurement 
Intelligence 
Unit blog, (S. 
Khan, 2012) 
August, 
2010 
Transportation 
& logistics 
Two cargo 
ships collided 
outside 
Mumbai 
Oil spill; one 
ship capsized; 
200 containers 
lost; closure of 
two Mumbai 
ports for 2 
weeks; $4 billion 
in goods 
delayed 
Illegal 
communicatio
n errors (two 
ships were 
using different 
radio 
frequencies)  
www.Indiane
xpress.com, 
(Webb, 2012) 
 
July, 
2006 
Transportation  Seven train 
bombings over 
11 minutes  in 
Mumbai 
210 killed, 714 
injured, 
substantial 
damage to 
rolling stock, 
tracks and 
stations 
Attack by 
Islamist 
terrorists 
(Lashkar-e-
Qahhar) 
BBC News 
and 
Wikipedia 
2005, 
2006, 
2007 
Businesses and 
residents of 
Mumbai. 
Severe flooding 
in Mumbai 
Loss of life, 
property 
damage, severe 
delays, loss of 
power & phone 
Monsoon 
season, 
urbanization 
The Times of 
India 
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July, 
2012 
Businesses and 
transportation 
shut down for 
hours or days.  
The world's 
biggest power 
outage 
620 million 
people w/o 
electricity in 20 
of India's 28 
states.  
Growing 
demand for 
power; theft 
of power, 
insufficient 
infrastructure 
www.Huffing
tonpost.com 
 
 
Dec. 
1984 
Union Carbide 
lost unknown 
amounts, incl. 
$470 million 
settlement 
with Indian 
govt.  
History's worst 
industrial 
accident: 40 
tons of methyl 
isocyanate gas 
leaked from a 
pesticide plant 
in Bhopal 
3,800 people 
killed, 
thousands 
injured, lasting 
impact on 
Bhopal 
Poor 
maintenance, 
faulty 
equipment 
and 
procedures. 
www.ncbi.nl
m.nih.gov 
 
2010 - 
2012 
Logistics & 
transportation. 
Severe threat 
in Uttar 
Pradesh, 
Madhya 
Pradesh137, and 
around Delhi 
“India is 
becoming 
increasingly 
noted for large-
scale theft 
incidents, 
including truck 
hijackings and 
warehouse 
robberies” 
$13 million 
reported thefts 
of iron last 6 
months of 2010. 
Some violence.  
Opportunistic 
criminals, 
more high 
value freight 
and high 
commodities 
prices 
(Burges, 
2011, 2012) 
 
  
                                                          
137 Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh are two of the poorest states in India, with annual GDP 
per person of $666 and $849 respectively, compared to the national average of $1,329 (Economist, 
2012a). 
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APPENDIX D: SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO THE PROFILE QUESTIONS 
 
 
Distribution of respondents, by organizational membership: 
 Indo-American Chamber of Commerce (IACC)   13 30.2% 
 Bombay Chamber of Industry (BCI)    12 27.9% 
 Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals (CSCMP)   9 20.9% 
 Indian Merchant Chamber (IMC)      9 20.9% 
Distribution of respondents, by organizational level: 
 Managing Director, VP, General Manager, C-Level Executive 18 41.9% 
 Chair, owner, CEO, President       9 20.9% 
 Manager         6 14.0% 
 Director, Senior Manager       5 11.6% 
 Analyst, Specialist, Coordinator, Consultant     4   9.3% 
 Other          1   2.3% 
Distribution of respondents, by functional area (multiple responses allowed): 
 Supply chain management     25 58.1% 
 General management      24 55.8% 
 Sales and marketing management    11 25.6% 
 Human resources        6 14.0% 
 Other          6 14.0% 
 Production and manufacturing management     5 11.6% 
 Engineering and product development      5 11.6% 
 Financial management, accounting, IT      3   7.0% 
Distribution of respondents, by general sector: 
 Services, incl. education and government   16 37.2% 
 Durable goods       10 23.3% 
 Non-durable goods or consumables      8 18.6% 
 Capital goods (buildings, machines, heavy equipment, etc.)   7 16.3% 
 Natural resources        6 14.0% 
 
Distribution of respondents, by location of global headquarters: 
 India        33 76.7% 
 Abroad (USA, Australia, Germany and Qatar)   10 23.3% 
Distribution of respondents, by ownership: 
 Fully Indian       28 65.1% 
 Mixed, with majority foreign owned      6 14.0% 
 Fully foreign         5 11.6% 
 Mixed, with majority Indian owned      4   9.3% 
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Distribution of respondents, by company activity (multiple responses allowed): 
 Owns & operates own production and development facilities in India 27 62.8% 
 Sources from Indian companies      23 53.5% 
 Other or none of the above        6 14.0% 
 
Distribution of respondents, by business type (Indian National Industrial Classification 2008; 
multiple responses allowed): 
 Manufacturing        27 62.8% 
 Transportation and storage        9 20.9% 
 Agriculture, forestry or fishing        5 11.6% 
 Construction          5 11.6% 
 Information or communication, incl. software or IT services    4   9.3% 
 Electricity, gas, steam or air conditioning supply      3   7.0% 
 Wholesale or retail trade, repair of motor vehicles or motorcycles   3   7.0% 
 Professional, scientific or technical activities      3   7.0% 
 Education          3   7.0% 
 Mining or quarrying         2   4.7% 
 Human, health or social work activities       2   4.7% 
 Other service activities, incl. trade associations      2   4.7% 
 Water supply, sewerage, waste management or remediation activities   1   2.3% 
 Accommodation or food service activities      1   2.3% 
 Real estate activities         1   2.3% 
Distribution of respondents, by annual global sales, in US dollars: 
 Less than $1,000,000         9 20.9% 
 $1,000,000 - $10,000,000      14 32.6% 
 $10,000,000 - $100,000,000        7 16.3% 
 $100,000,000 - $1,000,000,000        3   7.0% 
 $1,000,000,000 - $10,000,000,000       1   2.3% 
 More than $10,000,000,000        6 14.0% 
 
Distribution of respondents, by functional activity done in India (multiple responses allowed): 
 Production or development, incl. goods or all kinds of services  31 72.1% 
 Marketing and Sales       22 51.2% 
 Sourcing        20 46.5% 
 Other           8 18.6% 
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Distribution of respondents, by category of goods or services sourced or produced in India 
(Reserve Bank of India and International Monetary Fund classification; multiple responses 
allowed): 
 Other manufactured goods      12 27.9% 
 Engineered goods, incl. transportation equipment, machinery  11 25.6% 
 Chemicals and related products, incl. pharmaceuticals, cosmetics   9 20.9% 
 Agricultural and allied products        6 14.0% 
 Transportation services (goods or passengers)      6 14.0% 
 Other business services, incl. accounting, law, consulting, R&D, storage   5 11.6% 
 Maintenance, repairs or manufacturing services      4   9.3% 
 Other products          4   9.3% 
 Petroleum products         3   7.0% 
 Electricity, gas or water supply        3   7.0% 
 Ores and minerals         2   4.7% 
 Telecommunications, computer or information services, incl. software   2   4.7% 
 Construction services, incl. architecture       2   4.7% 
 Personal, cultural or recreational services, incl. A/V, educational    2   4.7% 
 Government goods or services        2   4.7% 
 Textiles and textile products        1   2.3% 
 Handicrafts          1   2.3% 
 
Distribution of respondents, by the annual value of what is sourced, produced or developed in 
India: 
 Less than INR 10,00,000 (10 lakhs)       0   0.0% 
 INR 10,00,000 – 1,00,00,000 (10 lakhs to 1 crore)     6 14.0% 
 INR 1,00,00,000 – 10,00,00,000 (1 crore to 10 crores)   11 25.6% 
 INR 10,00,00,000 – 1,00,00,00,000 (10 crores to 100 crores)  10 23.3% 
 INR 1,00,00,00,000 – 10,00,00,00,000 (100 crores to 1,000 crores)   6 14.0% 
 More than INR 10,00,00,00,000 (1,000 crores)      7 16.3% 
Distribution of respondents, by number of persons directly employed in India: 
 None          1   2.3% 
 1 – 10          4   9.3% 
 11 – 100       14 32.6% 
 101 – 1,000       11 25.6% 
 1,001 – 10,000         8 18.6% 
 10,001 – 100,000        2   4.7% 
 More than 100,000        2   4.7% 
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Distribution of respondents, by which percentage of products or services sourced or produced in 
India is exported out of India: 
 100%          7 16.3% 
 75 – 99%         2   4.7% 
 50 – 74%         8 18.6% 
 25 – 49%         7 16.3% 
 1 – 24%        12 27.9% 
 0%          7 16.3% 
 
Distribution if respondents, by location of their major Indian suppliers and/or major Indian 
production facilities (multiple answers possible): 
 Central India         8 18.6% 
 East India         8 18.6% 
 North India       20 46.5% 
 North-East India        2   4.7% 
 South India       22 51.2% 
 West India       35 81.4% 
 
Distribution of respondents, by how many years they have sourced or operated in India: 
 Less than 3 years        6 14.0% 
 3 – 10 years         6 14.0% 
 10 – 20 years         8 18.6% 
 More than 20 years      22 51.2% 
 Don’t know         1   2.3% 
 
 
